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ABSTRACT 
TLMOTHY N E I L W I L L I A M S 
T H E L O C A T I O N AND R E S T R U C T U R I N G O F T H E U K D E F E N C E LNDUSTRY; 
T H E C A S E O F T H E S O U T H W E S T 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the factors influencing the 
location of the defence industry in the UK and assess the impact of recent 
changes at the regional level. Such changes include cuts in defence 
expenditure and a re-evaluation of the methods of military procurement. 
The thesis begins with a descriptive analysis of defence markets and an 
explanation of the way in which the post-war UK defence sector has been 
supported by a relatively large and stable defence equipment budget. A 
review of the relevant literature suggests that defence markets are 
characterised by a number of unique features. The defence literature 
suggests that only limited data exist which describe the Defence Industrial 
Base (D.I.B.). However, it appears clear that the majority of defence 
suppliers are concentrated in the South of the UK. Possible theoretical 
explanations for this spatial distribution are analysed together with economic 
explanations for defence industrial agglomerations. 
The thesis then describes the methodology used to generate new data 
concerning defence companies based in the South West of England. The 
methodology comprised a postal questionnaire and telephone interviews 
with defence company managers. The survey results give rise to a number of 
important conclusions. Firstly, the defence sector remains less competitive 
than civilian manufacturing even though the majority of defence firms have 
significant levels of non-defence turnover. Secondly, restructuring is having 
distinct effects on the defence industrial base including substantial 
employment loss. However, medium sized defence firms appear to have 
been more successfijl in their response to the restructuring of the sector. The 
evidence from case studies demonstrate that growth firms appear to rely 
upon flexible production structures or niches associated with size. Finally, a 
model of inter-defence firm linkages suggests that firms v^th higher levels of 
defence Uimover were more likely to have local inputs, local customers and 
local competitors than firms with lower levels of defence sales. Overall, the 
thesis confirms the view that the defence industry is a special case and is 
characterised by a distinct spatial form. 
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Introduction 
During the 1980s and 1990s academics have become increasingly interested in examining 
the impact of major changes in the industrial environment (Piore & Sable, 1984; Massey, 
1984; Fothergill & Guy, 1990). Recent research has frequently analysed the pressures 
arising from the intemationalisation of business which has encouraged new organisational 
methods of production and changing patterns of sectoral dominance. However, Smith 
(1989), has argued that the defence sector in the UK has been partly excluded from 
mainstream commerce and this may have allowed the sector to resist some of the changes 
taking place in the global economy. Nevertheless, the defence industry in the U K is now 
facing a period of restructuring in response to dramatic changes to the military environment 
and a re-evaluation of the methods of military procurement. The loss of defence related 
employment associated with the recent restructuring is particularly important in a regional 
context as some parts of the UK rely heavily on jobs created by defence expenditure. 
The official data available to describe the distribution of defence related employment in the 
UK are limited. Moreover, alternative methodologies rely on estimates and proxies because 
of the difficulties in identifying firms with defence business and associated employment. 
These limitations also restrict information describing the nature of the supply chain in the 
defence industry. It is, therefore, difficult to assess the precise regional economic effects of 
the recent period of restructuring. 
This thesis attempts to alleviate some of these problems by obtaining new data. In 
particular, information is sought which describes the spatial organisation of the sector. The 
determinants of location and linkages patterns between defence companies are thus the 
principal subjects of the research. The effects of defence industrial restructuring on location 
are also central to the investigation which is organised as in Figure 1.1. Chapters two, three 
and four are largely concerned v^th analysing the relevant theories and empirical literature. 
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Chapter two provides an analysis of the main features of defence markets. It considers 
demand, supply and the methods of price determination, thus, illustrating the nature of the 
defence sector. Chapter three considers theories of regional economic grov^h, industrial 
location and the historical development of the defence industry. These theories are 
considered in turn as potential explanations for the spatial organisation of the sector. 
Finally, chapter four reviews the South West economy comparing the role of the defence 
sector in the region with the rest of the UK and reviev^ng locally-based defence studies. 
Collectively, the literature surveys reveal the special characteristics of the UK defence 
industry and highlight the need for further empirical analysis of the sector. 
Chapter five describes the research methodology which primarily involved a postal 
questionnaire survey of defence companies in the South West, The strengths and 
weaknesses of the technique are detailed in this section. In addition, the results of the 
analysis are presented with appropriate statistical tests. Finally, a number of initial 
conclusions are drawn to establish further direction for the thesis. Chapter six considers 
more sophisticated modelling techniques and presents the results and conclusions from 
these tests. 
Chapter seven describes the second stage of the research process which comprised a 
number of in-depth telephone interviews with defence company managers. The purpose of 
this section was to gain possible explanations for the relationships identified in earlier 
sections of the thesis. Finally, chapter eight draws together final conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
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2 
The UK Defence Industrial Base: Market Conditions. 
Economic Effects and Regional Distribution, 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter establishes the context and motivation for this thesis. I t begins by examining 
the distinctive economic characteristics of the UK defence market, including the role of the 
state, the structure of the supply side of the market and the nature of the procurement 
process. The dramatic changes which have occurred in the industry since the early 1980s 
are also examined. This is followed by an analysis of the strategic importance of the defence 
industrial base to the UK economy. In general, the introductory sections aim to show that 
the defence industry is an interesting subject of study given its unique characteristics, 
topicality and economic and strategic relevance. 
After considering the national context, the remainder of this chapter examines the regional 
distribution of the defence sector in the UK. A brief critical survey of ofiBcial statistics and 
other data sources which provide information at a standard regional level is presented. The 
severe limitations of existing data are emphasised. However, despite these limitations, the 
uneven regional distribution of the defence mdustry seems well established and ensures that 
a study of the industry is of considerable relevance to regional economists and geographers. 
2.1 The Economic characteristics of Defence Markets 
2.11 Demand 
The size of the defence budget in the UK has been, and still is, a contentious issue. Indeed, 
there are wide ranging views as to how much a country like the UK should spend on its 
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military capabilities. Until relatively recently, defence spending repeatedly absorbed up to as 
much as 5% of GDP. Moreover, despite recent falls, defence spending is currently the 
fourth largest public spending category and in 1994-95 cost the taxpayer over £22.78. 
Many argue that this high level of spending has denied public fimds and investment to other 
areas of the economy (Barker et al, 1991, Chalmers, 1985). However, the impact of 
defence spending on economic growth remains a hotly debated issue (De Grasse, 1982; 
Sandler & Hartley, 1995). 
One of the distinguishing features of the defence industry is that, historically, the state has 
been the controller of the defences of the realm. Thus, there is a single domestic buyer for 
defence goods in the form of the MoD. Moreover, the MoD has played a significant role in 
regulating the defence industry through a variety o f devices including the contracting 
procedure, control of research and development funding and direct state ownership of 
major contractors. It is often argued that these specific institutional structures have been 
ftjndamental in ensuring that the defence industrial base is distinctive fi'om other forms of 
commerce. Lovering (1993), for example, lists a number of studies which describe the 
unconventional nature of the UK defence industrial base (DIB). Indeed, the 
"military-industrial-complex" has come to be a widely accepted term used to portray the 
special form of production which characterises the DIB. 
Following a series of changes since the late mid-1980s regulation is now less direct and has 
weakened somewhat. The MoD is increasingly acting as a consumer, divesting ownership 
to the private sector, buying weapons on the basis of value for money, and letting market 
forces shape industrial structure (Smith R. 1989). This contrasts to the position of defence 
departments in many other countries where the state still takes a more direct position in 
controlling the industry. For instance, in France, ownership o f the industry has been 
preserved as a role for the state until much more recently than in the U K (Smith R. 1989). 
The monopsony of the MoD is partly diluted by the export potential of some defence 
products. Although it is difficult to estimate the true value of UK defence exports, those 
products which are identifiable as such were worth almost £3 billion in 1993 (UK Defence 
Statistics 1995). This represented a decline fi"om a peak of £4.5B in 1990 as a consequence 
16 
of the world recession and reduced international tension. Moreover, international arms 
transactions are restricted for two logical reasons. Firstly, the UK government in common 
with other governments and International Agencies, monitors the traffic of defence related 
products to prevent strategic capabilities falling into enemy hands. Secondly, the preference 
of many ministries of defence for domestically produced equipment has further limited the 
exchange of arms between countries. For example, in the UK, defence equipment imports 
were worth just over £1.1B in 1993 (UK Defence Statistics 1995). The bulk of these 
imports included missiles and aerospace equipment acquired from NATO members. Thus, 
in general the UK has traditionally imported only technologically advanced goods which it 
has been industrially incapable of securing from domestic producers (Smith, 1990). 
Thus, the size of the defence market is mainly determined by the size of government 
expenditure allocated for defence purposes. Indeed, Smith R. (1989), estimated that the 
MoD accounted for 80% of equipment demand in 1984. Today, exports probably make up 
a larger proportion of defence demand. Yet, it is virtually impossible to be confident of the 
size of this ratio given the limitations of export data. Table 2.1 for instance, suggests that 
since the late 1980s the export ratio has been variable but considerably higher than 20%. 
Table 2.1 U K Defence Equipment Expenditure and Exports (£B) 
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 
Defence expenditure' 7.1 7.3 7.5 8.1 7.4 7.4 
Defence exports^  3.7 4 4.5 3.5 3.1 3 
raiio'^ ' 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 
'expenditure on defence equipment 
' data for exports taken for first year quoted by column 
source: UK Defence Statistics 1995 
In real terms, defence spending has grov^m more or less consistently since the late 1950s. 
This relatively stable pattern of demand may have diminished the risk faced by many 
defence manufacturers compared to enterprises selhng in other markets which may have 
been subject to the more cyclical aspects of commerce. Dunne (1993), for example, 
demonstrates that the defence industrial base was hit less hard by the recession o f 1979-81 
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than a sample of similar sized non-defence enterprises. Nonetheless, this trend in equipment 
spending obscures some prominent variation both nationally and regionally because of 
expensive individual procurement projects (Smith, 1990; Law, 1983). Furthermore, over 
time, there have also been major changes in defence expenditure to confront the rise and 
fall of perceived threats. Indeed, some writers have argued that the defence sector exhibits 
a unique wave-cycle demand pattern related to the degree of international tension rather 
than the business cycle (Higham, 1968; Todd, 1988). In spite of this, in general, there has 
been little volatility in expenditure on an annual basis during peace-time. This stability in 
demand has probably extended the viability of the defence industry throughout much of the 
post-war period. However, it is also true that the limited numbers of buyers in the defence 
market has probably limited its expansion relative to other commercial markets (Levering, 
1993). 
The consistent growth of defence spending in real terms masks the fact that the demand for 
defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP has followed a general dov^ward trend since 
1945. Moreover, prices for defence goods have grown faster than the general price level in 
the UK. Thus, even in the wake of World War 2, the UK recognised that the rising costs of 
security meant that it was unable to participate independently in world affairs. Indeed, 
Baylis (1986), argues that the increasing threat of the Soviet Union coupled with the 
escalating costs of defence forced Britain to enter into collective security arrangements 
dominated by the USA. These were not just defensive alignments but also involved 
industrial co-ordination. Even today, Britain remains interested in securing access to US 
technology through off-the-shelf purchases and collaborative projects with US partners 
(Taylor, 1994). However, these programmes may not be productively rewarding due to 
transatlantic intransigence and protectionism. In fact, the demand for increasingly 
sophisticated weaponry has meant that UK defence industrial collaboration is now 
increasingly linked to European joint ventures in an attempt to overcome high technical 
costs. 
Considerable pressure has always existed to curtail the size of the burgeoning UK defence 
budget. During the Cold War, Britain tended to spend more o f GDP on defence than its 
major European Allies in spite of defence cost inflation. The first phase of the post-World 
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War 2 era is notable for the massive rise in military spending to deal with the Korean crisis 
which pushed the level of defence expenditure to over 9% of GDP. However, this was the 
highest point in the post-war time-path, and defence spending as a percentage of GDP has 
fallen slowly and fairiy continuously since this peak, although the actual decline of the 
defence budget has not been smooth. Baylis (1986), describes how conflicting objectives of 
military strategy and economic reality have interacted to control the pattern of defence 
spending. His account suggests a recurring pattern as one military role was sacrificed after 
another. However, world events consistently interfered to slow the decline and even top 
brass protestations and resignations have not stemmed the inevitable surrender of many 
traditional British roles. 
Thus, the dominant forces shaping post-war defence policy were "cash, costs and 
commitments" (Smith, 1985). Indeed, there have been a number of major defence 
expenditure reviews since 1957. However, many studies argue that the defence expenditure 
reforms up to 1981 were nominal and played little part in shaping actual defence policy 
(Smith, 1990; Dunne, 1993). In the 1980s there was a noticeable rise in expenditure which 
was implemented to meet the commitment set by NATO of a 3% annual grov^h rate in 
military spending. However, this was the last significant growth phase and defence 
spending has since fallen rapidly and now represents less than 4% of GDP. This final phase 
began with the end of the NATO spending commitment in 1984-85. In addition, the 
Conservatives' tight monetary stance motivated restrained spending policies, and defence 
expenditure became a prime target for cuts. The defence budget fell by 10% in real terms 
between 1984-85 and 1988-89, and by 1990 the share of national income devoted to 
defence was at its lowest level since the 1930s. The "Options for Change" defence review 
anticipated additional reductions in the defence budget so that it would remain at less that 
3 .5% of GDP. Although the Gulf War actually highlighted some military weaknesses and 
lobbyists gained ground for restrictmg the cuts, the overall impact of the war was not 
noticeable (Dunne, 1993). 
The recent recession and the large size of the budget deficit have also contributed towards 
further reducing government defence expenditure. The 1994 "Front Line First Review" has 
proposed a continuation of the trend of reducing the defence budget by cutting 17,800 
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military related jobs. However, additional funds have also been cdlocated to an equipment 
strategy which will rely on increasing the technical nature of Britain's weaponry. It is 
estimated that these additional funds will secure 10,000 jobs in the DIB. 
Another considerable influence on the level of defence expenditure has been the 
competitive effects of new contracting procedures. The savings from competitive tendering 
may give the impression of additional cuts in the defence budget, yet they actually represent 
efficiency gains in the cost of weapons procurement. However, the NAO (1994a), 
concedes that it is difficult to quantify the benefits of competition. Thus, it is difficult to 
make conclusions about changes in the growth of defence demand when the effects of 
competition cannot be quantified or isolated. 
2.12 Supply 
An important feature of the UK defence market is that it is oligopolistic and dominated by a 
few large firms. Table 2.2 shows the pinnacle of this hierarchy although it omits the details 
of many smaller specialist firms and sub-contractors (Smith R. 1989). U K defence industrial 
capacity is heterogeneous and it includes firms from the aerospace, electronics, engineering, 
ordnance, ship-building and vehicle sectors. Many of these firms are monopolies in their 
specialist market niches. Indeed, Smith and Smith (1992), argue that the traditional market 
structure, certainly in the UK and in France, for major types of defence systems is one of 
national monopoly. Moreover, Hartley (1985), asserts that as a result of government 
commitments to maintain a domestic arms industry national suppliers are protected from 
the rivalry of other domestic or foreign firms. Thus, the market power of such firms is only 
challenged when defence equipment is imported from abroad or when contracting 
procedures are used which actively restrain the cost of a project. 
Even with the recent introduction of competitive contracts, the high level of fixed costs in 
the major defence markets are likely to retain and re'mforce industrial concentration. The 
introduction of competition may be more successful in less specialised markets where there 
are low barriers to entry and products are similar to civilian goods. However, Smith 
R.(1989), notes that once contracts have actually been awarded to defence firms they are 
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often in a position of monopoly. This is particularly important as many contracts are subject 
to frequent renegotiation of product specification as technology and military needs change. 
That said, this may be the case in civilian markets too. Yet, in defence, it has been cu*gued 
that cost uncertainty and long lead times have made it necessary to exclude firms from 
competition to enable them to risk the required investment. 
Table 2.2 Contractors paid £5M or more by MoD in 1994-95 
Contract size No. Arms 
>£250M 7 
£100-£250M 10 
£50-£iOOM 12 
£25-£50M 27 
£10-£25M 56 
£5-£10M 74 
note: the table also includes a number of construction and service suppliers, 
source: UK Defence Statistics, 1995 
It is the specialised nature of many defence products which contributes to the industry's 
high fixed costs. In particular, Smith R.(1989), estimates that fixed costs are high because 
of R&D costs which may constitute more than one quarter of total costs in the UK. For 
example, in 1992, 42.6% of all UK R&D expenditure was allocated to defence research 
(CSO, August 1992). Moreover, as demand is often restricted to the domestic market, 
production runs can be short. Thus, only i f export sales can be used to spread the cost of 
production will costs tend to reflect marginal rather than average vaJues. Indeed, it has been 
argued that vnih trade liberalisation of the arms market a nation might make cost savings of 
25-30% (Hartley, 1985; 1987). Such a saving would have to be ofiFset against the loss of 
control that the MoD is able to exert over domestic UK producers. In fact, this may have 
been the major reason for limits on the entry of new firms into the defence industry. Those 
firms which are capable of producing the required goods are those which can give 
guarantees of delivery of the right product, and are considered reliable in preserving 
National Security. Moreover, new entrants are thus further discouraged by the policies of 
national governments who wish to purchase their defence goods from domestic suppliers. 
21 
Inevitably, these types of policy have evolved to ensure that countries are defensively 
self-sufficient and are not reliant on supply lines which could be severed at a time of crisis. 
This preserves the status of large oligopolistic firms in segmented domestic markets. 
However, the spiralling development costs of new weaponry systems have fostered an 
increasing number of joint ventures between countries. Certainly, cost escalation has been a 
major issue in defence economics. Indeed, defence prices as measured in the National 
Accounts, tend to rise about 2% p.a. faster than the general rate of inflation (Smith, 1985). 
However, Smith also makes a number of qualifications in the light of this statement. Firstly, 
defence does not suffer any more inflation than the rest of central government consumption 
which itself runs ahead of the retail price index. Secondly, forecasting errors on large 
equipment programmes may give the impression that costs are spirzdling out of control, 
when in truth, original estimates for contracts may have been unrealistic. Finally, no 
allowance is made for productivity grov^h or quality changes which may run hand-in-hand 
with price rises. 
This last point is perhaps the most significant because the growang technical content of 
weaponry has undeniably raised the price of defence equipment. Nevertheless, presumably 
the increased accuracy and eflfectiveness of new technology make it possible to maintain a 
smaller arsenal. At the same time, technical innovation by potential enemies has raised the 
pressure on Western military scientists to continue to innovate. Indeed, the Cold War arms 
race was not only about stock-piling huge quantities of military hardware and ammunition, 
but it was a race to create an advantage through technical superiority. Indeed, 
"...Engineers these days refer to military aircraft, warships, or armoured vehicles as mere 
'platforms'. No matter how tough, fast or agile, the vehicle is a box whose job is to carry 
the electronic components that do the real work," (Economist, 3 .9.1994). 
This is ftirther supported by the MoD's own analysis of its procurement expenditure which 
describes the development of the sector as a conversion of the "military industrial complex" 
to a "military high-technology complex" (Breheny, 1988). Thus, the Cold War arms race 
had the effect of removing the upper constraints on military equipment budgets, and it was 
responsible for the growth in military R&D spending. This guaranteed the existing club of 
22 
defence suppliers a continuous stream of new defence projects to work on, and the lack of 
competitive conditions in the industry also insulated their privileged positions. In fact, 
under some contracts firms were actually guaranteed a profit margin before they even 
commenced production. 
In addition, these changes to the cost and quality of weapons precipitated the restructuring 
of the armed forces. For instance, a coherent response was to substitute the manpower of 
the forces with new military hardware. Official data show that front line manpower of UK 
regular based service personnel has fallen continuously over the last two decades, whilst 
defence production expenditure has generally increased (UK Defence Statistics, 1993). 
However, this change may be the result of many influences and it is not just a reflection of 
the substitution of labour by capital. 
As defence spending became more capital and less labour intensive in the front line, it may 
have created more employment in the DIB. Most typically these workers have included 
large numbers of professional engineers, scientists, and technologists (PESTs). For 
example, Lovering, (1991a), compares estimates for the levels of PESTs employed in 
defence dependent sectors against other engineering sectors of the UK. The evidence 
strongly suggests that PEST employment is well-established in defence orientated sectors. 
Kaldor et al (1986), have estimated that 35% of all UK qualified scientists and engineers 
were employed in defence work. Indeed, the high level of MoD demand for this type of 
labour might have inflated the salaries of these employees, thus crowding out these skills 
from other industrial sectors. 
However, the decHne in the defence budget in recent years has led directly to a decline in 
defence related jobs. Official estimates suggest that between 1980-81 and 1993-94, 
345,000 jobs were lost in the industries which supply the MoD (Defence Statistics, 1995). 
For instance, table 2.3 shows the decline in the number of defence industrial jobs 
dis-aggregated into equipment and non-equipment related employment. Thus, the number 
of directly created jobs which are specifically dependent on equipment expenditure are 
estimated to have declined by 125,000. Furthermore, indirect employment from equipment 
expenditure is also estimated to have fallen by 85,000 over the same period. Finally, despite 
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rises in the value of UK defence equipment exports throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
defence export related employment has also fallen by 70,000. The table also shows falls in 
employment related to non-equipment purchases (for example, food). 
Table 2.3 Changes in U K Defence Employment 1980-81 to 1993-94 
1980-81 1993-94 
employment based on equipment expenditure 230,000 105,000 
indirea emplo>Tneni from above 190,000 105,000 
export related employment 140,000 80,000 
non-equipmeni related emplo>Tnent 180.000 110,000 
Total emplo\*mem based on defence spending 740,000 395,000 
note: totals subject to rounding not supplied by source 
source: UK Defence Statistics 1995 
Another outcome of the recent changes in the defence environment was a shift in the 
ownership of the DIB. Before 1979, government policy was to encourage concentration as 
monopolies created economies of scale and large firms were better competitors in world 
markets. For example, British Aerospace was created by contracts which forced its internal 
divisions to merge. Rolls Royce was nationalised after it had gone into receivership. Of the 
major contractors only GEC was a private supplier, and the five other largest suppliers 
were all managed by the state. However, the effects of equipment cost increases combined 
with the Conservative's fi-ee market economic philosophy resulted in the introduction of 
new competitive conditions. Thus, by 1989, all major contractors were in the hands of 
private owners; the Royal Dockyards were under agency management, and the MoD 
research establishments were converted to agency status. BAe and Rolls Royce were sold 
as independent firms, BS warship yards were sold oft* separately; the Royal Ordnance 
Factories were sold to Vickers and BAe, and Shorts' went to Bombardier of Canada. In 
many cases, the new policy transferred defence industrial firms fi*om the public sector to 
positions of private monopoly or oligopoly. 
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2.13 Price determination 
Generally, prices in the defence industry have been determined by direct negotiation 
between the MoD and domestic firms. Traditionally, this was done by one of three 
contracting procedures (Kennedy, 1983). First, "fixed price contracts" which predetermined 
the price of work before it was carried out were probably the most cost-effective method. 
They placed some pressure on the producer to minimise costs. Thus, in part, the price level 
was determined by the cost structure that the firm faced and contracts were awarded to the 
firm promising the required quality at the lowest price. Therefore, this type of contract was 
most suitable for standardised products and more difficult to negotiate where there were 
unknown development costs. 
By contrast, "price to be agreed contracts" were more flexible arrangements which allowed 
a firm to begin work on a project almost immediately. As negotiation processes can be 
lengthy this permited a valuable time saving and once some preliminary work had been 
undenaken provided information for the negotiation process itself. Hence, this method of 
contracting did not encourage competition between firms and potentially placed an 
open-ended commitment upon the MoD. 
The final system involved "cost-plus contracts" in which the MoD reimbursed the 
contractor for all of his costs incurred, and payed an additional amount, either as a 
percentage of the total costs or as a fixed sum. Arguably, this was appropriate for new 
defence products where the final version was the result of repeated testing and 
development by the end-user and therefore costs were inherently uncertain. However, 
under this system there is no restraint on costs and so this was potentially the least 
cost-effective of all the contracting procedures. At its worst, this system represented the 
provision of subsidies to ineflScient producers, but the MoD has traditionally argued that 
such contracts were necessary where cost structures were indeterminate over time. 
In addition to the traditional contracting procedures, the nature of defence markets also has 
specific effects on price determination. For example, firstly, in the context of public choice 
theory, government policies have tended to favour producers more than consumers 
25 
(Sandler and Hartley, 1995). Indeed, this can be seen as an principal-agent issue because 
there is a divergence in the goals of defence manufacturers and the consumer. The former 
group have enjoyed the benefits of a largely unchecked rise in defence expenditure at the 
expense of the taxpayer who cannot effectively police the level of defence costs. 
Secondly, there are transactions costs associated with contracts because of informational 
uncertainties. These arise because of adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection 
occurs when more risky actors purchase greater insurance cover because they are aware of 
their high risk status. Sandler and Hartley (1995), argue that adverse selection exists in 
defence contracting because the government doesn't know a contractor's expected costs. 
Thus, contractors are more likely to overstate their future cost levels to reduce the risk that 
they face. 
Moral hazard is where one party in a contract behaves in a more risky manner because they 
know that a contract exists which will compensate this behaviour. This may arise in defence 
procurement contracts because the government cannot police a contractor's effbas to 
restrain project costs. For example, firms which are liable for only a small proportion of 
cost overruns have a weaker economic incentive to minimise costs. Thus, knowing that a 
project can cost up to a certain threshold encourages contractors to cost maximise up to 
that limit. 
The price determination methods of the UK defence industry clearly often lack the 
competitive effects that would arise from the existence of many buyers and sellers. 
However, this does not mean that all defence markets are completely uncompetitive. 
Efficiency may promoted by contestibility (the threat of rivalry) (Baumol, 1982). Moreover, 
some goods and services are sold to the MoD which are also available in civilian markets. 
For example, markets for food, clothing, fuel, construction, transport and other like 
services are produced by firms operating in competitive civilian markets and this may help 
to promote value for money. However, in these markets the MoD regularly issues sizeable 
contracts where values are often greater than £5M and the presence of a substantial buyer 
may meddle with the competitive operations of these markets. 
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Value for money has become an increasingly important issue for MoD equipment purchases 
in recent years particularly due to economic weaknesses and spiralling weapons costs. 
Thus, as a response the MoD has sought to increase the use of competitive tendering, to 
avoid the reliance on cost-plus contracts, and tie rewards more closely to performance. In 
addition, the structure of the MoD Procurement Executive has been reformed and the MoD 
has attempted to take a more hands-off approach to its suppliers and draw them from a 
much wider range of firms (SDE, 1987). 
Contracts are now classified into five types depending on the price formula involved. These 
include elements of competition, references to market forces, cost estimation periods, 
actual costs including incentives to minimise costs and actual costs plus a percentage fee. 
The first two categories of contract represent the most competitive systems. Together the 
value of contracts in these categories has generally risen since the early 1980s and in 
1994-95 they represented 69% of all MoD contracts placed (UK Defence Statistics, 1995). 
However, the value of these contracts has displayed a high degree of volatility. In the 
mid-1980s, this can be attributed to spending on very large projects such as the Trident or 
Eurofighter 2000 (Smith, 1990). Moreover, the official explanation for the early-1990s 
volatility was the placement of the Challenger 2 and EH 101 contracts. There has been a 
substantial fall in the number of contracts awarded on a cost-plus basis. In 1980-81, these 
contacts made up 22% of MoD contacts by value, but by 1990-91 they only constituted 1% 
of all spending. Moreover, they have remained at this level throughout the 1990s. Thus, the 
overall picture shows that competitive contracting has become a significant part of the 
MoD's approach to purchasing. 
In overall terms, early MoD estimates suggest that savings of up to 30% have been made 
by the new tendering systems (SDE, 1987). Furthermore, the NAO estimates that 
competition has reduced the costs of procurement by as much as £1B per year, and this has 
enabled exporters to win orders of over £6B (NAO, 1994a). However, the 1993 Major 
Projects Report describes a significant number of cost overruns in weapons procurement 
(NAO, 1994b). Moreover, a recent study by Schofield (1995), argues that, 
"It is difficult to accept the MoD's case that its competition policy has led to the savings 
claimed under the Levene reforms" 
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Indeed, Schofield argues that between 1986-91 costs have only been contained because of 
reduced orders, delaying contracts or even complete cancellation. However, other 
commentators are not so critical. Sandler and Hartley (1995), note that there are very few 
empirical studies of the impact of competition in the UK. Nevertheless, they document 
price saving estimates of between 10-70% fi-om a range of studies. Moreover, they believe 
that the industry is now demonstrating a reduced level of concentration and a higher level 
of competition. 
It is also important to note that there are costs involved in the system of competitive 
tendering including the extra time and effort in evaluating alternative proposals. In addition, 
firms also have to spend time and money when preparing bids for contracts. Moreover, 
competition may be characterised by increasing disputes with contractors i f lower limits are 
imposed on contracts where costs are indeterminate. Thus, established long-term 
military-industrial relationships may be disrupted. Smith R. (1989), argues that whilst 
obtaining value for money in equipment purchasing is one of the most important objectives 
of the MoD the issue is not just one of lowest procurement price, but also involves 
performance, reliability, life cycle-costs, security of supply and a range of other factors. 
Clearly, there is a danger that these qualitative factors may be sacrificed in the drive to 
lower cost. Sandler and Hartley (1995), describe other complexities which exist such as the 
uncertainty of buyer requirements, informational gaps and asymmetries. Where firms 
produce multiple products it becomes especially difficult to measure the costs associated 
wath individual projects. Moreover, when regulation procedures are implemented to 
overcome the above, they may be intricate and therefore costly in themselves. 
In analysing the conflicting objectives of value for money and the spin-off effects to the 
wider economy of defence spending. Smith R. (1989), concludes that defence procurement 
is difficult enough without adding wider economic considerations which further complicate 
the decision process. He also illustrates the point with a number of examples which show 
that attempts to place industrial policy above military considerations have been costly 
disasters, the most notorious of these being the Nimrod AEW aircraft. Others include the 
Chevaline front end of the Polaris missile, and the A L A R M missile. The increasing 
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emphasis on competition that the MoD favours further illustrates that military objectives 
should take precedent over industrial policy. That is to say that contracts are not awarded 
for social reasons but are given to firms who are best able to supply the needs of the MoD. 
In conclusion, the increase in competitive contracting may have led to the production of 
defence equipment at a lower cost. However, it may be too early to empirically assess the 
effects of the new contracting systems because of the long term nature of many defence 
projects. Moreover, as Schofield (1995), notes there are severe data limitations which limit 
the ability of researchers to conduct comprehensive studies. Nevertheless, the MoD claims 
that increased incentives have increased investment by arms contractors and reduced prices. 
In addition export performance has been improved and the supplier base has been widened 
(SDE, 1987). In the long run, these gains have to be ofiTset against problems that may arise 
from the transfer of risk from the MoD to the supplier firm and other costs of competition. 
In addition, the long-term effects of spiralling development costs may ultimately result in 
cutting comers when cost controls are imposed on a project. A potential penalty o f cost 
reduction may therefore be a fall in defence industrial quality. 
2.2 The Defence Industrial Base (DIB) and its effects on the economy 
Hartley et al (1987), suggest a number of explanations involving both strategic and 
economic issues for providing a DIB in the UK. Firstly, it is argued that national 
independence is promoted by maintaining a domestic DIB. However, many foreign 
companies already supply the UK with arms and, indeed, there is no clear definition of a 
foreign company. For example, it is not clear whether the important issue is the source of 
the design, the ownership of the firm, or the location of production. In fact, in the case of 
strategic nuclear weapons the UK is irreversibly dependent on the USA, a situation which 
is determined primarily by costs. The economic reality is that although the UK might like to 
be fully independent in its capacity to supply its defensive needs, it is unable to afford to do 
so. 
Secondly, it is assumed that a country with a DIB is in a better position to remain informed 
about the arms market. This is termed the "leverage eflfect" (Hartley et a!, 1987). It is 
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suggested that the capacity to produce domestic defence equipment enables a country to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of foreign supplied substitutes. Whilst this may be true, a 
cheaper alternative may be to establish an R&D centre for such purchasing decisions. 
Moreover, the increasingly competitive nature of the world arms export markets may also 
encourage better value for consumers. 
Thirdly, a defence industrial capability might be regarded as an insurance scheme for the 
future. For example, i f the capacity of the DIB is diminished then this sacrifices skills and 
factors of production which cannot be resurrected without incurring substantial costs. 
Indeed, it is often suggested that the defence industry is characterised by such specific 
skills. Thus, it may be difficult to switch resources from civilian to military manufacturing 
sectors should the need arise (Lovering, 1993). 
Fourthly, as many defence contracts are expensive long-run affairs they could be vulnerable 
to significant changes in economic conditions. Therefore, favouring domestic producers 
may have the advantage of reducing exchange rate risks associated with a foreign contract. 
In addition to the above arguments, some have argued that foreign supplied equipment is 
not tailored to the needs of British Forces. It is reputed that the requirements of U K forces 
are unique, but as Hartley et al (1987) point out, this is questionable. Perhaps the only 
strength to this argument is that US produced equipment is done so with the requirements 
of a global superpower in mind. Inevitably, this often makes such equipment overdeveloped 
and too expensive for European needs. 
Strategically, the maintenance of a DIB may be desirable because of the insecure nature of 
supply in the event of a conflict. For instance, there is the risk that shocks to the 
international environment such as changes in regimes, shortages, or embargoes will affect 
the availability of military equipment. However, there is little historical evidence for the 
success of deliberate supply disruptions. For example, neither the German U-boat campaign 
nor the Allied bombing of ball-bearing factories had the intended effects of destroying 
economic linkages (Hartley et al, 1987). 
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A final argument put forward for the existence of a DIB is that the it creates economic 
benefits. These may include job creation, forex savings and earnings, government finance 
and technological spin-offs. For example, the UK has large aerospace and electronics 
industries which are geared towards supplying the mihtary. These industries are thriving 
dynamic sectors engaged in high-tech production of essential military equipment, and are 
major exporters of manufactures. I f the prices of these companies match those of identical 
goods produced by foreign suppliers, it can be argued that the domestic products confer 
additional benefits to the UK. These advantages include tax streams and domestic 
employment (which generate multipliers and potentially negates unemployment benefit 
payments). However, the multipliers created by expenditure in other sectors such as 
education may be substantially higher (De Grasse, 1982). Thus the true economic cost or 
benefit of the DEB is difficult to estimate. 
Sandler and Hartley (1995), discuss a number of other distinctive economic effects of 
military spending. Often the effects are most relevant for less developed countries (LDCs) 
and may be less significant for the UK. For instance, positive benefits fi-om high defence 
spending may include counter-cyclical injections, technological spin-offs, social 
infrastructure provision and the economic benefits fi"om the stability o f security. However, 
negative effects of high defence spending could include crowding out of private and public 
investment; R&D diversion from the private sector; low spin-off potential from miUtary 
technology; balance of payments problems fi-om high-cost imports and tax burdens from 
inefficient bureaucracies associated with the military. 
It has been argued that high defence expenditure increases current security only at the cost 
of damaging the long-run economic base that provides the foundation for fijture security 
provision (Smith, 1990). Thus, in the post-war period Britain's high level of defence 
expenditure may have been a cause of its poor level of grovrth. Contrast this, to the 
generally higher levels of growth experienced in Germany and Japan where military 
capabilities have been restricted. Ironically, both these countries are now leaders in 
defence-intensive technologies such as electronics. Indeed, it is highly likely that military 
expenditure has depressed civilian investment by consuming half of UK public R&D 
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resources. Moreover the returns on UK defence R&D expenditures have been low and 
have little civilian spin-off potential (Maddock, 1983). 
In recent years, there has been a spate of interest in the net effects o f defence spending. 
Sandler and Hartley (1995), who review over 25 econometric studies believe that it is 
conventional wrisdom that heavy defence commitments hamper growth. They argue that 
often supply-side modelling techniques omit some of the negative effects of defence 
spending on growth. Thus, they favour demand-side models which consistently suggest that 
defence can crowd out investment, even i f the overall effect is small. They also conclude 
that re-allocations of defence spend'mg to civilian areas are unlikely to be a major pathway 
to growth. This is consistent with Smith's (1990), conclusion that: 
"...the difference in military expenditures between Japan and the UK accounts for a 
fraction of the difference in their growth rates, albeit an economically significant one" 
(Smith, 1990). 
2.3 The Regional Distribution of the Defence Industrial Base in the UK 
2.31 Identifying the Defence Industrial Base 
Initially, we have assumed that the DIB constitutes all producers who supply goods to the 
military. However, this definition would include suppliers who sell weapons through to 
those who sell food or cleaning services. Although these latter groups may be affected by 
recent sectoral restructuring they are also likely to be highly involved in commercial 
markets. Indeed, many of the firms who sell specialised defence products to the MoD may 
also sell part of their output in civilian markets. Thus, it is difiBcult to generate a simple 
definition of a defence industrial firm. One solution could be to base a definition on the 
level of sales to the MoD. However, many companies produce defence related output for 
other defence firms as well as for the MoD. Moreover, a definition based on defence 
turnover would ignore absolute values of defence production. Thus, for instance, a large 
conglomerate may only have 5% of turnover in defence markets, yet this work may be 
worth many millions of pounds. Alternatively, product nature could form the basis for a 
defence industrial definition. However, once again, products may have civil and defence 
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applications and such a definition would have to be flexible in its application. Traditionally, 
most analyses of defence industries have focused on suppliers of lethal and destructive 
equipment and suppliers of non-lethal equipment directly associated with military activity. 
This means that the role of the MoD in civilian markets has been partially ignored in 
empirical work (Taylor and Hayward, 1989; Commission of the European Communities, 
1992). 
The diverse nature of the defence industrial base is clearly one reason which explains why 
there is limited data available. Moreover, there is no defence category in the standard 
industrial classification and hence defence firms are distributed across a wide variety of 
industrial categories. In addition, the secret nature of information which relates to the 
defence industry may have historically played a part in restricting the supply of data. 
Despite these problems a number of sources attempt to describe the regional distribution of 
the DIB in the UK. These estimates include official data supplied by national statistical 
services, data supplied by the European Commission, and a range of national, regional and 
local academic studies. Each study reviews employment related to a number of types of 
defence production such as equipment and non-equipment. The extent and limitations of 
these sets are outlined below. Non-equipment employment is included here because 
although this is not a principal focus of this research the distribution of non-equipment 
producers is a significant component of many official sources which describe the DEB. 
Moreover, the distinction between equipment and non-equipment goods may be blurred 
(for example, defence medical supplies). Thus, some description o f the distribution of 
non-equipment production may be worthwhile. 
2.32 The UK Defence Statistics 
The principle source of regional information on defence employment is published annually 
by the MoD in UK Defence Statistics (formerly Statement on the Defence Estimates). 
However, regional data for indirect employment fi-om sub-contractors and employment 
which is associated with non-equipment spending or exports are not available. Note also, 
that the national and regional data do not include employment generated by the 
consumption expenditure of defence employees. However, these statistics do provide 
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estimates for the regional employment of service and civilian manpower employed by the 
MoD and estimates for employment dependent on defence equipment expenditure by 
standard region. 
Table 2.4 shows that, currently, the lion's share of direct defence equipment employment is 
contained in the South East (37%). The South West has the second highest proportion of 
defence employment, confirming the existence of the well documented North-South divide 
in defence expenditure. Outside of these two regions the North and North West regions 
contain significant levels of defence employment. Table 2.4 also shows that the 95,000 
defence jobs which were lost since 1985-86 were concentrated in a few regions and 
particularly in the South East where defence employment fell by 45,000 (47% of the 
reduction). This has reduced the South East's regional dominance and has heightened the 
importance of the South West region despite the net loss of 5,000 jobs in the region. The 
North Western region has also been severely affected by cuts in defence industrial 
employment losing almost 50% of its 1985-86 employment level. Scotland has also sufifered 
a considerable proportional reduction in defence employment. Thus, the recent cuts in 
defence expenditure are having a pronounced regional impact. 
In assessing the validity of these official statistics it is important to be aware of the 
problems of the methodology used to compile the statistics. Direct employment estimates 
are calculated on the basis of a breakdown of MoD expenditure by Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) categories derived from the data firom the main MoD billing computer. 
This is divided by a measure of sales per employee for each of the industries where defence 
is sufficiently large. The totals for indirect employment (i.e. those who supply the main 
contractors) are estimated by using a CSO input-output table which shows the extent to 
which the output of each industry depends on inputs from supplying industries. Once again, 
indirect employment totals are calculated by using sales per employee at each stage over 
the whole of the supply chain. This methodology is also used to produce the national 
employment estimates for other categories of defence spending. Basic data on 
non-equipment spending is taken from the MoD accounting system whilst the figures for 
defence exports are estimated from H M Customs and Excise tariflF headings and from 
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estimates provided by the Society of British Aerospace Companies. However, as has 
already been noted, no regional analysis of these categories is available. 
Table 2.4 UK Regional Direct Defence Equipment Employment 
1985-86 to 1993-94 (000s) 
1985-86 % 1988-89 % 1993-94 % 
U K 200 100 160 100 105 100 
England 167 85 140 87.5 93 89.5 
North 15 7.5 18 !0.5 11 11 
Yorks & Humberside 4 2 4 2.5 1 1 
East Midlands 8 4 6 3.5 3 3 
East Anglia 4 2 2 1.5 2 1.5 
South East 84 43 63 39.5 39 37 
South West 22 IJ 23 15 18 17.5 
West N4idlands 7 3.5 8 5 7 7 
North West 23 11.5 16 10 12 11.5 
Scotland 18 9 15 9.5 8 8 
Wales 3 1.5 2 1.5 1 1 
N. Ireland 8 4 3 2 1 I 
Note: estimates include only those working for contractors supplying equipment to the ;V/oD. 1986 is the 
first year that regional figures are available, 
source: Defence Statistics 1993, 1995 
In addition to limits in the scope of regional data there are many other problems associated 
with the ofificial methodology. Bishop & Gripaios (1995), for example, argue that it is 
questionable to assume that average sales per employee in defence firms will be identical to 
those which prevail in the industrial sector to which they belong. This may be the case 
because of the unique economic conditions which prevail in the DEB. For example, 
traditional cost-plus contracts may have created little pressure to limit the size of the 
workforce. Thus, sales per employee in the defence industry may be significantly different 
to non-defence industries. A counter argument to this is that some SIC codes are specific 
enough to identify pure defence industrial firms (for example, ordnance), although there are 
others such as shipbuilding and aerospace which are non-specific. 
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Inaccuracies in the data are also highlighted when information is available from other 
sources. Bishop & Gripaios (1995), for example, note that the figures for the South West 
must be under-estimated as more jobs were lost in the Devonport Dockyard between 1987 
and 1992 than were officially recorded as lost for the whole of the South West. It is 
suggested that the error may partially arise from a reversal of the traditional "head oflfice 
effect" as job losses in peripheral branch plants go unrecorded in the South West and are 
attributed to the South Eaist where many company headquarters are located. Furthermore, 
Nawaz (1994), suggests that falls m employment could partly be due to increasing 
productivity in manufacturing as a whole. Thus, increases in sales per head lower the 
estimate of employment according to the MoD methodology. Moreover, the reduction in 
employment dependent on MoD equipment expenditure has a knock on effect on 
employment which is indirectly created by sub-contracting. 
The UK Defence Statistics (1995) also chart regional direct employment data as a 
percentage of those who work in each region. These data emphasise the relatively high 
level of defence dependence of the South West and Northern Regions. However, this is a 
crude overview because it implies that Scotland, the North West and South East Regions 
have similar concentrations of defence dependence. This is misleading because defence 
dependence for example, in the North West may be more important because the economic 
base is smaller. Moreover, this presentation suggests that the maximum dependence in any 
UK region is 1.2%, implying that generally defence industrial employment is relatively 
insignificant. In contrast, a map with a higher resolution would be likely to show that 
defence is much more important in a number of localised areas. 
2.33 Nawaz Methodology 
The data contained in the UK Defence Statistics provides the basis for some more 
comprehensive estimates of the regional distribution of defence related employment. For 
example, Nawaz, (1994), has made estimates for equipment, non-equipment and export 
related employment for the standard regions. This method begins with the official data 
describing national employment dependent on direct equipment expenditure. These are 
converted into regional estimates as detailed in the previous section. These are then used to 
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generate other categories of defence related employment which are not disaggregated by 
region in the UK Defence Statistics. 
Estimates for indirect employment dependent on equipment expenditure are made by 
assuming that the distribution of these employees is identical to the estimates made for the 
directly employed workers (i.e. regions have the same ratios o f direct to indirect 
employment dependent on equipment expenditure). These ratios are therefore dictated by a 
similar regional distribution to that of table 2.4 although, Nawaz (1994), originally uses 
estimates for 1992-93. Thus, any region with a high measured direct defence employment 
concentration will immediately have this enhanced by the addition of indirect employment. 
Estimates for employment based on non-equipment expenditure are assumed to be 
dependent on the size of UK forces deployed in each region. This assumption is validated 
by Nawaz on the grounds that the more service personnel there are in a region the more 
expenditure will be needed to maintain those personnel. Nawaz admits that this might not 
take account of a bias towards London because the location costs of basing sta£f are likely 
to be higher. However, the main problem with this estimate is that this assumes that 
military bases have a high degree of control over their purchasing decisions and use this 
freedom to purchase goods locally. This may be a reasonable assumption in some cases but 
it is clear that many important purchases are made at a national level and that local 
autonomy is strictly limited. Thus, indirect employment is unlikely to be simply proportional 
to regional service employment. 
The final set of figures used in compiling the regional estimate are for exports. Export 
related defence employment data is weak because it does not identify the source region of 
the product and so does not indicate where the jobs are located. Nawaz argues that the 
regional pattern of export related employment is unlikely to reflect the distribution of 
equipment-related employment. Apparently this is because the largest category of defence 
exports are aerospace products which are only produced in a small number of locations. 
Indeed, estimates suggest that the aerospace industry may account for 75% of all UK 
defence exports. Therefore, Nawaz uses the spatial pattern of MoD regional equipment 
expenditure on aerospace products as a proxy for the distribution of export related defence 
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employment. Whilst this may correctly identify regions specialising in aerospace as 
providing export related employment it clearly does not take into account non-aerospace 
defence exports. This may also under-represent regions which specialise in the export of 
defence aerospace goods but have limited contracts with the MoD. Moreover, i f the 
aerospace industry has a different sales-employment ratio to other defence industries then 
this may introduce additional errors. Whatever the problems caused by these limitations this 
method suggests that 50% of export related employment is located in the South East, 20% 
in the South West and 8% in the North West. 
The comprehensive data for the regional distribution of defence industrial employment is 
presented in table 2.5. This verifies that the South East has the largest share of defence 
employment and that the South West region ranks second. Moreover, in percentage terms, 
the Nawaz estimates are virtually identical to official estimates of regional defence 
equipment related employment. In addition, there are no official estimates of the other 
categories of employment. Thus, no further discussion is required here. 
Table 2.5 UK Regional Defence Employment 1992-93 (000s) 
Region Direct 
equipment 
Indirect 
equipment 
non 
equipment 
export 
related 
total % 
North 15 13 14 13 I 1.1 0 0.5 30 7.1 
Yorks & Humbs 3 2 2 2 7 65 0 0.6 12 2.8 
EostNlids 4 3 3 3 6 5.4 1 1.2 14 3.3 
East Anglia 2 1.5 2 1.5 8 7.3 3 3.4 15 3.5 
South East 43 35.5 39 35.5 39 35.4 30 35.5 151 35.5 
South West 19 16 18 16 24 21.7 22 25.7 83 19.5 
West Nlids 8 6.5 7 6.5 3 3.1 3 3.2 21 4.9 
North West 14 12 13 12 I 1.3 18 21 46 10.8 
England 108 89.5 98 89.5 90 81.8 77 91.2 373 87.8 
Scotland 10 8 9 8 10 9.5 2 2 31 7.3 
Wales I 1 I I 3 2.5 1 1.2 6 1.4 
N. Ireland 2 1.5 2 1.5 7 6.1 5 5.6 16 3.8 
UK 120 100 110 100 110 100 85 100 425 100 
source: Nawaz (1994) 
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Nawaz (1994), also makes individual estimates for defence employment by UK county. 
This is a methodology designed specifically to overcome the discrepancy identified between 
the UK Defence Statistics and a study by the Commission of the European Communities 
(1992), (detailed later). Data for non-equipment and indirect employment are calculated by 
breaking-down data from NUTS U regions. Firstly, data from the 1991 Census of 
Employment are used to estimate each county's dependence on defence equipment 
industries by SIC code. Secondly, non-equipment expenditure is assumed to be distributed 
across counties according to the size of regular UK forces in each county. No calculations 
are made for export related employment. The results of this methodology show how 
changing the resolution of analysis alters the appearance of geographical relationships. For 
example, the Fife region ranks as the most defence dependent in the U K using this method. 
Yet, this county is not highlighted by any other methodology. The county estimates are not 
presented here. However, as a guide these estimates are used later (table 5.2) to illustrate 
the section of the thesis which examines the survey sample. 
2.34 European Commission Methodology 
An alternative estimate of regional defence related employment has been made in a recent 
European Commission Report (CEC, 1992), which identifies European regions which are 
dependent on a number of types of defence related employment. These include defence 
industrial employment, military related employment, and the two combined. 
Methodologically, data are taken from national statistics produced by procurement 
contracts and supplemented with company information. Inevitably, this supplementary 
information sufiFers from a number of standard problems. Firstly, company reports are often 
an aggregate of their total military and non-military activities. Secondly, employment is 
allocated to the location of the company's headquarters and not to the actual location of 
particular defence industrial activity. An additional problem is that the output o f defence 
companies may be double counted when a firm acts as a supplier to other enterprises in the 
defence supply chain (presumably because the methodology does not take account of 
intermediate goods). 
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Table 2.6 UK defence industrial dependence: employment shares (%) and relative 
positions to other E .U . regions 
iRegion 'defence 
industries 
(A) 
'military* 
only 
( B ) " defence 
related 
( Q 
position 
in 
ranking 
A 
position 
in 
ranking 
B 
position 
in 
ranking 
C 
Cumbria 6.4 0.95 7.35 1 11 
Essex 2.78 L14 3.89 2 
Lancashire 2.35 0.27 2.62 6 
Cornwall & Devon L55 5.32 6.81 15 15 12 
Avon, Glos. & Wilts L26 4.25 5.48 18 22 20 
Hamps & 10 Wight L18 7.83 8.95 19 10 9 
North Yorkshire 0 6.25 6.25 11 13 
East Anglia 0.18 4.34 4.51 21 
Lincolnshire 0 4.1 4.1 24 
Berks, Bucks & Oxon 0.36 3.98 4.33 26 
TmCE E. U. A VERAGE= LI 3.72 4.82 
notes: 'defence industrial employment as % of regional employment 
^military employment as%of regional employment 
source: European Commission (1992) 
The data primarily relates to prime contractors although employment from a number of 
smaller companies is also included. Moreover, the methodology principally focuses on the 
direct equipment sales of the prime contractors and ignores employment which is generated 
by non-equipment, indirect equipment and export spending. However, in addition the wider 
literature on defence activity is also used in the Commission's study. It is argued that this 
provides valuable and reliable information on locations which are dependent on defence 
employment. Nevertheless, there is likely to be some bias in this sample. For example, many 
studies have been commissioned by local authorities to highlight the importance of defence 
in some regions. Thus, this approach may disregard regions with only modest defence 
industrial roles i f they have not been documented in the general literature. This is noted by 
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the Commission which states that the literature is certainly not comprehensive for all E.U. 
regions. 
The report concludes that six UK NUTS I I regions are in the top nineteen defence 
industrial dependent regions of the European Union. These are Cumbria; Essex; 
Lancashire; Devon and Cornwall; Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire, and Hampshire and 
Isle of Wight. All these regions have a measure of defence industrial dependence which is at 
least twice the E.U. average. Table 2.6 shows that, in absolute terms, between one and 
three percent of regional employment is based on defence industrial production in all these 
regions apart from Cumbria which has 6.4% of employment dependent on defence 
industrial output. This is directly related to the nuclear submarine shipyard at Barrow and 
demonstrates the importance of an individual facility at a county level. 
Seven UK regions are highlighted as having a high dependency on military related 
employment. These are: Cornwall and Devon; Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire; 
Hampshire and Isle of Wight; North Yorkshire; East Anglia; Lincolnshire and Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire. Note, the significant threshold of this measure is higher 
for military related employment than defence industrial employment. This suggests that 
military related employment is more widespread. 
The third Commission ranking of combined military and defence industrial employment 
identifies 5 UK regions where combined dependence is at least twice the Union average. 
These regions are Cumbria; Devon and Cornwall; Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire, 
Hampshire and Isle of Wight, and North Yorkshire Of particulju* interest, is the presence of 
five of the seven South West counties in the Commission's rankings, confirming the relative 
importance of defence in this region identified by both Nawaz and official statistics. 
2.35 Levering Methodology 
An alternative estimate of the regional importance of defence activity has been made by 
Lovering (1991b). He begins vnih raw data which estimates the defence dependence of 
some regions of the UK based on the number of workers employed directly on MoD 
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equipment procurement contracts plus those employed by the military. This initial data 
therefore omits employment generated by defence exports, indirect equipment and 
non-equipment employment, and, also, civilian MoD manpower. Lovering estimates that 
this omission may ignore 75% of defence industry employment. 
Many examples are used by Lovering to illustrate the limitations of this initial measure of 
defence dependence (Lovering, I99lb). Some regions have no defence related employment 
recorded despite containing large defence industrial plants. For example, the Royal 
Ordnance Factory in Manchester employs 1,200 people, and there are also several 
electronics and aerospace plants located in this region. Despite this, not a single defence 
industrial job is recorded. Many of these omissions are attributed to branch plant 
relationships and to sub-contracting. The overall effect of this is probably that direct 
defence industry employment in Greater London, Cumbria and Essex are overestimated, 
whilst in Avon, Gloucester and Wiltshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, North 
Yorkshire, West Midlands County and East and West Central Scotland they are 
underestimated (Lovering, 1991b). 
In an attempt to rectify these patterns, Lovering attempts to estimate employment 
dependent on indirect spending, non-equipment spending and exports. As detailed earlier, 
national estimates for these categories are provided by the MoD (Statement on the Defence 
Estimates). These are used as a base and distributed regionally according to various 
principles. For non-equipment employment estimates, it is assumed that defence related 
employment is distributed geographically in proportion to local employment in 
manufacturing industry minus regional direct defence equipment employment. This ensures 
that the prime MoD contractors are not double counted. Lovering (1991b), argues that this 
methodology is robust because a sensitivity analysis of different sub-divisions of production 
industries and manufacturing does not alter the rankings significantly. This implies that it is 
a reasonable approximation to assume that non-equipment spending is spread across all 
sectors of production. 
Indirect equipment related employment and jobs indirectly created by defence exports are 
assumed to be distributed in the same proportion as employment dependent on 
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non-equipment spending. It is argued that this takes account of the diversity o f suppliers 
which are involved in selling to the prime MoD contractors. Of course, this would be 
flawed i f indirect employment was more closely related to the distribution of employment 
associated with direct MoD equipment procurement which would be the case i f there was 
substantial local purchasing. Lovering argues that it would be unlikely that indirect 
employment would be distributed in the same pattern as direct equipment employment 
because areas such as the South of England, the Bristol-Gloucester and 
Preston-Manchester sub-regions contain, "relatively low share(s) of defence 
subcontractors and other companies in the defence supply chain", (Lovering 199lb). In 
fact, this actually contradicts some earlier studies which argue that the distribution of 
sub-contractors should follow the pattern of main contractors due to the advantages which 
these areas may offer (Law, 1983; Breheny, 1988). In general, given the lack of firm data it 
is, therefore, difificult to assess the validity of this methodology. 
Employment related to defence exports is assumed to be distributed in the same proportion 
as employment arising from MoD equipment purchases. This assumes that all defence 
production is exported in equal proportions. Clearly, this may be an mappropriate 
assumption i f the bulk of defence exports are aerospace products as Nawaz (1994) 
suggests. Moreover, this assumption carries any errors identified from direct employment 
estimates in the export calculation. Indeed, this may account for the high estimate for the 
level of defence exports from the South East when this methodology is used. 
Table 2.7 shows the Lovering estimates for the top 5 NUTS I I regions on the basis of total 
defence industrial employment. It is interesting to note that this methodology produces 
some distinctly different results to other estimates. In particular, the importance of the 
Midlands region is not highlighted in any o f the other estimates considered. Moreover, 
Lancashire is the only other top 5 region included in this estimate which is not from the 
South East or South West. 
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Table 2.7 Total defence industrial employment in UK NUTS I I regions 
NUTS ri region defence industry 
employment 
Greater London 64,800 
West Midlands City 39.140 
Avon, Glos. & Wilts. 29.211 
Lancashire 29,044 
Essex 
1 
28,746 
source: Lovering (1991b) 
2.36 Other data sets 
In addition to the data sources outlined above, there are a number of other academic 
studies which supply some information on defence related employment. Typically, these 
studies begin with basic data for direct equipment expenditure and then infer some 
relationships about associated employment. The most well known, i f somewhat dated 
study, is that of Short (1981). Indeed, this study stimulated the initial upsurge in interest in 
the regional distribution of defence employment in the 1980s. 
Short studies the deployment of UK forces and considers the importance of defence 
equipment expenditure for the regions between 1974-5 and 1977-8. The basic data used are 
the Appropriation Accounts which are regionally apportioned by a variety of methods, 
including regional expenditure by the procurement executive. 
Short cautions against the use of absolute figures in assessing regional defence dependence 
because there is no benchmark to work fi'om and there is significant volatility in 
government spending in the regions on a yearly basis. This is a reflection of the fact that 
individual regions tend to specialise in the production of certain items o f equipment, and in 
years when the MoD updates these items, the picture becomes distorted. Similarly the 
location of the armed forces can vary rapidly with the movement o f personnel. These 
volatilities certainly appear to occur in Short's annual data and consequently he advocates 
using 4 year moving averages. In general, the data confirms the dominance of defence 
44 
spending in South East and South West, and highlights the importance of defence 
expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP in the South West. It thus tends to support 
the broad conclusions of recent studies despite the considerably different methodologies. 
Law (1983), examines the importance of the defence sector in British regional development 
by assessing the distribution of the armed forces in the UK. Historical arguments are 
proposed for the location of the various forces, however, the regional importance of 
defence industrial employment is not quantified. The conclusion of the paper is that the 
distribution of military forces is concentrated in the South. It is also suggested that the 
concentration of these forces may be important for the location o f defence industrial 
activity although no specific empirical estimates are made. 
Jones (1987), uses 1981 census data to determine the spatial distribution of military 
housing in the UK. No primary data is provided, but a map from the study reveals a strong 
concentration of military households south of a line between the Bristol Channel and the 
Wash. This map shows the distribution of heads of households who are classified under 
socio-economic grouping (SEG) 16. At the district level a threshold of 1000 households 
per area is taken as being significant. Four districts are found to have over 3000 
households where the head is classified under SEG 16. These are in descending order 
Plymouth, Gosport, Huntingdon and Portsmouth. 
A finer spatial analysis is also carried out at the level of the enumeration district (ED). EDs 
were selected where greater than 50% of the private households had a head who was 
employed in the military. This confirms the southern concentration of British military 
personnel. However, it is suggested that very few of the highlighted EDs are found in 
metropolitan areas. Instead, they are more likely to be located in relatively small towns, 
rural areas or on the fringes of larger cities. No evidence is provided to substantiate these 
observations. The areas of the highest identified military employment are located in a 
central southern area with lower levels of employment as one moves towards the 
south-east. 
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Lovering (1991a), illustrates that the distribution of defence manufacturing is largely a 
reflection of the location of the two high-techno logy sectors of aerospace and electronics. 
Analysing the combined regional distribution of employment in these two industries 
illustrates some similarities to the pattern of employment generated by MoD spending on 
defence equipment. One noted exception to this is the northern region which contains very 
little aerospace or electronics employment, but produces significant quantities of other 
defence equipment such as tanks, related equipment and shipbuilding. 
Bishop & Gripaios (1995), employ the methodologies used by Nawaz (1994) and Lovering 
(199lb) to create new regional estimates for changes in defence industrial employment. 
This is achieved by using more recent information on changes in defence employment over 
the period 1987-88 to 1990-91. Whilst the results broadly confirm the conclusions of other 
studies, the data highlights the wide differences in estimates that can be obtained by using 
different methodologies. The study also confirms the widespread job losses which appear to 
have occurred in the South East in recent years. 
In addition to the above studies there are many studies which describe the level of defence 
activity in local areas. It is impossible to survey all of these studies, but many relate to the 
South West of the UK and these are described in detail in the fourth chapter of the thesis. 
2.4 Conclusion 
There is a considerable literature which suggests that the conditions in many defence 
industrial markets are distinctly different from those of civilian markets. Indeed, defence 
markets are intriguing because demand is limited almost exclusively to the state and also 
there is a chosen "club" of major systems suppliers. Moreover, in the past, price 
determination methods have not encouraged cost-effective production, and even recently 
there is mixed evidence to suggest that the state is securing value for money. However, 
although there are certainly imperfections in UK defence markets, a number of 
commentators describe high opportunity costs from the demise of the DEB. Inevitably, this 
debate, and the unique market conditions coupled with the recent changes, have invoked 
substantial interest in the future of the defence industrial sector. 
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Despite the limitations of the existing studies a relatively clear picture of the regional 
distribution of defence spending has emerged. It is clear that there is a high concentration 
of defence related employment in the South East and South West o f the UK. Moreover, 
relative measures of defence dependence underiine the importance of the South West 
region. The North and North West regions also have significant levels of defence related 
employment but the rest of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales only have 
relatively small military and defence industrial roles. There is some evidence, however, that 
the dominance of the South has been somewhat eroded in recent years as a consequence of 
cutbacks in defence spending (UK Defence Statistics, 1993, 1995; Bishop & Gripaios, 
1995). However, there is also some concern that there is a degree of bias towards the 
South East in the regional data as many of the proxies used in estimating regional defence 
related employment over-weigh the importance of the South East (Nawaz, 1994; Lovering, 
1993). I f this is the case, then the considerable falls recorded in South East employment in 
recent years may also be overstated. Whatever the true pattern of job losses, they will be 
distributed unevenly because defence dependent regions are more likely to suffer higher 
losses of employment. 
In order to understand the likely consequences of restructuring the underlying casues of the 
spatial development of the defence sector should be analysed. Thus, the next section of the 
thesis considers possible explanations for the southern concentration o f the DIB in the UK. 
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3 
Explanations for the location of the U K defence industry 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of a number of theories taken from economics and 
geography which may provide explanations for the spatial development of the defence 
industrial base. Of course, the existence of a variety of competing location theories tends to 
imply that none are completely satisfactory even for traditional explanations of industrial 
geography. Thus, it may be legitimate to draw on elements fi'om several location theories to 
explain the geography of the defence industry. However, an evaluation o f the importance of 
alternative factors is hampered by a serious lack of empirical data. Moreover, the previous 
section has also shown that it is a complex task to describe the location of the defence 
industry because of the diversity of the sector. 
Location theories include simple models of trade, models to explain industrial location and 
models which explain regional economic growth. The models often overiap and include 
common elements such as, the importance of factor endowments or cumulative growth. 
This section begins with a discussion of theories which are essentially neo-classical in 
nature. Principally, this includes a treatment of basic industrial location theory. However, as 
a response to the limitations of the neo-classical theories, alternative approaches to location 
have developed. For example, behavioural arguments which highlight the role of managers' 
preferences in location decisions. These are discussed in the second section of the chapter. 
Thirdly, the role of corporate geography is explored. This approach discards the traditional 
theoretical perspective which considers firms as owner-managed single plant enterprises 
and instead treats decision making issues as one of corporate policy. Fourthly, models 
which regard spatial development as a fijnction of time are considered. For example, a 
number of models perceive economic growth as self-perpetuating through forces of 
cumulative causation and endogenous growth although there may also be long-run 
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pressures causing convergence in regional economic growth rates. Finally, in recent years, 
applied researchers have become increasingly interested in the adoption of a broader 
perspective to industrial location. In a structuralist approach, Marxist descriptions of 
development are increasingly used to explain industrial geography as stages of wealth 
accumulation and decline. The usage of this type of paradigm has grown in recent years in 
an attempt to explain the major industrial restructuring which has occurred in developed 
countries since the 1980s. An examination of this approach forms the final section of the 
chapter on and prompts a historical discussion of the development of the UK DEB. 
3.1 Neo-classical approaches 
The neo-classical paradigm has provided the central strand of much of economic theory 
and, as Snuth D. (1989) notes, it has also been used to provide theoretical support for the 
capitalist economic system. However, the paradigm contains inherent weaknesses and is 
not very well suited to explaining spatial relationships. Yet, attempts have been made to 
overcome these weaknesses and it provides a logical beginning for the present discussion. 
This section firstly considers static, normative neo-classical theories and then extends the 
discussion to consider growth models. 
3.11 Normative location theories 
Originally, academics judged time to be "more fijndamental" than space, and this prejudice 
became a standard except for proponents of the German School of location theory. The 
school includes the formulations of Weber (1929), Christaller (1966), and Losch (1954), 
who resurrected the initial constructs of early geographers. These spatial models were 
limited in that they were based on a geometric tradition, but it was thought that this could 
be rectified by importing a degree of theoretical strength fi-om neo-classical economics. 
Normative location theory is a deductive approach to explaining industrial geography. It is 
based on a set of propositions regarding the objectives of those responsible for location 
decisions. Moreover, it is normative because it indicates the optimal outcome for the 
entrepreneur under a set of simplified geographical assumptions (Chapman and Walker, 
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1987). Weber (1929), started from the premise that the best location was one where costs 
are minimised. Most importantly, this was based on a consideration of transport costs. 
However, factor costs and the effect of agglomeration were also taken into account in a 
number of models. Combining these approaches, which use the neo-classical precepts such 
as utility theory, variable cost and variable revenue analysis, produces a method of site 
selection by constrained optimisation. 
Transport cost minimisation places primary emphasis on the distance costs that are incurred 
between a single-plant firm and its inputs, and between that firm and its final source of 
demand. For example, on an isotropic plane, a firm would locate between its suppliers and 
its customers so that the distance between them reflected the ability to transport the 
intermediate or final good to the necessary location with the minimum cost. In reality, 
relative transport costs are determined by perishability, hazardousness or the bulky nature 
of the good. 
In truth, Weber's model was very basic because it took no account of the location of 
competitors and demand was assumed to be perfectly elastic. Thus, the manufacturer could 
sell all of its output regardless of location and competition fi-om other suppliers. However, 
other writers have modelled location in ways which have permitted more realistic variations 
in underlying market conditions (see Chapman & Walker (1987) for a review). For 
instance, it is possible to model how markets are shared spatially when demand varies. 
Alternatively, spatial forms of game theory can be used to show how decision-makers react 
to competitors. However, a common factor in all these models is the concept o f rational 
economic man. This implies that all decision makers are profit maximising actors who 
operate with complete knowledge and an ability to predict the fiiture. Furthermore, 
geometric patterns continue as the basis for all these neo-classical theories. Thus, 
realistically, they are of limited value. 
To some degree, the simplified nature of basic models o f industrial location can be rectified 
by relaxing the assumptions of isotropy. For example, models can be specified by allowing 
for spatial production cost variations. Alternatively, when the existence of different 
transport networks is considered, sites which are more favourable than others can be 
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identified by their proximity to communication networks. However, with the numerous 
variations in transport quality which apply in the real world it becomes very difficult to 
apply industrial location theory. In practice, it is impossible to quantify the relative merits of 
one specific site over another for a range of inputs and other conditions. 
Another criticism of the neo-classical industrial location theory is that it is entirely static in 
its outlook. Indeed, there are no empirical studies of defence industry location patterns 
entirely based on a neo-classical tradition. The nearest use of the theory to locational 
explanations is to assign a single factor input as a major determinant of location. For 
example, it is often said that the existence of large pools of labour o f the right type are 
important reasons for site location in the defence industry (Lovering, 1985a; 1991a; 1993). 
This may be true but it is not a general explanation. Thus, an approach which tries to 
identify single location requirements can only ever be a partial explanation for the 
distribution of the defence industry. 
Such failings of neo-classical theory are recognised by Markusen (1991) in her exposition 
of the military-industrial-divide. She advocates the use of a richer politiccil economy to 
explain spatial theory, especially one which, "draws upon historical materialism as a 
method instead of borrowed neo-classical concepts like transaction costs and increasing 
retiints to scale". In particular, she envisages the inadequacies of contemporary spatial 
theory for defence industrial explanations as being dependent on the peculiar character of 
the role of the state. Moreover, these views are echoed by Law (1983), who states that: 
".(the) special relationship with the government (placed) defence firms... in an unusual 
market position with much less competition from rival firms since it is in the government's 
interest to maintain the inner ring of firms. Consequently the economic trends of 
industrial location which require firms to seek least cost sites would be less relevant to 
defence firms whilst behaviottral explanations might be more usefid". 
Thus, it may not be appropriate to model the defence industry using neo-classical 
assumptions because there are numerous sites of demand scattered throughout the worid. 
Moreover, producers have not traditionally been subject to competitive conditions which 
encourage cost minimisation. Indeed, transport costs may often have been superseded by 
the importance of other strategic conditions. 
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3.12 Neo-classical regional economic growth models 
One potential solution to the limitations of the static neo-classical approach, is to 
investigate location decisions under dynamic conditions. This can be done by considering 
theories of regional economic growth and applying them to areas which have become 
specialised in defence industrial roles. Essentially, the neo-classical approach stresses the 
role of supply-side factors in determining regional growth (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). 
Assume, for example, that i and j are two regions, and that the labour force (L) and the 
capital stock (K) in each are initially fixed. Assume also, that there is no technical progress 
and that production functions are identical in both regions. I f there is an increase in the 
indigenous labour force in j , this will cause a divergence in the K/L ratio between the 
regions. Region i will have a higher K/L ratio, higher labour productivity (and a higher 
wage) and hence a lower rate of return to capital relative to region j . Thus, labour migrates 
from region j to region i because the wage rate in region i is higher than that in region j . 
Factor migration ceases when the wage rates are equalised at the equilibrium wage rate w .^ 
The one-sector neo-classical model predicts a convergence in the real incomes of regions 
through equilibrating factor movements. Moreover, the two-sector neo-classical model is 
similar in its construction. However, it assumes that there are two sectors: an export and a 
domestic one. If, for example, there is an increase in the demand for a region's exports this 
will be reflected in a rise in the price of exports and the marginal revenue product of labour 
and capital will increase. This means that the regional capital stock increases because of 
greater indigenous investment and a net inflow of capital from other regions. Furthermore, 
the increase in the K/L ratio raises the marginal physical product of labour and leads to 
higher real wages. This induces workers to move from the low-productivity domestic 
sector to the high-productivity sector and encourages an inflow of workers from other 
regions. Thus, the two sector neo-classical model predicts convergence between regions as 
there will be an increase in employment of labour in the region's export sector until 
inter-sectoral and inter-regional equality of real wages are re-established. 
52 
The basic neo-classical growth model is limited by the assumption that investors and 
workers are perfectly informed about factor price differentials and that they respond rapidly 
to such differences. However, in reality, wages may be inflexible downwards, and 
multiplant organisations often charge uniform prices and negotiate national wage levels on 
a national basis. This clearly casts doubt on the assumption of perfect factor price 
flexibility. Moreover, factor movements may not automatically remove factor price 
differentials. Similarly, the costs of factor movements are not zero, labour is not perfectly 
homogenous, population growth rates change, returns to scale and technical progress rates 
vary across regions. Ultimately, relaxing any of these assumptions may undermine the 
conclusions of the model. 
Despite the above problems, there have been a limited number of empirical studies which 
have shown that there may be automatic forces which tend to promote the regional 
convergence over time of per capita incomes. For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), have demonstrated that US states which had the lowest growth rates in 1880 grew 
the fastest over the subsequent century, whilst those with the highest original growth rates 
subsequently grew more slowly. 
One particular problem with the dynamic neo-classical approach is that it does not directly 
address the issue of the location of the firm, but rather describes the potential growth path 
over time of that firm in space. To an extent this implies that growth models are post-hoc 
explanations of sectoral concentration. Thus, at best, when using a dynamic model it is only 
possible to explain how a region could have become specialised in the production of a 
particular good but not why that location was selected from the outset. 
Neo-classical regional economic growth theory has been attacked widely in the 
geographical literature. It has been derided by Clark (1990), who argues that the theory is 
in tatters and has become irrelevant because of its lack of empirical foundations. 
Furthermore, Richardson (1978), criticises the theory on the grounds that: 
"The working assumptions and abstractions that the neo~classicist uses as a starting point 
for his analysis cou id never be Justified in a world which recognises the existence of space 
Ofid time 
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Other criticisms include the argument that the approach is ahistorical; a fault also levelled at 
many descriptive studies of the defence industry (Lovering, 1993). In fact, the 
neo-classical approach may be the one which is the least applicable to the defence industry. 
Ultimately, the stringent assumptions of neo-classical growth cannot be reconciled with an 
industry that has an oligopolistic structure and is dominated by the influence of a single 
buyer. Most importantly, the approach fails to account for the essential role of institutional 
factors which have shaped the defence industry. For instance, the structure and spatial 
distribution of the defence sector have not been determined by competitive market forces. 
They have been determined by the military-industrial complex. Moreover, even with the 
increasing levels of competition which are apparent in the defence industry of the 1990s, it 
is difficult to associate the sector with the conditions associated with basic neo-classical 
models. 
3.2 Behavioural approach 
Gregory (1989), argues that the limitations of traditional location theory led to a variety of 
responses firom geographers who wished to revitalise the standing o f the discipline. One 
such development occurred in the early 1970s vAlh the emergence of behavioural 
geography which involved an attack on the concept of rational economic man. 
Behavioural geography is an approach to human geography which draws on psychology. 
Hence, human behaviour is seen as the result of complex cognitive processes and not just in 
terms of specific stimulus-response relationships. This shift permitted the incorporation of 
more realistic behavioural assumptions into location theory but generated new difficulties in 
empirical testing. Although several texts which pursued this branch of geography were 
published in the seventies (see Gregory, 1989 for a list), the whole approach appears to 
have been partly limited in its output because of the scathing criticism that the work 
received (Keeble, 1976). 
Keeble (op. c//.), identifies the behavioural approach as one which does not focus on the 
firm as a vehicle for rational economic man, but instead sees it as a decision-making unit 
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which is confronted by conflicting goals, limited knowledge, limited control of its 
environment, and also a level of irrationality of perception and behaviour. The wide range 
of influences which play a part in the location of a firm are so diverse that it is difficult to 
crystallise the behavioural approach into a theory of industrial location. At least the 
neo-classical models may be applied to create a framework of rules so that ultimately the 
result is a science of some form, even i f this relies on somewhat unrealistic assumptions. 
Three distinct types of problems can be identified with the behavioural approach. Firstly, 
behaviouralism is even more "data-demanding" than classical theory (Keeble, op.cit.). For 
example, Keeble cites a study by Townroe (1974) in which the maximum number of 
enterprises included in the analysis is 200. This upper limit is set by the time consuming 
nature of the survey which relies on in-depth interviews concerning the dynamics of the 
economic environment. Secondly, processing data may be a problem because of 
small-sample sizes and the multifarious nature of information. Thirdly, it is difficult to 
identify behavioural conclusions from such surveys. This is because as interviews become 
more personalised and the information gleaned becomes more detailed, the resultant 
behavioural relationships become more diverse (Townroe, 1972). 
A number of studies have used behavioural methodologies to analyse quasi-defence 
industrial sectors. Two examples help to demonstrate the type of analysis which has 
developed from the behavioural approach. Haug (1991), for example, investigates 363 
high-technology organisations in Washington State which include a high proportion of 
aerospace companies involved in defence work. The results of the study which are based on 
a postal survey assess the importance of a range of location factors. For instance, these 
include the proximity of the home of the founder, local climatic and economic conditions. 
In conclusion, the study confirms that economic conditions may not be the primary 
consideration for the location of a firm. Instead, the location of the founder of the firm may 
be a more important determinant. However, it is clear from the study that only a few 
potential characteristics are evaluated as location determinants. Thus, only prominent 
features of location may be highlighted and the survey should not be considered as a truly 
behavioural one. 
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A similar study on location of high-technology firms in a peripheral UK area identifies a 
range of factors as being important in location decisions (Gripaios et a/, 1988). In a postal 
survey, a response from 79 out o f 197 high tech firms in the travel to work areas (TTWA) 
of Plymouth, Exeter and Bristol, revealed that 67% had some defence business. In addition, 
both economic and behavioural influences were found to play locational roles. For instance, 
the behavioural roles were found to include perceptions of the quality of the working 
environment and location of the firm's founder. Moreover, the study was supported by 18 
telephone interviews in the Plymouth area which investigated more qualitative aspects of 
location decisions. However, evidence from participants was often conflicting and the 
difficulties in quantifying the importance of individual factors in the decision making 
process are highlighted by the survey. 
Thus, both of these studies show that psychology is an accepted determinant of location 
decisions. However, generally, behavioural aspects are included in research only as a token 
gesture. Probably, no true behavioural studies of defence company location exist because of 
the limitations of the technique. Therefore, there is little evidence to show that location 
decisions are the product of personal considerations over the more obvious and 
conventional factors such as proximity to raw materials or markets. Nevertheless, the lack 
of data is no justification for dismissing the role of behavioural aspects in location 
decisions. Indeed, it is highly likely that personal considerations may be highly relevant to 
the location of the defence industry. This may be the case because the industry has not been 
subject to much competition, thus, leaving spatial margins for managers to exercise some 
choice in their location decisions. However, without extensive data collection it is 
impossible to be certain of such generalisations. 
3.3 Corporate Geography 
Clearly, the influence of behavioural geography has highlighted the role of individual 
choices in any decision making process. Yet, the role of the individual is becoming 
increasingly marginalised in society because of the growth of large organisations. Indeed, 
any focus which draws its theoretical basis firom the owner-managed single plant enterprise 
ignores any influences of collective action and centralised decision-making. 
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Chapman & Walker (1987), describe "corporate geography" or "the geography of 
enterprise" as part of a wider concern with large firms. Indeed, Hayter & Watts (1983), 
defined the geography of enterprise as: 
"The study of the influence and policies and stntctttres of multiproduct, multiplant 
enterprises on changes in industrial location and on processes of regional economic 
development". 
However, Dicken & Thrift (1992), criticise this emphasis on larger enterprises. They 
recount that it is generally agreed that corporate geography was initiated by McNee (1960) 
who argued that the concepts of the geography of enterprise should be applied to the study 
of both small and large firms. 
Thus, there is now a recognition that geography has outgrown its normative roots which 
portrayed the entrepreneur as subservient to the exogenous environment. Rather, it is 
emphasised that the collective power of large organisations makes them able, at least to 
some extent, to manipulate their economic surroundings. Chapman & Walker (1987), argue 
that this has completely altered the perception of the location decision. For example, fi-om 
the perspective of a large organisation, a location decision is an investment decision. 
Indeed, the location aspect is secondary to investment planning. A decision to increase 
output is the cause of a change in corporate behaviour and the subsequent location of the 
necessary facilities is the effect. 
Nevertheless, there are still a range of investment decisions available to a large enterprise. 
These could include new plant expansion, mergers or acquisitions. Indeed, firms may 
acquire external plants to exploit access to technology and in such instances geographical 
outcomes are incidental to corporate power. However, this argument is based on the 
premise that the firm is adopting a financial strategy, when in truth, there may be occasions 
where large enterprises make decisions about location which are based significantly on 
geography. For example, firms may wish to set up branch plants especially to exploit 
regional markets or factor endowments. 
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Although some commentators focus on corporate strategy in defence enterprises there are 
no specifically geographical studies devoted to this area. Typically, analysts have 
concentrated on corporate restructuring. Moreover, they have mainly distinguished 
between firms focusing upon existing defence markets and those seeking to move into new 
civilian ones. For example. Smith and Smith (1992), in a review of corporate responses to 
recent changes in defence markets emphasise the difference between three groups of 
strategies. Firstly, there are "consolidators" whose strategy is based on retaining and 
developing defence markets. Secondly, there are "diversifiers" who aim to concentrate on 
moving into civilian markets. Finally, there are the "converters'* who aim to entirely convert 
military plants to civilian use. Lovering (1993), reviews a number of strategies adopted by 
prime contractors. For example, he highlights that BAe has aimed to concentrate on 
defence markets whilst Racal is outstanding because it has significantly moved out of 
defence markets. Smith and Smith note that initially many defence firms adopted "wait and 
see strategies". However, as the firms recognised that defence market changes were 
permanent they started to pursue more active restructuring plans. However, the study, in 
common with similar studies pays no attention to the spatial implications of such changes. 
No more attention is devoted to the corporate approach at this stage as there are many 
similarities between it and the structuralist paradigm. Indeed, some geographers are 
described as perceiving the geography of enterprise as, "a way station on the long march 
from Weber to Walker (and Storper)". (Dicken & Thrift, 1992). In fact, it may be argued 
that the object of the geography of enterprise has changed over time. For example, by the 
early 1980s, one of its main concerns was that of corporate restructuring and not corporate 
structure itself This shift in emphasis was clearly a reaction to a world-wide recession and 
a particular concern with regional and local labour markets. Whatever the opposing views 
of academics who debate whether this is a single paradigm or in fact more than one, there 
are insufficient studies of the defence industry in the UK to clearly separate the two; 
descriptive approaches of industrial structure and restructuring are confined to section 3.4. 
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3.4 Organisational approach 
An additional response to the limitations of the neo-classical approach emerged from 
organisation theory which aims to explain the behaviour of firms as they exercise control 
over the production process (D. Smith, 1989). This approach continued the abandonment 
of the focus on the single-plant, single-product firm and adopted work which examined 
organisation modes such as markets and cities. Thus, industrial agglomeration and 
locational interdependence are the prime foci of this discipline. In fact, Gregory (1989), 
claims that this approach not only drew much of its strength from the location-decision 
models outlined above, but was also concerned with the interrelationships between firm 
organisation, development and spatial behaviour in the context of economic environmental 
change. Indeed, it has even been claimed that the organisational approach could supersede 
other location theories (Keeble, 1979). 
3.41 Cumulative causation and growth pole theory 
The new broader perspective derived from organisation theory continued the focus on the 
spatial pattern of economic development. In particular, interest grew in the tendency for 
economic growth to result in polarised development and the role of manufacturing in this 
process (Chapman & Walker, 1987). However, unlike the normative, behavioural and 
geography of enterprise approaches which focused only on the location of industry, the 
organisational paradigm was an interdisciplinary approach concerned with much wider 
issues. Moreover, one of the central themes of the approach was the significance of time. 
This differed from many of the previous approaches which were essentially static. 
The dynamic nature of the theory arises because of the view that some sectors of industry 
are more propulsive in economic terms than others. For example, sectors such as chemicals, 
iron and steel and metal products are considered to be lead sectors because they are 
characterised by above average levels of backward and forward linkages (Chapman & 
Walker, 1987). These sectors, therefore, have the power to transmit considerable grov^rth 
potential throughout the economy. Moreover, these impulses are also enhanced by induced 
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income or multiplier effects associated with corporate and personal expenditures which 
circulate throughout the economy. 
Locally aggregated linkages can create two types of external economies of scale. Firstly, 
localisation economies result fi-om the geographical concentration o f plants in the same 
industry. For example, transfer or linkage economies develop from the geographical 
proximity of plants which have input-output ties with each other. Similariy, R&D joint 
ventures and a local pool of suitably trained labour are other potential benefits of 
localisation economies (Lovering, 1991a, Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). Furthermore, 
greater plant specialisation is possible under such conditions and this can further reduce 
long-run average costs (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). 
Secondly, agglomeration or urbanisation economies arise fi-om the geographical association 
of a large number of economic activities which may or may not be in the same industry. 
These include urban transport and commuting facilities, large pools of workers and the 
provision of a wide range of government and commercial services. In addition, urban 
centres offer good conditions for innovation and the diffusion of innovation (Armstrong 
and Taylor, 1993). 
However, the growth that is created in a particular region by these spatial economies of 
scale may arise at the expense of other regions which are drained of their high quality 
capital and labour. This may occur because factor migration is selective and only the most 
skilled, young and enterprising workers tend to relocate to new sites. Moreover, only the 
most mobile, flexible capital will tend to accompany this labour. 
Indeed, the notion that labour and capital are attracted to core regions where factor 
rewards are higher are the essential features of cumulative causation and growth pole 
models (Perroux, 1950; Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958). For example, as factors are 
drawn into these areas average cost curves fall through external economies of scale. Thus, 
as costs and prices fall, or output is increased, demand is stimulated generating a virtuous 
circle of growth. So in these models, factor migration is seen to cause regional economic 
imbalance. This contrasts with the neo-classical view that factor migration tends to equalise 
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factor returns and incomes between regions by removing unemployment fi*om backward 
areas. In reality, this outcome is unlikely as it relies on unrealistic assumptions of perfect 
factor mobility and (downward) price flexibility. In truth, regions will probably have neither 
the advantage of factor immobility which enables them to trade on the basis of comparative 
advantage, nor will they enjoy complete factor mobility which would make persistent 
unemployment impossible, (Van Hove & KJaassen, 1987). 
Thus, two types of process can be envisaged as emerging fi-om factor migration effects: 
neo-classical growth convergence or alternatively growth polarisation. Indeed, specific 
terms have evolved to describe these processes. Firstly, "backwash" (Myrdal, 1957), or 
"polarisation" (Hirschman, 1958), are the effiects which operate when regional growth rates 
are on a diverging path and economic inequalities are growing. These processes produce 
two distinct types of geographical regions: a "core" area or "growth pole" of concentrated 
economic development, and a relatively undeveloped "periphery" (Perroux, 1950; Myrdal, 
1957; Hirschman, 1958). In addition to the polarisation effects identified by localisation and 
agglomeration economies, positive multipliers are created in central core regions where 
grov^h is perpetuated because profits can be invested in R&D (Oakey et al, 1982). In the 
core, the regional market size increases and so does the tax base. This allows the provision 
of more infi-astructure and further cements the inter-industry linkages in the area. 
Moreover, savings may be taken fi-om the periphery (where they exceed the demand for 
capital) and redirected to the core. The net effect of all this is to magnify the multiplier in 
the fast-growing region and reduce the multiplier in the slow-growing one. 
Secondly, "spread" (Myrdal, 1957), or "trickle-down" effects (Hirschman, 1958), are the 
terms used to describe forces which occur when growth rates equalise incomes across 
space. For instance, in the long run, equilibrating effects (along neo-classical lines) may 
develop. "Spread" (Myrdal, 1957), or "trickle-down" effects (Hirschman, 1958), occur as 
growth rates reduce inequalities between regions. In addition, "spread" effects may extend 
into the periphery and wealth may "trickle-down" as the core expands and over-heats. In all 
likelihood, central congestion costs and radial improvements in infrastructure may promote 
the decentralisation of the core and force development in the periphery. This tendency is 
further encouraged by inflated factor costs in the core relative to lower rents and wages on 
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the edge of the growth pole. Eventually, a gradient which encourages investment away 
from the centre should become established. 
Several theorists argue that opposing forces of regional economic development will occur 
at various stages of industrialisation. Some argue that converging tendencies are inevitable 
consequences of economic development (Williamson, 1965; Richardson, 1978). Thus, at 
first inequalities in regional incomes may become exaggerated by backwash or polarisation 
effects, but these may be ameliorated at a later stage by spread and trickle-down as shown 
in figure 3.1. Nevertheless, Vanhove and Klaassen (1987), emphasise that for trickle-down 
to predominate over polarisation, complementarity must be very strong between regional 
economies. This might explain why neo-classicists anticipate regional economic 
convergence because they assume that regions are all similar to one another. 
Figure 3,1 Patterns of regional economic growth over time 
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Thus, organisational theory predicts two possible regional economic outcomes. Either, 
growth poles and cumulative causation processes create permanent divergence in regional 
incomes, or there may be sufficient negative feedback in the processes of development to 
reduce inequalities. Inevitably, the debate continues because of the lack of data to describe 
long run spatial development. 
These theories may be of relevance to the location of the defence industry. Indeed, it is 
logical to envisage the sector in a dynamic framework where its spatial form has evolved 
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fi-om a steady stream of military expenditure. Thus, in the post-war worid, the strength of 
defence industrial growth poles may be related to linkages within the sector. For example, 
in a recent study the Commission of the European Communities (1989), concluded that 
distance from suppliers and customers is an important factor in the location of any business. 
However, distance is not important simply owing to transportation costs, but because of 
the importance of maintaining personal contact between customers and suppliers. This 
contact, is perhaps, especially relevant to the defence industry due to its specific 
supplier-customer relationships, corporate structures and behaviour, labour practices, and 
even "culture" (Kennedy 1983; Hartley 1991, Smith and Smith 1983; Hartley and Hooper 
1987, Lovering 1993). I f this is the case, then localisation economies should be particularly 
relevant for the development of a defence industry growth pole. It might be expected that 
clusters of defence firms may develop close to major contractors, military bases, MoD 
contact points and MoD research establishments. For example, this is confirmed by the 
European Commission study (1992), which suggests that oflen military dependent regions 
are those which also contain high proportions of defence industrial employment. This may 
be advantageous because of the benefits of having local suppliers and reduced transport 
costs, perhaps the free use of trained military personnel, or test sites made readily available 
for product development, (Markusen and Yudken 1993). 
On the other hand, military bases have limited autonomy over their purchasing decisions 
and major suppliers have traditionally been determined by the MoD which operates at a 
national scale, not at a regional or local one (Bishop, 1986). However, Breheny (1988), 
argues that contracting procedures are more decentralised than is generally assumed. For 
example, major research establishments play an important role in the process and are 
empowered to commit substantial sums of money to contractors without reference to 
Whitehall. However, it should not be forgotten that the final users of defence products are 
represented by a single consumer in the guise of the government. In truth, this may make 
the location of defence firms relatively unimportant because there is no incentive to favour 
adjacent suppliers over more distant ones. Yet, the detailed, on-going and regular 
negotiation which is involved in the procurement process requires frequent contact between 
the contractor and the MoD (Breheny, 1988). This may be facilitated by closer proximity 
between the parties. However, the closeness of the final site of demand may not be relevant 
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when the areas where the goods are used are highly dispersed such as different military 
bases and various locations around the world. In addition, some goods are capable of 
moving themselves to market (Markusen and Yudken 1993). Thus, some of the arguments 
cited above would tend to undermine the case that regions with a high military presence 
should naturally become foci for defence industrial growth poles. 
Despite the above arguments, it is possible that a site which is close to military decision 
makers may be particularly advantageous to defence firms because this may improve their 
chances of being awarded a production contract. Thus, this may favour locations where 
military decisions are made. The importance of such proximity has been confirmed in an 
interview survey of high-tech companies with defence business in Berkshire (Breheny & 
McQuaid, 1985). For example, a number of respondents stressed: 
"the crucial importance of ready access to local Defence Research Establishments 
(DREs), contact points and Whitehall.... (ds\d)... the need for prime contractors to have 
access to other defence contractors and potential sub-contractors". 
This might partially account for the overall southern bias in the UK defence industry as this 
is where the majority of MoD contact points for purchasing are situated (Breheny, 1988). 
Breheny {op. cit.\ argues that there is no evidence up to Worid War Two of DREs 
influencing the location of private contractors. Only in the 1950s did the DREs come into 
their own when defence expenditure was going through a period of rapid expansion. 
Indeed: 
"/// the post-war period, expansions, relocations and new businesses (took) a distinct 
westward and south-westward bias ...(^x\d)... the location of the DREs was probably a 
major reason for this deflection of decentralisation" 
A casual observation of other E U member states suggests that a relationship exists between 
the capital city and defence industrial production. For example, the maps produced by the 
C E C (1992), suggest that regional defence dependence and the proximity of the capital city 
appear to be correlated in Spain, Greece, Netheriands, Belgium, Portugal, France and the 
UK. However, Ireland, Luxembourg and Denmark have no significant indigenous military 
industry and Germany is a special case because of post-war agreements. 
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Political centres may also be favourable locations because they may offer greater 
agglomeration economies than smaller cities. Thus, in the UK, the southern bias of the 
defence industry may suggest that strong localisation economies are ofiFered by being close 
to the MoD contact points in London and also that agglomeration economies are being 
provided by the generally higher level of development in this region. 
In the post-war period, the relationship between military, industry and government has 
often been conceptualised as the "military-industrial complex" (MIC). However, although 
there is much text devoted to this area, the MIC is considered primarily an issue of political 
economy, and has rarely, i f ever, been regarded as having a spatial dimension. Kennedy 
(1983), states that there is little agreement on what the MIC is, but defines it as an 
interacting relationship between the military as an institution, and the part of industry that 
supplies the military hardware. The relationship has evolved over time so that the defence 
industries and the military can satisfy the strategic needs of the state, and it is inevitable that 
this relationship will have spatial effects. Indeed, the MIC could be viewed as a special 
growth pole based on high levels of localised public expenditure. 
Lovering (1991a), identifies the MIC as "the creator of small islands of modest prosperity". 
He suggests that the defence industry did not obey the same locational rules as other 
manufacturing, but remained static in its original locations. It became the largest source of 
stable high-paid employment, and a key suppher of training in a number of regions that 
otherwise became disadvantaged. In truth, this inertia may be explained by Cold War 
pressure to develop and manufacture new products as quickly as possible. Thus, although 
there may have been favourable economic reasons for the relocation o f plants, the cost in 
time and reorganisation would have outweighed the benefits of moving the plant to a new 
site. Hence, this locational inertia is partly a result of government financed investment in 
built capital, but it also reflects the importance of industry specific skills and buyer location. 
For example, defence firms would not have been able to seek new lower cost sites i f this 
isolated them fi-om essential links with other firms and perhaps contact with the MoD. 
Relocation would have distanced defence firms fi'om the regional pools of skilled labour 
and especially traditional manual skills which defence sites had created by on the job 
training (Lovering 1991a). Of course, these types and qualities of inputs were only to be 
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found where past rounds of investment had created them. Thus, it was necessary to find 
locations where both these labour types existed, and so this perpetuated the existing sites of 
the defence industry and restricted any development away from these core areas. Finally, 
another reason for the inertia of the defence industry might be that the sites of demand such 
as military bases or MoD contact points have also been immobile. Of course, recent cuts in 
the level of defence expenditure have resulted in the closure of some of these bases, and 
this may play a part in altering the pattern of demand. 
3.42 Endogenous growth theories 
A second form of the organisational approach which describes growth as a process of 
cumulative development is endogenous growth theory. This approach is rarely given 
significant attention in reviews of economic growth as the models often merely provide a 
descriptive collection of conditions which have fostered growth in some regions (Sweeney, 
1987; Quince & Partners, 1985). Generally, these predict a divergence in regional incomes 
largely because they focus on case-specific examples of industrial clustering. Indeed, 
endogenous growth models describe continual economic growth as a localised feature 
dependent on the creation of new economic activities particularly through new firm 
formation. In turn, this depends on entrepreneurial vitality which, it is argued, exists only in 
those regions which have an information-rich environment which creates innovative 
potential. Thus, the vitality of an economy is strongly correlated to the size of the small 
firms sector because it is the major source of entrepreneurs, a major source of new 
employment, and the source of a disproportionately large number o f innovations. These 
small firms appear to breed other small firms so that growth or decline is cumulative. This 
argument is backed up by empirical evidence which suggests that small firm formation rates 
are highest in areas where there are already large concentrations of small firms and in areas 
where economic growth is most rapid (Economists Advisory Group, 1978). 
One particularly important feature in the growth of the small-firm sector is an 
information-rich environment. In such locations, entrepreneurship is nurtured by the local 
culture which is based on information exchange. For example, a study of the "Cambridge 
Phenomenon", identified the relationship between high-tech firms and the firms servicmg 
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them in the local area around Cambridge (Segal, Quince & Partners, 1985). Indeed, it was 
found that between 1960 and 1984 355 businesses had been founded locally, of which, 330 
survived and 244 had parent-child relationships. Other features which it was argued could 
have promoted the grov^h of the area were informal networks of highly skilled labour and 
support from King's College and Barclays Bank. These institutions provided essential land, 
advisory services and backing to foster an agglomeration of high-tech small firms 
(Sweeney, 1987). 
It is usually argued that several factors are important in the creation of an information-rich 
environment: the education and training systems in a region: the quality and intensiveness 
of the information flow between firms and entrepreneurs; the cycle time between the need 
and the delivery of information for decision making; and, the technical culture and 
progressiveness which determine the innovative potential of a region (Sweeney, 1987). 
These factors tend to be concentrated in the central core regions, leading to the 
impoverishment of peripheral regions as entrepreneurs have poorer access to information 
and less awareness o f new developments in technology. Thus, a greater number of new 
firms are established in the core regions which then experience cumulative growth. Hence 
endogenous growth theories seem to predict a divergence of incomes between regions. 
The features which characterise endogenous growth theories may help to explain the 
regional development of the defence industry. For example, Bishop & Gripaios (1993), 
surveyed local suppliers of Devonport Management Limited (DML) and British Aerospace 
(BAe) in Plymouth. They concluded that almost 70% of respondents that dealt with the 
two firms typically employed twenty-five or fewer workers. Moreover 43% of respondents 
had a turnover of less than £1 million. Of the respondents, 77% were acuially located in 
Plymouth, with 14% in the rest of Devon and 9% in Cornwall. This shows the highly 
concentrated spatial distribution of the small firm suppliers to the two major regional 
defence firms. A subsequent study of DML reveals that 19% of suppliers and over a third 
of expenditure is concentrated in Devon, whilst the adjacent counties form a significant 
proportion of the remainder of suppbers, (Bishop, 1996). 
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Thus, the structure identified in the Plymouth area is one which contains two major defence 
equipment producers and a multitude of smaller suppliers. This is consistent with the 
structure identified by Sweeney (1987) as an environment conducive to growth: 
"It is the nature of large firms' operations, their attitude towards innovation and to 
smaller firms which is significant. Much of the impulse to innovate in SMEs comes from 
technologically-demanding customer firms". 
However, this is not strong evidence for the existence of endogenous growth patterns 
because other factors may also play significant roles and Plymouth is hardly a famous 
example of dynamic regional growth. In addition. Bishop identifies that these small firms 
exist as service providers rather than product manufacturers, although a few do supply 
engineering and electrical inputs. At first sight it might be reasonable to suggest that a 
higher growth rate could be achieved i f these small firms were actually more involved in 
product manufacture rather than in service provision. It is commonly assumed that 
entrepreneurial activity and new innovations would be created most easily in a 
manufacturing environment because such products are more tradable than service ones. 
Thus, growth rates would be stronger in an industrial sector than in a service one. 
However, this may not be the case, according to Sweeney (1987), because services, 
primarily the quaternary sector (i.e. the business, finance and information industries; not 
traditional services), are the ones on which the information-intensive manufacturers and 
other businesses depend and these exhibit rapid technical progress. 
Small firm formation in the defence sector may also be affected by contemporary changes in 
the defence industrial environment. For example, given that it is only since 1987 that central 
purchasing has become less important in determining overall defence procurement, it might 
be expected that the number of small defence firms in Devon and Cornwall would increase 
fi-om this time. Casual empirical evidence supports this because in the late 19S0s in Devon 
there was, for a short time, a high rate of new firm growth (Gripaios & Gripaios, 1992). 
However, this has been attributed to large-scale redundancies at DML which, coupled with 
redundancy payments, generated a large number of new local small businesses. 
Interestingly, in many cases these firms secured sub-contract work v^th the dockyard. 
Thus, large firms may have been going through a period of rationalisation which spawned 
new firms with competencies based on skills learnt fi-om their previous employers. 
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Conceivably, this may make the defence industry more flexible and more able to cope with 
future changes. 
Although endogenous growth theories appear to be useful in analysing the development of 
the defence industry, the discussion has mainly moved from the major oligopolistic defence 
equipment producers to their suppliers. In the available data which describes the UK 
defence industry, these indirect suppliers to the MoD are often neglected because of the 
difficulties in identification. I f we favour this theoretical approach to the spatial distribution 
of the defence industry, there is clearly a problem i f we cannot measure the employment 
which is created by these small firms. Thus, the conclusion is that for any geographical 
assessment of the economic development of defence dependent regions, more data is 
required of the type produced by the Plymouth study. However, it is more difficult to 
investigate whether the other endogenous growth characteristics (such as an 
information-rich environment) are having a marked effect on regional development. 
3.5 Structural approach 
Previous sections have mentioned the similarities between the corporate geography and 
structural approaches. Indeed, many academics have seen the former as a pre-cursor to the 
latter, although others view the two as separate but related approaches. However, the 
principal concern of broad descriptive perspectives in the 1960s were with the management 
and re-direction of economic growth, whilst in the 1980s, the focus has been on the 
stagnation and decline of industrialised economies (Chapman & Walker, 1987). This 
dichotomy has proceeded from differing views of spatial causality between industrial 
organisations and the economic environment. On the one hand, the geography of enterprise 
envisaged large organisations as virtually autonomous to the environment in which they 
operate whilst the structural paradigm is more concerned with the impact of 
macro-economic processes on the individual firm and on society in genereil. 
The structural approach can primarily be viewed as an application o f Marxist ideas o f 
political economy to theories of industrial location. Thus, late twentieth century industrial 
restructuring is seen as one stage in the processes of capitalism. Moreover, contemporary 
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dynamics depict an image where manufacturing jobs in urban cores are displaced by new 
service sector employment. Hence, it is the consequences of these contemporary changes 
which are the focus of the paradigm. Thus, according to Chapman &, Walker (1987), this 
represents a shift of the traditional geographical concentration upon the entrepreneur to a 
societal perspective. However, economists might argue that this shift may be seen merely as 
discarding the microeconomic perspective of the individual, and switching to the macro 
level, the subject of which is society itself. 
The principal advantage of the structural paradigm is its breadth. Indeed, Smith (1981), 
argues that Marxism offers an opportunity to develop an integrated comprehension of 
reality as a whole. However, the advantages of an approach which generalises explanations 
for societal development may also be limited by the disadvantages of its unfocused 
character. Inevitably, this has meant that applications of the structural paradigm are not 
common because of its intellectually demanding holistic nature. Nevertheless, Massey & 
Meegan (1979), analyse the spatial implications of a public sector reorganisation of the UK 
electrical engineering sector in the late 1960s using this paradigm. Such restructuring was 
perceived to be the result of prevailing domestic conditions which, in turn, were the 
inspiration for the focus on the contemporary recession. Hence, the perception that it is the 
environment that determines spatial outcomes and not necessarily the autonomous 
decisions of the manager or entrepreneur. 
Two of the more recent themes of the strxicturalist literature are the concepts of flexible 
accumulation (Scott, 1988) and flexible specialisation (Piore & Sabel, 1984). Conceivably, 
these are new features of late twentieth century capitalist accumulation and they may be 
linked to distinct spatial outcomes. For example, flexible accumulation may have replaced 
large proportions of Fordist production structures. Traditionally, multi-national 
organisations exploited international divisions of labour by manufacturing and marketing 
fi-om a number of locations around the world. Essentially, larger proportions of industrial 
production are now perceived to be based upon small firms. Moreover, enterprises are 
likely to employ combinations of factor inputs which generate a production unit which is 
much more capable of switching between products or even markets thus reducing the risk 
that the firm faces. Indeed, this flexibility is brought about by the nature of employee 
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relations, the organisation of work within firms, and the broader social division of labour 
(Gertler, 1995). Consequently, much of the flexible accumulation literature argues that the 
spatial implications of this phenomenon are agglomerations of activity. These occur 
because of the existence of local linkages which develop between many small enterprises. 
Moreover, these are enhanced by the related concept of flexible specialisation. Essentially, 
this form of production is based on the same factor input qualities outlined above. In 
particular, the central theme of thesis is that firms trade on the basis of specialist 
competencies. Thus, production is divided amongst many enterprises which each supply a 
niche component of a final good. Inevitably, close proximity between sub-contractors aids 
communication and encourages localisation economies. 
Nevertheless, considerable criticism has evolved which challenges these latest elements of 
the structural paradigm. Indeed, the amalgamation of abstract macro-economic theory with 
micro-economic explanations of production in "new industrial spaces" is considered to be a 
general weakness (Phelps, 1991). Furthermore, the validity of many empirical studies which 
survey new industrial spaces has been questioned. For example, Appold (1995), argues that 
virtually all empirical studies of industrial districts and agglomeration suffer firom two 
serious methodological drawbacks. Firstly, most recent reports rely on surveys of allegedly 
successfijl districts, thus ignoring firms which may have equally successful production 
structures yet are not geographically agglomerated. Secondly, spatial agglomeration has 
been taken as evidence for the existence of locally bounded advantages. Thus, many 
researchers have presumed sectoral clustering as proof of on-going operational advantages. 
This, Appold argues, may not actually be the case. For example, clustering might arise fi^om 
a principal local employer shedding labour which possesses sectorally specific skills. 
Lovering (1990), argues that much of the post-war British defence industry has been 
shaped by Fordism to a greater extent than has the rest of British industry. Conceivably, 
this resulted fi-om the lack of competitive pressure in the sector permitting less need for 
restructuring. However, there were also some aspects o f defence industrial production 
which diverged fi'om this pattern. For example, in some cases the complexity of defence 
irmovations prevented mass production strategies and instead relied on specialist 
small-batch industry. More recent restructuring has further reduced the influence of Fordist 
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production structures. Indeed, Markusen (1991), summarises much recent research as 
focused on a post-Fordist regime of accumulation and the emergence o f flexibly specialised 
production systems. She argues that, certainly in the US, these have evolved fi-om greater 
product specialisation and shorter production runs. Moreover, new technology has also 
been central to the new structures, permitting small firms to thrive. In the Cold War, 
smaller enterprises were able to supply highly sophisticated electronics-intensive machinery. 
In contrast, production for the ("hot") Worid Wars was typically on a massive scale to 
supply huge armies of men with large quantities of weaponry. Markusen (1991), suggests 
that the outcome of these transformations was to generate new industrial spaces which 
avoided the traditional locations of the US DIB. Of course, any direct comparisons 
between the UK and the US are virtually impossible given the small size of the British Isles. 
However, similar changes to UK defence industrial production have also occurred although 
they may be as dependent on Southern regions as were Fordist industries. Indeed, Lovering 
(1993), describes the characteristic 1990s defence industrial plant as being located in the 
South-East but excluding Greater London. 
An additional factor of note in any structuralist description are the political decisions which 
underiie any allocation of public funds. Markusen (1991), for example, describes the 
complexities of the lobbying process in the USA. It is plausible that decisions to favour one 
area over another with defence contracts could rest on a desire to promote local 
government support. This could take the form of defence expenditure as a regional policy. 
Cynics might go so far to suggest that regional policy is not a solution to regional 
inequalities but is only used to promote regional support for government. This could be one 
possible explanation for the high defence dependence in certain areas of the UK. Such 
political decisions appear to be common-place in the UK, and are illustrated with wrangles 
over orders for the Challenger tank and the awarding of numerous ship building contracts. 
Thus, decisions concerning military production may be determined, in part, by political 
decisions which have distinct geographical outcomes. 
It is difficult to construct structural descriptions of economic development and decline 
because of the holistic nature of the paradigm and this broadness also limits such 
descriptions of the spatial development of the DIB in the UK. However, there are 
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contributions in the literature which may be seen as structural explanations for spatial 
development. Firstly, defence expenditure may follow a cyclical pattern in response to 
military threats. In addition, it may be subject to national reorganisation, for example, in 
procurement processes. These may be seen as the causes of structural shifts in the nature of 
the sector and the corporate responses of defence firms and the consequences for defence 
industrial employment are the subjects of a number of studies. Secondly, historical 
descriptions of state and private ownership o f the means of military production provide 
substantial additional material. Such histories are discussed in significant detail in the next 
section. 
3.6 Historical approach 
Gregory (1989), suggests that the ahistorical nature of the neo-classical paradigm has been 
identified as a major weakness and examines three approaches which have attempted to 
remedy this deficiency. Both the "historical particularity" (Gregory, 1989; Lovering 1993) 
and "global context" (Gregory 1989; Lovering 1993b) of the different phases of capitalist 
development have been used to explain waves of product and production process 
innovation. These two categories include, for example, theories of long waves of 
development (Hall, 1985) and the new international division of labour (Frobel et a], 1980). 
However, the third approach produces an historical methodology which is particularly 
applicable to the defence industry. This approach focuses on "the structural 
interdependencies of production, society and urbanisation of the space-economy". Hence, 
the next section of the thesis involves a historical treatment of the defence sector which is 
theoretical in nature. This approach attempts to show how national security is organised 
within a region as part of the state apparatus and plays an important role in creating 
political units in space. Moreover the early defensive shell of the state may still be visible m 
its form today, although a discussion o f the specific historical development of a large 
number of individual defence sites is unrealistic. This analysis is complemented by a more 
contemporary descriptive account of the spatial distribution of the military and those 
industries which supply it. 
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3.61 Defence origins 
War has raged in Europe throughout time, and attempts to explain why this area has 
remained a zone of instability are provided by theorists such as Cohen (1973), in his Shatter 
Belt theory, and Mackinder (1919), in his Heartland theory. It has been suggested that 
conflict was responsible for the existence of the city because defence was important to 
protect the other ftinctions provided by urban areas. Mumford (1961), has stated that it 
was war which built the city, and Ashworth (1987), cites both Houston (1953), and Smith 
(1967), as proponents of this argument. However, both Weber (1958), and Pirenne (1949), 
argue that defence is but one fijnction of the city, and therefore, only part of the 
urbanisation process: 
Accepting that defence is at least one major force in the urbanisation process, Ashworth 
(1987), sets out a number of specific defensive ftinctions (which may overiap) to account 
for this process. Firstly, the protected city evolved according to its financial resources and 
the appreciation of the strength of an external threat. Physical fortifications altered the ratio 
of attacking to defending forces needed to take the city and thus raised the resources 
required by an aggressor to do so. The alternative would have been to deploy a large armed 
force, but this was usually more costly than the erection of defensive walls. Thus, the 
defensive role of a city represented an agglomeration economy to the agents involved in a 
conflict, it also helped to maintain the success of the commercial and administrative 
ftinctions of the area. Ultimately, this ensured that the political and economic means of 
waging war were also maintained. Furthermore, city walls also served the ftmction of 
allowing a degree of control over the inhabitants. Clear delineation of control fostered 
administration, fiscal management and policing. Indeed, Castells (1983), states that "the 
medieval city became an autonomous political entity" because of its military walls. Thus, in 
terms of spatial analysis, the city became a region which might be viewed as a 
self-governing area with limited external trade. Hence, the city was now a growth pole 
created by its defensive role and this core status was to remain in many cases even after the 
defensive roles were extinct. In fact, many examples o f this type of fortification exist in the 
UK; these vary from the most simple, such as first century London, protected by an earth 
bank and a wooden palisade, to massive defences such as the walls of York. 
74 
Secondly, the fortified strong-point differs from the protected city in that it is part of a 
larger defensive system. Therefore, it is a specialised role for a city rather than a necessary 
means of self-defence, implying that the defensive role of the city was not designed merely 
to protect the urban area, but rather a larger region. Consequently, urban fijnctions other 
than defence were always of secondary importance and were there to be supportive of the 
defensive role. In the UK, for instance, such lines of defence are predominant around the 
coast, and particular examples might include Plymouth, Southampton and Portsmouth. 
Thirdly, the bastide is a city used as an instrument of military or political control over the 
area in which it is built. It may represent one unit in a whole chain of cities established for 
this purpose. Generally, the bastide provides both immediate protection for settlers and also 
acts as a centre for a pacification programme of the area. Ashworth (1987), identifies that 
the common features of such settlements cannot be found in their form but may be found in 
their broader locational patterns, regional distribution and reasons for development. Many 
Roman towns in the UK served as bastides. 
Fourthly, the garrison town is an urban area designed to provide service facilities for 
defence forces. These facilities may include transit facilities, supply depots, maintenance 
arsenals and dockyards as well as drill or training areas. Ashworth (1987), highlights the 
fact that the UK has not had any large standing army for the past two hundred years, and 
most of the armed forces have been trained and garrisoned overseas. Arguably, garrison 
towns will therefore have been of limited significance in the historical development of the 
UK defence industry. Nevertheless, many towns and cities in the UK still have military 
bases situated at the original sites of central urban defences. For example, there was until 
recently a Marines base adjacent to Crown Hill Fort in Plymouth, the Exeter garrison is 
also situated at the location of the original defensive settlement. 
Fifth, the revolutionary city is one which developed in a manner which facilitated central 
control over the urban population thereby determining the success or failure of a 
revolution. Arguably, a dense building structure and a narrow irregular street pattern 
favours a lightly armed force operating in small units when fighting against a mechanised 
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force. Conversely, broad avenues with long uninterrupted vistas favour heavily armed 
forces with mobile platforms. In truth, an urban form such as this is more suited to a 
discussion of continental urbanisation rather than the evolution of the UK which has not 
experienced a revolution since the seventeenth century. 
Finally, the city as a battle terrain per se is an urban defence form which has only developed 
since the second world war. Before this time war was only ever fought at the periphery of 
the city because "once the walls had fallen the battle was over". Once again, this fijnction of 
a city is of limited significance for the UK. 
Thus, there are a number of different defensive roles that could provide reasons for the 
development of a city. However, it is not possible to say conclusively whether any o f these 
categories are more likely to retain military connections than others. Nevertheless, 
historical defensive fijnctions provided by cities established the spatial framework upon 
which the present day defence sector developed. Moreover, the defensive functions 
identified above highlight the link between military power and urban areas. Primarily, this 
relationship existed because there were agglomeration economies in defending a small area, 
and because it was also easier to exert internal control over the population. These concepts 
are used in the next section to demonstrate how such relationships can be applied to 
broader geographical units. It investigates the relationship between military power and 
geography and considers the consequences for the development of the DIB. 
3.62 The defence industry and power over territory 
Originally, the word "territory" was applied to city-states such as those of classical Greece 
and the jurisdictions o f mediaeval Italy. In modem usage the application to cities is obsolete 
and it is now used solely in descriptions of nation-states. Indeed, territory is closely tied up 
with the concept o f sovereignty, because by definition, there should be one final and 
absolute authority in a political community which wields the physical power (Hinsley, 
1966). 
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Taylor (1985), argues that it was the bringing together of territory and sovereignty which 
provides the basis for the modern inter-state system which arose from the religious wars in 
Europe emanating from the Reformation and counter-Reformation. Indeed, Herz (1957), 
argues that the slate emerged to provide security in an environment where instability was 
the order of the day: 
"The legal concept of sovereigtity was backed up by a hard shell of defences which made it 
relatively impenetrable to foreig}i armies so that it became the ultimate unit of 
protection The hard shell of the walled city was replaced by the sovereigfi state and 
the new defences based upon much larger resources. Such new warfare required a firm 
territorial basis, not the personal hierarchy of the mediaeval period", (Herz, 1957). 
Underlying these changes was the gunpowder revolution in warfare which effectively made 
individual city ramparts obsolete. However, other factors will have played a part in the 
enlargement of territorial-sovereign units. For example, Tilly (1975), emphasises the 
stability which is created when a whole area mobilises its resources because large regions 
are more self-sufficient than smaller ones. In economic terms, there are gains from the 
centralisation of power which facilitates the supply of public goods such as defence. In 
addition, this evolutionary process was fuelled by the rise of mercantilism, which entailed 
the transfer of commercial policies from the trading city to the territorial state (Isaacs, 
1948). Thus, the survival of the state was not restricted to its defensive capabilities but also 
its ability to capture and retain a share of global trade. 
Ever since forces have engaged in territorial conflict the distance between warring factions 
has dictated the level of resources necessary to invest in defence. For instance, i f the 
location of a threat is more distant, then by the time the aggressor has reached the conflict, 
the army may be considerably tired and vulnerable to supply line disruption. Thus, 
historically, geographical factors have determined the location o f major defensive 
settlements. Indeed, vwth improvements in the mobility of armed forces this distance 
constraint has been progressively reduced and conflict could take place fijrther and further 
away from the base. 
The relationship between power and distance, which becomes weaker further from home 
has been coined "the loss of strength gradient" (Boulding, 1963). Furthermore, this 
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gradient has become shallower with each technological innovation of war. For example, the 
weakening of this relationship has accelerated over time as the advent o f gunpowder, naval 
power, radio, aircraft, rocketry, nuclear weapons and satellites have reduced the friction of 
distance which permits potential conflicts. Thus, the ultimate war based on inter-continental 
missile attacks could be seen as the total elimination of the distance constraint. 
In addition, it could be argued that today conflict exists at a level which is higher than the 
nation-state because the loss of strength gradient is so weak. Hence, this explains the 
polarisation of the globe along lines of "geostrategic regions" which comprise "groups of 
states sharing a common political or economic philosophy" (Blacksell, 1989). Cohen 
(1982), identifies a division into two major worid regions. Firstly, the "Trade-dependent 
Maritime World" comprises western Europe, the Americas, most of Afirica and Australasia, 
and is held together by a complex network of maritime trading links. Secondly, the 
Eurasian Continental Power is built around the former-USSR and China and is land-based 
yet has been largely integrated by ideology rather than by trading relationships. 
Arguably, technological improvements in weaponry since the Second Worid War have 
polarised the globe along the lines of geostrategic regions. This implies that ultimately 
distance should have a smaller role to play in any major conflict. However, this argument is 
challenged by those who take the view that in the arms race the superpowers 
under-estimated the security afforded to them by friction of distance (O'Sullivan, 1985). 
Indeed, O'Sullivan's argument suggests that nuclear weapons are redundant since they make 
territory uninhabitable. Nevertheless, it is contestable whether this completely removes the 
threat of usage. 
Thus, to summarise, it is possible to envisage a situation where at first there is a castle or 
fort in every district. However, as one social group extends its effective control over an 
increasingly large area (by conflict or co-operation), the number o f small individual 
defensive centres that are required to maintain control is reduced. Eventually, whole 
regions are assigned a common defensive role and as this process continues they become 
enlarged to create a relatively stable pattern of nation-states. This stability is enhanced by 
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many forces such as acculturalisation between social groups and international treaties which 
outlaw the acquisition of territory by conquest. 
Thus, historically, principal defensive roles have transferred from city to state. Yet, many 
cities still play a role as a component of the defensive system of the nation-state. Therefore, 
an important question is why some cities or regions have developed comparative 
advantages in defence products. Initially, all settlements probably had a defensive role and 
there are a number of scenarios which might account for regional defence concentrations. 
Firstly, a settlement or region could find that its initial defensive role continues through 
time to create a pole of growth based on the maintenance of armed forces and/or military 
procurement expenditure. For example, this category might include areas where defence 
was but a part of the output of the local economy. Alternatively, the defence role could be 
lost and the area might develop by adopting some other form of specialisation or even slip 
into economic decline i f no alternative commercial role evolved. Finally, new sites could 
also develop with some military or defence industry role. It seems likely that any of these 
scenarios could evolve depending on the strategic, commercial or political influences that 
exist in an area. Thus, these forces will have shaped both the pattern o f nation-states and 
their defence industries. Hence, the next section considers these issues in the context of the 
UK. 
3.63 The historical evolution of the U K defence industry 
Lovering (1993), describes the modem development of the geography of the UK defence 
industry as involving four distinct phases. This provides a framework in which to examine 
the historical evolution of the industry. 
Firstly, from the mid-1800s arms production was transformed from a charge of the state by 
industrial capitalism to privately owned enterprise. Lovering (1993), argues this developed 
centres in the heavy industrial engineering towns of the North. For example, a large 
warship building programme was initiated in 1889 as a response to increasing fear of 
German expansionism. One consequence was that the Royal Dockyards were incapable of 
supplying the additional ships and, therefore, private firms were invited to engage in 
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warship production (Todd, 1987). This occurred at a time when shipbuilding was shifting 
northwards and deserting the Thames where factor costs were arguably higher and iron and 
stee! were not readily available. Thus, in part, the shift fi-om on-site military bases to new 
locations was a result of the desire to reduce costs by private sector firms. Hence, demand 
shifted from the public sector dockyards (whose location was historically determined) to 
the private sector whose location was much more influenced by market forces and in 
particular the desire to minimise costs. Therefore, in simple terms, the selection of some 
sites such as the centres of the North could be equated to neo-classical descriptions of 
industrial location. 
Prior to these developments, the traditional approach of government was to procure the 
majority of arms supply ft-om state owned establishments and employ the private sector 
only in times of emergency (Law, 1981). In effect, there was a state monopoly on arms 
supply which only ceased in the mid-nineteenth century. However, Law (1981), suggests 
that by 1900, two-thirds of defence equipment was supplied by the private sector. State 
owned enterprises were unable to keep pace with technological changes or the level of 
demand for weapons that prevailed at the turn of the century. Thus, a selected club of arms 
manufacturers evolved and this established the beginning o f a special relationship with the 
government. Indeed, it is argued that this relationship was a two way flow with the 
government enjoying a high degree of control over the monitoring of quality, reliability and 
speed of supply of its equipment purchases, whilst the firms enjoyed a relatively protected 
position from outside competition. In truth, this special relationship was a continuation of 
the power of the state over its defensive capabilities. Moreover, to totally relinquish this 
physical power would be to cede sovereignty to secondary institutions which could 
undermine the control that the state extended over its territory. Thus, the net effect was a 
dilution of the direct power of the state over its defences through a limited transfer of arms 
production to the private sector. However, this enabled the state to increase the overall 
military potential of the UK. 
In the second phase of Lovering's scheme some companies which developed as military 
suppliers in the nineteenth century survived in their original locations. However, they were 
joined by a new set of industries which avoided the Victorian industrial base of the North. 
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For instance, aircraft production took place where the founders lived or aJready had 
facilities for manufacturing, thus creating a bias towards the South of England. Indeed, as 
discussed earlier, the proximity o f the owners of capital often seems to be a prime location 
consideration for many modem industries (Oakey and Cooper, 1989, Haug, 1991). In 
particular, Law (1981), emphasises the concentration of aircraft manufacturers that was to 
be found around London, especially at Famborough where the Royal Aircraft Factory was 
situated. Arguably, this was because London was the headquarters o f the MoD where 
decisions about military procurement were made. 
Thus, from the outset, the state and the aircraft industry were linked in a close, 
interdependent relationship (Hayward, 1989). Either production was undertaken in the 
Royal Aircraft Factory, or it was with established engineering or armaments companies. 
The state had a degree of control over all of these enterprises and the new aircraft 
manufacturers merely swelled the numbers of firms in the inner circle of favoured producers 
(Law, 1981). Effectively, this suggests that the continual development of technology was 
rendering state control of arms production less practicable. It was increasingly necessary to 
transfer more arms production to new firms in order to keep pace with the growth in 
military developments. Only by extending the membership of the club of exclusive 
producers was the state able to obtain supplies of the new weaponry with only a small 
sacrifice of overall control. 
A third phase of development was instituted in the run up to the Second World War when 
the defence industry was shifted Westwards in an attempt to reduce its vulnerability to 
attack from Germany. In truth, this process may be explained by the loss of strength 
gradient, which makes defence sites vulnerable to the threat posed by German air strikes. 
Indeed, the strength gradient was now so shallow that immediate military strikes were 
feasible well into the territory of the UK. However, because distance stiD had some role to 
play, the optimal location for industrial plants was to be situated as far west as possible. 
Nevertheless, the true extent of this westward shift is questionable given that it is 
documented that after the war defence firms remained static and the current pattern o f the 
defence industry is markedly concentrated towards the East. For example, the European 
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Commission's (1992) study clearly depicts a strong southern and eastern concentration of 
military and defence industrial production. 
Finally, after the Second World War, the location of the defence industry in the UK with a 
few major exceptions remained largely in the south and notably within fifty miles of 
London. This outcome appears to be partly related to changes in the strategic environment. 
For example, the evolution of the Cold War meant that the major threat still lay to the East 
of the UK. Yet, now the range and destructive extent of missile technology was global and 
western locations in the UK could offer no more protection than those of the east. 
Consequently, this meant that technological change had largely removed strategic 
considerations fi"om location decisions. Thus, strategic issues no longer have such a role to 
play in an historical explanation and, alternative factors need to be examined in explaining 
the location of defence. 
The above description is a brief outline which cannot account for all the individual locations 
of the defence industry and the military. Lovering's (1993), historical account encompasses 
both political influences (e.g. the control of arms production) and economic influences (e.g. 
the development of least cost sites). Yet, an historical description such as this might not be 
seen as sufficient to some American academics whose treatment o f the US defence industry 
relies much more on specific locational explanations because in America there is much less 
history to confuse spatial relationships, so US academics expect spatial theories to be 
adequate to explain location. In the words of Manuel Castells (1990), British criticisms of 
US analytical efforts can be summarised as being due to the fact that Britain is different 
(from America), and because every region evolves according to its own specific set of 
factors. However, what may also be important is whether the different conclusions reached 
on opposite sides of the Atlantic are due to different attitudes of social scientists, or 
whether the two countries are genuinely afifected by their own spatial fix. This diflference of 
opinion may well be motivated by the depth of history which may affect a site in its defence 
industrial role. Thus, US studies are aided by the shallow depth of history which has shaped 
their defence geography and also their relative protection fi"om conflict on home territory. 
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Even Law (1981), who performs an extensive treatment of the historical evolution of each 
defence manufacturing group in the UK, does not attempt to explain the original location 
decisions of military industry. Generally, this is an acknowledgement o f the complexity of 
any historical analysis of the UK defence industry. Thus, it may be legitimate to accept that 
a complete explanation for the spatial distribution of the sector will never be available. 
In conclusion, a number of points are worth highlighting. Firstly, the defensive role of the 
city has been central to the evolution of defence sites. Secondly, the ability to extend power 
over distance has influenced the degree to which sites have become specialised in a defence 
industrial role. Finally, changes in technology have resulted in the loss of strength gradient. 
Consequently, the location of military power and its production which was traditionally 
located close to an aggressor has been progressively moved away fi-om the strike 
capabilities of an attacker. Indeed, today, distance provides no protection from the enemy. 
In particular, it is the changes to the strength gradient which may have lessened the 
importance of strategic factors in governing the location of the defence industry. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Thus, there are a number of models which describe patterns of regional economic growth 
although as Weber (1929) notes, there are two main forms of spatial theory. Firstly, there 
are theories which attempt to examine the causes of location. Secondly, there are those 
which examine the causes of agglomeration and dispersion. In the main, most theories 
described above are of the second type. Consequently, explanations for the causes of 
location are conspicuous by their absence. However, this is unsurprising as such 
information is unavailable apart from historical accounts which show that the roles of early 
military settlements can be traced through to contemporary military functions. These 
descriptions cannot be ignored, however, more recent events and processes are more 
relevant. 
Some regional economic models predict that there are forces which encourage clustering of 
economic activity, whilst others suggest that long-run forces o f convergence will 
counteract any polarisation tendencies. Many of these models can be applied in such a way 
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as to provide possible explanations for the spatial evolution of the DIB in the UK. 
However, the complex economic, political and strategic relationships which have 
determined the distribution of the defence industry preclude the existence of a single 
explanatory theory. Moreover, caution must be exercised when making such considerations 
because such post-hoc rationalisations tend to "fit" the data by the nature of backward 
reasoning. 
Inevitably, many of the above approaches identify a number of factors which are highly 
significant in the contemporary geography of the defence industry. In particular, localised 
concentrations of production are evident. Potentially, the military-industrial complex 
represents not only a special relationship in the production process of defence goods, but it 
may also constitute a spatial phenomenon. Thus, growth poles generated by this complex 
may be the dominant form of production created by a relatively stable level of state 
demand. Therefore, a principal aim of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that there are 
localised concentrations of defence industrial activity in the UK. 
Hypothesis 1: There are localised concentrations of defence industrial activity in the 
UK, 
In addition, the historical perspective identifies a number of time periods in which large 
scale changes wall have taken place in whole sections of the DEB. Many of these are related 
to changes that were the result of strategic policy decisions which effectively re-organised 
the ft-amework in which the industrial capacity of the state is arranged to wage a war. Such 
decisions are the result of changes in threats which are often related to technological 
advances which have reduced the strength gradient. Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
the roles of economic, strategic and institutional factors in the evolution of the sector. 
Thus, a second fundamental hypothesis is to test the idea that institutional factors have 
contributed to the spatial organisation of the defence industrial base 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional factors have contributed to the spatial organisation of the 
defence industrial base 
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Today, there may be new influences in the geography of the defence industrial sector. For 
example, the new phase of rationalisation and retrenchment may produce new spatial forms 
of production which are consistent with the flexible specialisation and accumulation theses. 
Indeed, it is likely that new production modes will evolve. However, so little evidence 
exists for the traditional nature of operations in the DEB that it may be difficult to assess 
how such changes are truly affecting organisation patterns. Thus, a third hypothesis is that 
changes in the defence environment are causing the spatial organisation of the defence 
industry to change. 
Hypothesis 3: Changes in the defence environment are causing changes in the spatial 
organisation of the defence industry. 
Thus, this chapter has envisaged the evolution of the DIB from a number of theoretical 
viewpoints. Indeed, many of these theories are consistent with the special characteristics 
which exist in the defence sector as identified in chapter two. Moreover, in the above 
discussion a number of ideas have been conceived which could be used to establish testable 
hypotheses concerning the spatial organisation of the sector. Given the importance of the 
DIB in the South of the UK it is also logical to include this particular area in an analysis of 
these issues. Thus, the next section of the thesis considers the potential of such a 
geographical area. 
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4 
The South West Defence Sector 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents background information on the South West region of the U K which 
is the subject of the detailed survey discussed in subsequent chapters. Initially, the basic 
economic characteristics of the region are considered including some of the distinctive 
features of the regional economy. Secondly, the defence industrial literature which 
specifically relates to the South West is reviewed. In particular, the clustering of defence 
industrial activities at Bristol and Plymouth are the prime focii of this section although 
relatively smaller concentrations also exist in the region. Finally, a number of observations 
are made concerning the implications o f the high level of defence dependence of the South 
West. 
4.1 The South West Economy 
The standard South West economic region comprises the seven counties of Avon, 
Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire. As a whole, the region 
has a relatively high standard of living and ranks as the third most prosperous of the ten UK 
standard regions when compared by a range o f economic indicators (Gripaios, 1996). 
Moreover, one outstanding feature is the consistent performance of the South West in the 
prosperity rankings. For example, it ranks highly in terms of both income and earnings and 
in 1993 it ranked third in terms of household income, second in terms of household 
disposable income and fourth in terms of personal income and disposable income. It was 
also the second fastest growing region in terms of percentage GDP growth. 
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Table 4.1 South West population and unemployment 
Population 
(1994) 000s 
Unemployment 
rate (%) Jan 
1996 
Avon 979 7.3 
Cornwall 479 10.3 
De\on 1,039 8.4 
Dorset 672 7.2 
Gloucestershire 550 6.0 
Somerset 478 6.7 
Wiltshire 588 5.2 
SIV 4J97 7.4 
UK 58.395 7.9 
source: Gripaios (1996) 
In terms of unemployment, the region had the second lowest level in the UK at only 6.8% 
in January 1996. Moreover, the labour market has become healthier in the last few years 
with the number of employees in employment and the civilian labour force growing by the 
second fastest in the U K between 1992-95. The quality of labour may also be the second 
highest nationally with respect to factors such as standards in higher education and low 
stoppage rates. 
Although the South West may be seen as a strong regional economy there are a diversity of 
economic conditions in the province. For example, the north east of the region is arguably 
well integrated into the main UK economy, yet in the far South West distance and physical 
conditions isolate the peninsular from the rest of the country. These differences can be 
illustrated, for example, by table 4.1 which shows that there is a wide variation in 
unemployment rates in the region. In broad terms these variations show a distinct 
geographical gradient reflecting the peripheral nature o f the western sub-region relative to 
the more prosperous east. Essentially, the problems of Devon and Cornwall have arisen 
from a combination of local and structural disadvantages, with the chief economic activities 
of the region having failed to provide a basis for rapid economic expansion in the late 
twentieth century. Indeed, a reliance on agricultural output and a deficiency of 
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manufacturing industry have arisen as a consequence of a relatively dispersed population 
and segmented local markets. The underdevelopment of Devon and Cornwall qualifies the 
areas for structural fijnds from the European Union and prior to this the sub-region 
received some regional support from domestic Assisted Area Status. This history of 
financial support for the region does not, however, seem to have fundamentally altered the 
prosperity of the area. Moreover, the amalgamation of the seven counties as a single 
economic region for statistical and administrative purposes has arguably been responsible 
for denying further assistance to the far south west. 
Table 4.2 Gross domestic product by industry groups 
(factor cost at current prices) £M (1993) 
South 
West 
U K S W % 
contribution 
to U K 
Agriculture, hunting, forestrv- & fishing 1,644 10,373 15.8 
Mining, quaming inc oil. gas extraction 480 12,147 4 
Manufacturing 8,143 118,294 6.8 
Electricity, gas, water 1,354 13.994 9.7 
Construction 2,395 29,221 8.2 
Distribution, hotels and catering; repairs 6,589 78,348 8.4 
Transport, storage & communication 2,864 46.263 6.2 
Financial & business senices 10,257 133,956 7.7 
Public administration & defence 4.334 38.199 11.3 
Education, social work and health senices 4,374 57,457 7.6 
Other services 2.334 31,292 7.4 
Adjustment for financial services -2.170 -23.741 9.1 
Total 42,598 546,120 7.8 
source: Regional Trends (1995) 
The South West contributes about 8% of UK GDP and most industriaJ sectors within the 
region have similar contributions to national output (table 4.2). However, two categories 
are particularly prominent relative to the national picture, namely, agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing and, public administration and defence. 
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4.2 Regional defence dependence 
It is widely recognised that the South West is, in relative terms, the most defence 
dependent region in the UK (Lovering 1991a; Braddon et al, 1991). The region contains a 
number of prime defence contractors and a wide range of sub-contractors and defence 
suppliers (Bishop & Gripaios, 1995). It also contains a key aerospace centre (Avon), and 
the UK's major naval dockyard (Devonport). There are many important military bases in 
the region and also over 30 contact points for local defence purchase orders (Defence 
Suppliers Service, 1995). 
Conceivably, the defence industrial import£mce of the South West may have evolved for a 
number of strategic reasons and the general forces involved have been discussed in section 
3 .5. However, a number of specific features may also be relevant for this particular region. 
Primarily, the length of coastline may have made the South West an area which has needed 
a high defensive role. In addition, its location may have made it a favourable starting point 
for maritime based trade with the rest of the world and this activity initially required 
military support. Finally, the region may have benefited from the westward shift of military 
industry in the Second World War in the attempt to reduce its vulnerability to attack from 
Germany (Lovering, 1993). Thus, historical and geographical factors may provide logical 
explanations for the high concentration of military (and in particular naval) activity in the 
region. 
In the 1980s and 1990s the defence dependence of the South West increasingly drew the 
attention of a number of academics and local authorities. This interest was no doubt fijelled 
by the anticipated spatial impact of rapid defence sector restructuring. Initially, many 
defence related studies were linked to studies of high technology manufacturing. For 
example, early UK studies such Breheny and McQuaid (1985), Boddy & Lovering (1986), 
Gripaios et a/ (1988), reviewed links between defence and high technology activity. Indeed, 
these works described development along the M4 corridor to the Avon region and into the 
far South West. Generally, such studies note a straight-forward link between the aerospace 
industry and military demand in such places as the Bristol region. However, in the Thames 
Valley earlier rounds of high-technology investment in the 1920s and 1930s may have been 
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responsible for the geographical concentration of activity which later evolved military 
connections and expanded towards the South West. Typically, the high technology studies 
noted that advanced industry was not responsible for dynamic or significant growrth in the 
region. For example, Boddy and Lovering (1986), stressed that the major growth of 
employment in the Bristol sub-region in 1971-81 was dependent on the growth of services 
unrelated to high-technology. However, they recorded that the overall dechne in high-tech 
manufacturing employment was considerably less than that in manufacturing in general. 
More recent studies have specifically concentrated on defence industrial production. 
Perhaps the most geographically comprehensive is that by Braddon el al (1991), which 
collectively considers the defence industrial activity of all seven South West Counties. The 
study reviews all types of military and defence related activity in the region and includes 
predictions for the inevitable effects of recent restructuring in the defence environment. The 
study also includes a few exploratory interviews fi-om a sample of companies in the defence 
supply chain although no quantitative data are presented. A number o f case studies are 
selectively quoted to suggest a high regional defence dependence. Moreover, although no 
comprehensive survey work is carried out, the authors concluded that 88-90,000 jobs were 
generated by direct and indirect defence employment in the region in 1988. Using 
unpublished data supplied by the MoD, and a methodology unspecified in their report, they 
estimated that this figure may have fallen to 77-78,000 by 1990. Whilst it is not possible to 
evaluate the appropriateness of their methodology, their estimate is considerably lower than 
that produced by Nawaz (1994) for 1992-93, which comprised 83,000 workers. Finally, the 
report makes two main policy recommendations. Firstly, a demand for a prompt and 
unequivocal statement on future UK defence policy including the size o f the budget for the 
next decade. Secondly, a call for a pro-active, co-ordinated regional approach to facilitate 
the efficient and equitable economic development of the South West. 
Other studies in the South West have concentrated on specific geographical areas. In 
particular, such studies have traditionally focused on the Bristol hinterland and Devonport 
Dockyard and its sub-region. Many of these studies include survey work which attempts to 
quantify defence industrial employment. These studies are considered in detail in the 
follov^ng sections. 
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4.3 The Bnstol Hinterland 
The defence industrial role of the Avon region is dominated by its links with the aerospace 
sector. However, the surrounding hinteriand is also strongly associated with aerospace. 
Lovering (1985a), describes Bristol as at the centre of a zone which appears to be uniquely 
dependent upon defence expenditure. The zone stretches from Cheltenham in the north, to 
Yeovil in the south and Swindon in the east. Thus, approximately the zone corresponds to 
the entire Northern sub-region of the South West. Of note within the area are the major 
establishments at Filton which is the home of British Aerospace and Rolls Royce. 
Furthermore, Dowry (TI) and Snuths are based in Gloucester and Cheltenham, whilst 
Westland (GKN) is situated at Yeovil. In addition, there are a substantial number of other 
defence related manufacturers in the region. 
The defence industrial role of the Bristol region evolved from the relocation of other 
defence activities into the region (Lovering, 19S5a). In particular, this included the 
relocation of 4,000 Admiralty employees to Bath in 1939 and proposals which led to 
Cheltenham becoming an import<mt site for MoD activities after the Second World War. 
Such plans were drawn up as a consequence of strategic thinking on safe areas. Moreover, 
rearmament policies in the 1930s encouraged development in the safe areas which 
happened to include some of the most depressed UK regions. Thus, new manufacturing 
industry was established in the Bristol hinteriand most noticeably with the development of 
the Bristol Aeroplane Company (BAC). As a firm capable of mass producing new airframes 
and aeroengines, BAC was well placed to capitalise on large supplies o f local labour. Thus, 
it became the second largest manufacturer of aero-products during the War. 
By the end of the War the aerospace sector had become the leading British high-technology 
sector and BAC had played crucial role, post-war, the company survived and grew as a 
result of successful technical and commercial initiatives. In the 1960s, the company merged 
with Rolls-Royce and corporate defence functions were consolidated in Bristol. Further 
specialisation and on-going innovation secured a further stream of projects despite defence 
expenditure reviews which partially curtailed the growth of the industry. 
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The importance of aerospace in the Bristol sub-region is hence the result of a long process 
of historical development However, despite the obvious concentration of defence activity 
in the area, the economic importance of the sector is difficult to quantify. There are few 
official statistics which are disaggregated to a sufficiently high level to provide a 
sub-regional picture of defence employment. Nevertheless, Lovering (1991b), has 
estimated that there were over 29,200 defence related jobs in the area in 1991. Moreover, 
the CEC (1992), estimated that Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire was the 20th most 
defence dependent NUTS n region in the EU in 1991. The methodologies and limitations 
of these data sets have been discussed in sections 2.34 and 2.35. 
Many local authorities in the region have commissioned their own studies of defence 
companies. For example, Wiltshire County Council conducted a survey o f 67 local defence 
companies in 1992. Respondents were represented almost equally by small and large firms 
(by turnover), and were located throughout the county. In addition, there was a wide 
variation in the percentage of sales in defence markets recorded by respondents. For 
example, 25% had more than 40% of their turnover in MoD work. However, 46% had 
more than 80% of their turnover in non-defence markets. Thus, this demonstrates that the 
"popular image of companies needing to convert totally from swords into ploughshares 
has little applicability in Wiltshire", (Wiltshire CC, 1992). 
Although the Wiltshire study provides an essentially static view of the defence industrial 
environment, it attempted to ascertain some dynamic perspective. For example, the loss of 
employment in large companies (with turnover >£5M) was found to be much greater than 
in smaller enterprises (with turnover <£1M). In fact, small and medium sized firms 
demonstrated a high variation in employment levels ranging from +400% to -90%. Yet, in 
overall terms the level of defence employment fell significantly in the period from five years 
before the survey. However, such totals are not quantified in the survey report. 
A more recent assessment by Wiltshire County Council (1996), estimated that over 27,000 
workers were employed in defence related companies in the county. The methodology 
tabulates that there were 13,900 workers employed in 23 companies with over 200 
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employees. In addition, there were 7,000 people employed in another 226 smaller 
companies. Thus, there were 20,900 direct employees of defence related industries. 
Furthermore, i f a multiplier value of 1.3 is assumed then associated indirect employment 
brings the total to 27,170 employees. The study also included a questionnaire survey of 58 
local companies. The response indicated that there was a high level of defence dependency 
with over 10% of companies having more than 50% of their sales in defence markets. 
Moreover, 4 1 % recorded that their defence turnover had decreased and 69% expected no 
future improvement in defence markets. Thus, as a response to these conditions, 83% were 
seeking to diversify into civil markets. 
Thus, the Wiltshire studies confirm a high concentration of defence industrial activity in the 
county. Moreover, a sub-regional analysis reveals that the majority of the defence 
companies in the area (66%), are concentrated in the Thamesdown district which includes 
the town of Swindon. No explanations or analysis for this high concentration are provided. 
Indeed, this is somewhat surprising given that the most recent report is designed 
specifically to win regional fijnds to support declining defence industries. However, what is 
clear from the study is that this concentration appears to be unrelated to the distribution of 
military establishments which, in the main, are concentrated to the south around Salisbury 
Plain and to the west around Chippenham. Certainly, some in-depth analysis of the nature 
of these local concentrations may be usefijl for understanding the fiiture restructuring of the 
sector. 
Another recent local authority study conducted in the area was commissioned by 
Gloucestershire County Council (1995). The study illustrates that the level of 
manufacturing employment in the county is slightly higher than the national average, whilst 
the level of employment in services is slightly lower. Moreover, within the manufacturing 
sector in Gloucestershire the key feature is the over-representation in the engineering 
sectors of aerospace and electronics which have a strong orientation towards defence 
markets. 
The Gloucestershire report also uses a methodology to identify the main defence related 
comparues and from this list, builds a picture of the likely level of defence industrial 
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employment. For example, it is estimated that there are 12 large defence firms in 
Gloucestershire with over 200 employees. In 1990, the workforce in these companies 
comprised 10,500 employees. However, by 1993 only 6,600 jobs remained in the county, a 
drop of 37%. However, it is also estimated that another 10,000 defence related employees 
were attached to defence suppliers in the county in 1990. Yet, applying the same 
percentage loss to this category reveals that as many as 4,000 of these jobs may also have 
been lost. Thus, assuming that there are 12,400 people directly employed in companies 
involved in the defence sector in Gloucestershire, then using a muhiplier of 1.3 indicates 
that there may be 16,120 employees dependent on defence industrial activity 
(Gloucestershire County Council, 1995). 
Thus, there are a high number of defence industrial firms within Gloucestershire. However, 
the study does not analyse the nature of linkages between defence companies. It simply 
reports that there are likely to be local trading relationships between these firms. For 
example; 
"The Gloucestershire economy is home to a number of ...companies which are closely 
linked to the defence industry. Some of these...engineering companies... will form part of 
the first tier of supply chain whilst others will either supply sub-contractors or work 
directly for the MoD" (Gloucestershire County Council, 1995). 
Thus, although the report acknowledges a number of defence companies concentrated in 
the area with various supplier roles, the actual causes of this concentration are not 
considered. Consequently, there is no discussion as to whether the closure of military bases 
or other defence firms will have a knock on effect on to other defence companies. Thus, as 
with previous studies, there is considerable potential for further analysis of the causes and 
effects of the concentrations of defence industrial activity. 
J-
In addition to Lovering's (1985a, 1985b,) historical discussion of the development of the 
military industry at Bristol there are some in-depth anzdyses of the defence supply chain in 
the area. Braddon et al (1992), analyse the supply chain associated with Rolls-Royce 
Aerospace Group based at Bristol. Initially, senior planning staff at the Military Engines 
Business group were interviewed to establish the fi-amework for a research programme. 
Secondly, interviews with senior management in Corporate Purchasing and Supply 
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functions of Rolls-Royce headquarters ascertained the buying policies of the company and 
directed the project towards relevant supplier lists. The geographical location of these 
initial sub-contractors were constrained to the South West. However, subsequent supplier 
rounds were investigated from all over the country. Thus, 60 companies were selected from 
the initial tier of Rolls-Royce suppliers from the five main purchasing areas. Telephone and 
face-to-face interviews were conducted wath senior executives from these establishments. 
Further analysis was conducted with companies from the second and third tier of the supply 
chain using questionnaires. 
The survey concludes that the range of activity in the supply chain is much wider than is 
commonly supposed. Consequently, the economic impact of defence cuts is likely to be 
more widespread than might be initially expected. Moreover, the future may be most 
difficult for small and medium sized defence specialists who will be vulnerable to defence 
cuts as they filter through the supply chain. Furthermore, at the lower end of the chain 
many suppliers are blissfully unaware of the ultimate military destination of their output. In 
addition, the matrix form of the supply chain where there is a high degree of 
interdependency between suppliers further heightens the vulnerability of some defence 
companies to cuts. Thus, the survey provides some analysis of the nature of linkages within 
the defence supply chain. However, much of the research is highly qualitative and the 
empirical work in general, focuses on strategic responses of firms and the implications on 
employment. Therefore, even this analysis does not extend so far as to investigate the 
spatial nature of the defence supply chain. 
Another interesting study was undertaken by Jenner & Wells (1990), who surveyed a small 
sample of thirteen local Westland suppliers through a mixture of questiormaires and 
interviews. The sample was deliberately non-ramdom in order to encompass the full 
diversity of producers thought to be important in the supply chain. Nevertheless, Jenner & 
Wells conclude that, as almost all of Westland's plant requirements are procured from 
outside the Yeovil economy, the area is too specialised and underdeveloped to be termed a 
local military industrial complex. Yet, they also highlight the high level of dependence 
which exists between a number of defence suppliers. Indeed, they recognise the need for 
further empirical work which investigates such clustering around prime contractors. 
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Clearly, a larger sample of the local area might reveal that there is a high level of 
interdependency between defence suppliers, and an analysis of the nature of local linkages 
amongst such enterprises may also be beneficial. 
More recently, the Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire area has potentially received 
significant inward investment from the relocation of the MoD procurement executive to 
Abbey Wood in the north of Bristol. Eventually, 7,000 people will be based at the new site, 
transferring employment fi-om a number of UK sites including Bath and Portland. 
Inevitably, the development of this site could consolidate the defence dependence of the 
sub-region proving to be a welcome boost for the local economy. Of course this may 
depend on the nature of the relationships which develop between this facility and local 
defence companies. However, other areas of the UK may suffer from such defence-led 
restructuring as defence related institutions are concentrated in fewer areas. However, as 
yet, there has been little quantification of the effects of this restructuring. 
Thus, a number of studies support the view that the Bristol sub-region is highly defence 
dependent. Moreover, historical descriptions confirm that the evolution of the DLB in the 
area has been promoted by both industrial and institutional factors. However, there has 
been virtually no analysis to explain the spatial nature of linkages between defence 
industrial firms or amongst other actors in the supply chain. The majority of spatial studies 
have assumed an advantage of close proximity between defence suppliers when in fact there 
has been little empirical testing of such benefits. For example, Boddy & Lovering (1986), 
assert that in part, the cluster of high-technology at Bristol is not unique, but is common to 
other regions of the UK. Indeed, several of the companies represented in their sample of 30 
electronics and aerospace firms fi-om the Bristol TTWA also have branches at a number of 
other sites which serve distinct local markets. However, whilst the authors consider Bristol 
to be unique due to its concentration of defence related demand, Bristol based respondents 
actually listed military institutions fi-om Plymouth to Malvern as users of information 
technology which provided benefits. Boddy & Lovering assert that this is evidence for a 
cluster of defence demand although they concede that without an assessment of the relative 
strength of these markets caution should be exercised. However, it may be unrealistic to 
consider demand as spatially concentrated when it is drawn fi-om such a wide geographical 
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area. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that the same list of demand sites could not be 
supplied by a group of firms from, for example, Lancashire. Clearly, such issues need 
further investigation. 
4.4 Devonport Dockyard 
The local economy of Devon and Cornwall, and in particular the Plymouth area, is heavily 
dependent upon defence expenditure for the generation of employment. This dependence is 
primarily associated with the Devonport Dockyard/ Naval base complex which is the 
largest naval support facility in Western Europe. The site includes the Royal Dockyard, 14 
dry docks and 5 basins, the naval base, barracks and a variety of headquarters and support 
services. Indeed, Bishop (1992), estimates that the dockyard generated £520m o f income 
directly and indirectly for the economies of Devon and Cornwall in 1991. In addition, there 
are 29 military bases in Devon and 8 in Cornwall as well as a number of other military 
establishments (Gripaios, 1994). Many of these are closely associated with the dockyard. 
Thus, Plymouth has the highest concentration of military and civilian defence personnel of 
any district in South West England. 
The Naval base at Plymouth dates back as far as the sixteenth century, but was 
consolidated by the construction of the dockyard in the seventeenth century (Bishop, 
1991). Thus, the defence sector became a major source of local employment and by the 
twentieth century, the yard was an important site for naval shipbuilding. However, after 
World War Two Devonport declined as a shipbuilding centre and assumed a role as a naval 
repair facility. Additional work was secured by the establishment o f a modem frigate 
refitting complex and the opening of a nuclear submarine refitting base. 
Few data are available to accurately ascertain the level of defence related employment in 
Devon and Cornwall. This is partly attributable to the lack o f local authority survey work 
which has been carried out in the sub-region until relatively recently. However, the CEC 
(1992), estimates that the sub-region is the twelfth most defence dependent in the Union 
and Lovering (1991b), estimates that 17,400 defence industrial jobs were supported in 
Devon and Cornwall in 1989-90. There have also been a number of recent academic studies 
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which have analysed the nature of the local defence industrial environment. Using multiplier 
analysis Bishop (1992), for example, estimates that in 1991 the dockyard directly or 
indirectly supported 29,900 jobs of which 6,900 were generated by the expenditure of the 
wages of defence workers and purchases of local firms. Furthermore, over 600 local firms 
received orders fi-om the dockyard and as much as 30% of all local income in Plymouth 
was generated by the dockyard and other military establishments in the area. 
One recent study estimates local defence employment as having fallen by 10-15,000 
between 1985 and 1991 (Bishop & Gripaios, 1995). The methodology fi-om this report 
assumes that all direct employment is generated by equipment spending via the dockyard. 
However, inevitably, additional defence related employment will also be affected by recent 
changes in the defence industrial environment. Moreover, fiirther job losses have recently 
occurred in the dockyard and the official payroll now includes under 3,500 employees 
(Gripaios, 1996). Two other surveys of manufacturing industry in Devon and Cornwall 
estimate that 52% of respondents in Devon and 42% in Cornwall had some defence 
business (Bishop & Gripaios, 1993). It is also estimated that over 2,000 Jobs are directly or 
indirectly related to defence sales in Cornwall. 
Bishop (1996), uses dockyard purchasing records to assess the spatial pattern of local 
supply linkages and shows that there is a high level of local purchasing with over 38% of all 
supplies being derived from within Devon and Cornwall. Moreover, the study tends to 
confirm the view that services are the main beneficiary of local spending. However, there is 
no evidence that the dockyard has generated a large number of specialist suppliers in the 
manufacturing sector. Arguably, this might contradict the view that defence industrial 
agglomerations are dependent on specialised local linkages and instead support the view 
that they are merely service orientated. This data somewhat contradicts evidence from the 
Wihshire County Council (1996) survey which suggests that only 37% of defence 
companies in the county were service orientated. However, the level o f defence industrial 
concentration in the region could vary between east and west. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the data relating to service companies may be even more limited than that 
corresponding to defence manufacturing firms because o f the non-military nature o f many 
service products. Inevitably, this makes it difficult to trace defence service firms. 
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Bishop & Megicks (1995), suggest that the level of spending on purchases from D M L is 
fairly low because local service spending typically involves small scale purchasing of parts 
and contracts, for example, in cleaning and catering. In contrast, demand for higher level 
professional services is generally limited despite significant outlays on training and business 
services. Thus, the analysis suggests that services dependent on defence expenditure are of 
limited value. Moreover, this is further confirmed by a postal survey o f 52 service firms 
with business with DML. Only 10% or less of the business of two-thirds of these firms was 
considered to be defence related, suggesting that these particular service firms are not 
highly committed to defence markets. 
In the Bishop (1996) study, although the source location of purchases are considered, there 
is no empirical analysis of why local linkages exist or how they might have developed. 
Without such details it is difficult to evolve explanations for any apparent spatial clustering 
of defence industrial companies. Thus, more in-depth analysis of the role of local linkages 
between such enterprises may be required to understand the geographical pattern of the 
sector. 
Thus, a number of studies depict Plymouth as a highly defence dependent area which has 
recently suffered a significant loss of defence related employment. Some studies of the area 
have demonstrated that indirect local defence employment may be service orientated 
although there is evidence that it may be of low value. There are no detailed explanations 
for the development of the sub-region as a defence dependent area other than historical 
ones. Cleariy, the concentration of defence companies in the area may deserve further 
attention to assess the nature of local linkages. 
4.5 South West defence industrial concentrations 
In addition to the major defence industrial concentrations outlined above, there are some 
smaller areas of interest within the South West. For example, Weymouth and Portland have 
had a long association with the Navy. This association has arisen not only through the 
presence of the Naval base at Portland with its associated accommodation and helicopter 
99 
training establishment, but also through the MoD procurement executive's Sea Systems 
Controllerate Division and Defence Research Agency. Indeed, the University of 
Portsmouth (1992), concluded that 23.2% of direct and indirect employment in the 
Dorchester and Weymouth travel to work area (TTWA) was dependent on defence. 
However, the estimate did not include defence industrial employment but was based on 
military related jobs. Yet, scenario planning conducted to estimate the effect of closure or 
relocation of some of the local military establishments reveals that 1,426 jobs could be lost 
from the TTWA (6% of employees in employment in the area). Conceivably, industrial 
redundancies will also be associated with the nnilitary closures and most significantly, these 
may be related to the closure of the DRA. Indeed, the importance of such institutions in 
local defence related economies are recognised by Breheny (1988). Moreover, Jane's 
International Defence Directory (1995), confirms that there are a number of defence 
industrial firms in the area. Thus, it is possible that these enterprises have emerged in part, 
fi-om local contact with the DRA at Portland. 
Various service related losses of employment have been associated with the gradual decline 
of military operations at Portland. The daily service requirements of local bases has, in the 
past, been responsible for a significant proportion of local employment. Thus, the closure of 
local bases been responsible for further local redundancies. I f services were as important for 
the naval operations at Portland as they are at Plymouth as estimated by Bishop (1996), 
then the closure of the local operations may have had a major effect on the local economy. 
Moreover, there will also have been a reduction in local expenditure through the loss of 
visiting naval personnel. Indeed, the University of Poasmouth study (1992), estimated that 
over £0.5M was injected into the local economy annually by these visitors. 
Recently, the military procurement and operations at Portland have ceased and all functions 
have been relocated to other areas including Bristol and Devonport. Consequently, 
Gripaios (1996), argues that it is unsurprising that unemployment has risen appreciably 
faster in Dorset than has been the case nationally. The area has traditionally had a lower 
than average unemployment rate, but by the end of 1992 the rate was much the same as for 
the rest of the UK. 
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Finally, Bishop (1994), analyses the economic impact of RAF Chivenor in North Devon 
using income and employment multipliers. He concludes that directly and indirectly the 
RAF base generated 1,264 jobs for the local economy. Furthermore, some local defence 
industrial firms have connections with the base and, indeed, Jane's International Defence 
Directory (1995) lists a number of manufacturers in the Barnstaple TTWA. More recently, 
the RAF base has been taken over by the Marines although the likely local employment 
effects of this transfer have not been quantified. Indeed, it is not clear whether the transfer 
of ownership of Chivenor could have an effect on local defence firms. This is likely to 
depend on whether local firms have been specifically involved in the production or 
servicing of RAF-related equipment. However, it seems likely that local services are o f a 
general nature and hence may not be significantly affected by the transference of ownership 
of the base. 
Clearly, there are other areas of some importance for defence activity within the South 
West. However, space and a lack of detailed information precludes any fijrther analysis at 
this stage. Nevertheless, the existence of various small concentrations of defence related 
activity tends to confirm the view that agglomerations may characterise the spatial form of 
the defence industry. Such agglomerations may be dependent upon military bases and may 
include significant amounts of employment generated by the provision o f local services. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Eariy studies of the South West suggest that employment in high-tech sectors has been 
relatively limited. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a high degree of defence dependence in 
the region. There are also studies which suggest that a large proportion of defence related 
employment is service based, but may be low in value. 
Previous sections have suggested that there may be a spatial link between military bases 
and defence companies. Indeed, the large numbers of military bases in the South West may 
offer a potential explanation for the high level of defence industrial dependence in the 
region. Obvious examples include the Devonport dockyard complex and the now redundant 
operations at Portland. However, there are few data which illustrate a link with and 
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amongst such enterprises and, historically, the majority of MoD purchases have been 
negotiated at a central level. Nonetheless, there may be local purchasing exercised through 
sub-contracted work and DREs, as explained in section 3.31. Thus, there is a need for 
more comprehensive data which assesses the relative importance of linkages between the 
military and its suppliers. 
Eariier sections of the thesis presented data which demonstrated that the South of the UK 
contained high levels of defence related employment. Within the South West, there is 
substantial evidence to suggest that nationally the region is the most defence dependent 
one. Even within the region, studies have implied that defence industrial activities may be 
spatially concentrated at an even higher level. For example, the Bristol hinteriand and 
Devonport Dockyard have been the focus of attention for a number of studies. These areas 
appear to have a high level of defence dependence which is exceptional within the South 
West and the UK. In addition, there may also be other concentrations of such activity in the 
region. Yet, there is limited information available which can help to explain why these 
concentrations exist (although there is some evidence to suggest that service related 
employment may be partly responsible for this agglomeration). 
Previous sections of the thesis attributed the spatial form of the sector in the South West to 
a level of inertia which arose from the unique conditions in the DEB. Indeed, the chosen 
club of contractors and the relatively stable levels of defence expenditure may well have 
been responsible for the development of clusters of defence industrial activity. However, no 
study of the region has provided empirical evidence to explain the continual importance of 
these sites and historical descriptions for geographical development provide only partial 
solutions. Indeed, there is a real need to quantitatively explore linkage patterns which exist 
between defence industrial enterprises in the South West. Conceivably, these would assist 
explanations of the on-going nature of industrial development in spatial clusters. It may also 
be worthwhile to investigate whether defence industrial activity generates stronger local 
linkages than other types of manufacturing industry. However, any research which 
concentrates on agglomerations would be problematic i f it ignored the existence of defence 
industrial enterprises outside agglomerations. Thus, for a representative study a sample o f 
defence industrial enterprises needs to be examined fi^om across the whole region. 
102 
5 
Research design, methodology and the basic 
characteristics of the sample 
5.0 Introduction 
Given the limited data available concerning the defence industry it was regarded as essential 
to collect primary data detailing defence businesses in the South West. Such an approach is 
advantageous as it creates an opportunity to inquire about issues which have not been 
considered in previous studies. For example, whilst surveys have often estimated local 
defence employment they have rarely included information concerning the influence of 
managers' perceptions or assessed the importance of agglomeration economies. 
This chapter explains the research design of the current project although some stages are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Initially, the merits and disadvantages of a number 
research techniques are reviewed. Secondly, the methodology adopted for a questionnaire 
based survey of defence firms in the South West is described. This includes an appraisal of 
the sample and its potential bias. In addition, the limitations of the technique are discussed 
in the context of the present survey. Finally, the last section of the chapter focuses on the 
basic sample characteristics of the new data. 
5.1 Research Design 
One important issue in the process of research design is the role played by intensive and 
extensive research (Healey, 1991). Common patterns or properties of a population may be 
established by extensive research which may be based on standardised questionnaires and 
formal interviews. Such surveys yield information which can be assessed using statistical 
analysis but cannot be used to provide explanations of sample properties. For example, 
extensive research may be an appropriate technique for collecting information concerning 
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spatial distributions but the technique may be less suited to providing geographical 
explanations for any distribution which is identified. Moreover, although distributions may 
be representative of a whole population, they are unlikely to be representative of single 
cases or other populations. 
In contrast, intensive research is concerned with causal processes affecting an individual 
case or group of cases. Intensive information can be gathered by interviews or by case 
studies to yield qualitative information related to issues such as managers' perceptions and 
linkage patterns. However, because the analysis considers individual cases, there is always 
the danger that a causal link identified in the data may not be representative of the 
population as a whole. Together, extensive and intensive research can be seen as 
complementary, primarily fulfilling roles of description and explanation respectively. 
However, this view is a generalised one and there may be a degree of overiap between the 
techniques. 
Ideally, all relevant businesses should be contacted in a survey, but resource constraints 
usually prevent this. For example, a population may be too large to include all cases in a 
survey thus requiring a degree of sampling. Alternatively, the target o f a research project 
may include a particular sub-section of a larger population again necessitating sampling 
techniques. 
Business surveys frequently derive the sample population of firms from business directories. 
This is often a quick way to identify a population, but, often appropriate population lists 
may be unavailable and directory sources are notorious for certain limitations. These 
include only partial population coverage, a bias towards larger enterprises, inaccuracies, 
and the tendency for information to become outdated (Healey, 1991). Such inadequacies 
may be overcome by also employing additional sources whilst screening for double 
counting. 
Questionnaires are regarded as a cheap and effective method of administering a survey 
particulariy when there are only a few factual questions which can be answered by ticking 
relevant boxes. Indeed, a questionnaire is a particularly useful method because coded 
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questions produce consistent answers. These facilitate analysis, but they must be carefijlly 
planned because there is a danger that the response options may be inappropriate for some 
firms. Fortunately, the difficulties associated with an encoded questionnaire can be 
overcome somewhat by piloting a representative sample of the population. This reveals 
problems which firms may have in answering any of the questions so they can be rectified 
before the bulk of the population is contacted. 
Alternatively, in an interview situation there is the opportunity to clarify the meaning of a 
question and its response options. In such situations, there is the danger of introducing a 
bias in the question when clarifying its meaning to a respondent. However, this 
disadvantage can be somewhat offset against the greater depth of information which can be 
gleaned from direct contact between the respondent and the researcher. Inevitably, this 
makes this technique more time intensive and this may affect the response rate if particular 
respondents perceive that they will be engaged for lengthy periods. Nevertheless, the 
personal approach which is required with direct contact may improve the response rate 
because, for example, a ringing phone demands anention. In contrast, when dealing with 
postal communications respondents can postpone filling in a questionnaire to a more 
convenient time, thereby reducing the chance of a response. However, postal response rates 
can be improved by sending reminders which politely encourage completed forms to be 
returned. 
5.2 The Defence Supplier Survey 
Given the complementarity of extensive and intensive research methods both techniques 
were used in the current study. Initially, the population of defence companies in the South 
West of the UK was defined using a number of source lists. This entire population was 
contacted through a postal questionnaire. Statistical analysis of the information yielded by 
this study was used to describe patterns within the population and examine a number of 
theoretical issues. Secondly, a number of individual firms were selected to participate in 
in-depth case studies of defence firms. This process helped to provide more detailed 
explanations of some of the relationships identified in the questionnaire stage. Thus, the 
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present study is essentially a micro study based on information collected from individual 
firms. 
An initial list of defence industrial firms in the South West was derived from Jane's 
International Defence Directory. This source lists major defence companies from all over 
the world by country and in alphabetical order and it also supplies information about firm 
size, profits and product nature. The list was supplemented by asking local authorities to 
provide records of defence companies to try to combat any omissions from the directory. 
The final population of defence manufacturers that was identified was relatively small 
thereby facilitating a complete survey. Thus, no selective sampling techniques were 
required, thereby reducing the danger of selecting an unrepresentative group of firms. 
A random sample of twenty cases was piloted and no modifications were found to be 
required to the original version of the questionnaire. In general, the survey was designed to 
avoid the inclusion of open-ended responses and most questions involved respondents 
ticking boxes or estimating proportions. The questionnaires were addressed to managing 
directors. However, it was necessary to ask a broad range of questions which may not have 
been answerable by single managers, especially in larger firms. As a consequence, some 
responses appeared to have been completed by more than one employee. In this respect, 
questiormaires may be advantageous compared to interviews as the respondent has time to 
consider their reply or ensure that the most competent respondent in the company 
completes the form. Nevertheless, a number of replies contained only partially completed 
responses which may have been caused by the complexity of some questions. Other 
questions were also occasionally misunderstood. For example, in one particular question 
some respondents mistook the word "county" for "country". In general, however, there was 
no evidence of a major problem with any individual question. 
To improve the final response rate of the survey, firms were contacted by telephone or by 
post and this invariably improved the response rate. However, it is unclear by how much as 
many firms may have been slow to respond to the initial questionnaire and there was a 
steady trickle of replies over several months. 
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5.21 Sample frame details 
The sample survey was limited to defence industrial firms and excluded firms which 
provided service type goods to the military such as food, clothing, fuel, transport and 
construction. Defence service firms were excluded partly in order to narrow the focus of 
the research. In addition, service firms offer a diverse range of products and are more likely 
to serve military markets as an extension of their customer base rather than designing a 
service especially for defence customers. The strength of their civilian market operations 
often means that they are less aff^ected by defence markets and also may be less willing to 
participate in a defence supplier survey. 
As has already been noted, there is no official definition of a defence industrial firm and the 
term could include an enterprise which sells military or non-military goods to a number of 
types of military customers. Thus, the sample frame was inevitably imperfect and it is likely 
that some non-defence industrial suppliers were included. This problem is, however, not 
too serious as non-defence respondents could be excluded from the subsequent analysis. 
More significantly some firms that sell products with military applications may have been 
omitted. Most typically these might be firms who do not consider that they are defence 
suppliers because they deal in very small quantities of defence goods or deal indirectly 
through sub-contractors. Moreover, some firms will always slip through the sampling net 
due to the inaccuracies of the original data sources. Decisions about the inclusion of a case 
in a defence industrial supplier list were left to the discretion of the original compiler of the 
list. The discretion of these editors is seen to be reasonable because firstly, they were often 
fairiy knowledgeable experts in their fields, and secondly, as there is no official definition of 
a "defence firm" there was no obvious way to exclude particular firms from the analysis. 
A summary of the population of defence industrial firms compiled from the listed sources 
can be seen in table 5.1. The county wide distribution of the sample is most noticeable for 
the large number of firms from the two counties of Somerset and Wiltshire, which together 
make up over 55% of the total sample Another feature is the lack of Cornish 
representation, which only constitutes 3% of the sample. The remaining counties each 
contain between 9% and 13% of the firms within the survey. It is unclear whether this is a 
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representative distribution in spatial terms, but it seems highly likely that there may be a 
significant bias in the number of firms from Somerset and Wiltshire. Indeed, Avon and 
Devon are generally thought to have higher levels of defence dependence than for example, 
Somerset. However, it is not possible simply to compare the county-wide sample 
distribution with a county ranking of defence dependence as the sample is a count of the 
number of firms, not a measure of defence employment. 
Table 5.1 Sample population of defence industrial firms in the South West 
JTDD, Total %of 
total 
Avon 33 28 61 11 
Cornwall 7 8 15 3 
Devon 27 22 49 9 
Dorset 37 34 71 13 
Gloucestershire 45 14 59 11 
Somerset 26 128 154 28 
Wiltshire 31 118 149 27 
Total 206 352 558 100 
source: ^ane^s International Defence Directory (1995), 
jSeven South West County Councils 
It is clear that the lists provided by County Councils varied considerably in the extent of 
their coverage. The large number provided by Somerset and Wiltshire reflected extensive 
surveys undertaken by the two councils, whilst other counties did not have such 
information available. Given the diflBculties involved in attempting to identify fiarther 
defence firms and the relatively large sample already derived it was hence decided to use 
the combined sample obtained fi-om JTDD and the County Councils. Indeed, there is no 
guarantee that any fiirther searching for information would have provided a "better" sample 
even i f there were any objective criteria to assess such a sample. However, given the 
limitations of the sample it is unwnse to infer a great deal fi-om any intra-sample variations 
amongst counties. Thus, in most cases the sample is treated as a whole rather than broken 
down into the constituent counties, 
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In general, it is possible to be fairly confident that the sample included all major defence 
industrial firms. However, many sub-contractors are likely to have been excluded. Cleariy, 
Jane's International Defence Directory (JIDD), which has an international coverage is likely 
to favour larger well-known defence suppliers although the editor gave assurances that the 
size of firm was no barrier to inclusion in the directory. JIDD may also under-report firms 
fi'om the South West because of the branch plant nature of the region. Where firms have 
South West plants, these establishments may not always be listed; instead, the headquarter's 
address in another region may be supplied. However, the extent of this particular bias may 
not be very large as many multi-plant firms are listed in JIDD with several regional 
addresses. The local authority hsts made possible the inclusion of a larger number of small 
firms than would have otherwise been possible. Given that JIDD with its larger resources 
found significantly less such enterprises for the region, the efforts spent to trace additional 
firms appears to have been well worth while. 
The above procedure produced a list of 558 manufacturing firms from the South West and 
included all major defence employers generally known to be present in the region. Whilst 
this is not a complete sample it is sufficiently large for analysis. Indeed, as Healey (1991) 
notes, there is no generally accepted minimum sample size for a survey, rather the issue 
depends on the research design and the planned nature of subsequent analysis. In part, this 
depends on the number of sub-categories required in the analysis because heavily stratified 
contingency tables inevitably end up containing empty cells. 
5.3 Sample distribution and sample biases 
Of the 558 questionnaires distributed, 234 were returned although 23 of these were 
reported as addressee gone away, (that is, the firm had either probably gone out of business 
or moved). A fijrther 31 firms replied that they had no defence business and should not 
have been included in sample. However, several firms in this category replied that they had 
"virtually no defence sales", and were perhaps politely declining to participate. Only 5 firms 
refused outright to participate in the survey. Thus, 175 responses were available for 
analysis from an effective sample of 504, yielding a response rate of approximately 35%. It 
is clearly likely that additional firms fi^om all counties have gone out o f business due to the 
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downturn in the defence market but their mail is not being returned. Thus, it is likely that 
the taie response rate is higher. 
It is worth noting that the county wide distribution of the survey responses is more evenly 
distributed than the original sample. This is largely due to the high lack of response from 
the Somerset and Wiltshire areas. The two counties combined represented 39.9% of the 
total response, but 55% of the original sample population. One possible explanation for this 
is that of the 23 firms in the sample returned as "addressee gone away", 16 were from 
Somerset and Wiltshire (70%). This could be because these county council lists were more 
inaccurate, out-of-date or contained more small firms which typically have higher failure 
rates. In summary, all the counties constitute at least 10% but not significantly more than 
20% of the total sample response, apart from Cornwall (4%). 
To establish whether there is any evidence of geographical concentration or locational bias 
*m the response it is usefiil to examine the distribution of employment in respondent firms by 
county. The survey asked firms to provide data for 1989 and 1995 and this is presented in 
table 5.2. This clearly shows that employment in the respondent firms was heavily 
dominated by Avon and Devon. The Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somerset, and Wiltshire 
regions had similar levels of defence employment, whilst the Cornish response contained 
less than 1000 people. 
It is interesting to compare the employment variation in the survey with 1992-93 estimates 
of employment dependent on direct equipment spending made by Nawaz (1994) which 
were discussed in section 2.33. Obviously, the absolute figures from Nawaz and the survey 
cannot be directly compared as the survey figures reflect both defence and non-defence 
employment and are only based on a sample. However, it is interesting to note that the 
majority of the Nawaz county estimates for 1993-93 lie between the estimates made for 
1989 and 1995 by the survey. A possible explanation for this is that the majority of the 
large defence firms were included in the sample. Thus, most of the changes in employment 
in the region were recorded by the participation of these companies in the survey. The 1995 
survey figures can also be scaled down by taking into account the proportion of a firm's 
business accounted for by defence and assuming that sales for employees are similar in 
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defence and non-defence areas. This procedure significantly scales down the employment 
estimates and reveals a level of employment considerably lower than the Nawaz estimates 
for 1992-93. However, an estimate of defence employment might at least consider the 
effects of sampling on the survey. As the survey response constituted 35% of the known 
population of defence companies it is possible that the current estimate may represent only 
35% of total defence employment. Indeed, allowing for the incomplete sample reveals some 
marked differences between the survey and Nawaz data. Assuming that the original 
population included all defence firms in the region then this would suggest that 100% of 
defence industrial employment in 1995 comprised 46,194 workers. Indeed, this is 
significantly larger than other official estimates for the region and may be related to the 
participation of the majority of the large firms fi-om the region in the response. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible that official estimates have previously under-recorded 
defence related employment because of informational gaps such as the difficulties involved 
in identifying defence companies. 
Table 5.2 Defence employment by county 
'no. 
firms 
'sample 
employment 
(1989) 
'sample 
employment 
(1995) 
'sample 
employment 
(1995) 
% sales^ 
^ Nawaz 
(1992-93) 
Avon 19 lOJOO 6,466 5,671 9,500 
Cornwall 7 965 985 148 2.000 
Devon 21 10,206 6715 3,718 10.100 
Dorset 36 5.872 4.431 3.101 3.400 
Gloucesicrshirc 21 6,003 3.556 912 3.900 
Somerset 34 5,246 3,457 1.673 2.100 
Wiltshire 35 3,239 3,307 963 3.500 
Total 173 42,231 2S^\7 16,186 3 4 3 0 
note: ^ employment divided by proportion of defence sales in turnover 
source:'postal survey, 'Nmvaz (199-1), 
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5.4 Basic sample characteristics 
This section provides a brief outline of the main characteristics o f the respondents to the 
survey. In particular, it focuses on employment dynamics, ownership and history, product 
nature, defence dependency and locational characteristics. More sophisticated analysis of 
the new data forms the content of subsequent chapters. 
5,41 Employment change 
Given the dramatic restructuring of the defence industry in recent years, an important 
question concerns the extent to which the sample has been affected by this process. One 
possible measure of the impact of restructuring is the extent of employment change. 
Unfortunately, the change in defence employment between 1989 and 1995 cannot be 
directly estimated as there are no estimates for defence sales per employee for 1989. 
However, the total change which includes all employees whether they are engaged on 
civilian or defence projects within the sample can be calculated. Table 5.2 shows a clear 
and dramatic fall in the total number of people employed in the sample frame since the late 
1980s. Thus, between the years 1989 and 1995, the work-force in the sample fell from 
42,240 to 28,928. This represents a drop of 13,312 workers leaving the sector representing 
32% of employment in the sample. Given that manufacturing employment as a whole in the 
South West contracted by only around 13% between 1985 and 1995, this clearly shows the 
potential impact of defence industrial restructuring (Cambridge Econometrics, 1996). 
Whilst it is impossible to gauge the extent to which the fall in employment in the response is 
defence related it is important to note that the data excludes any falls in employment which 
would arise from defence firms leaving the industry due to closures or by moving to civilian 
markets. Moreover, given that small firms cannot shed labour in great quantities in the way 
that big firms can, many small firms may not be present in the sample as they may have 
gone out of business. 
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The percentage change in employment within firms in the sample varies dramatically from 
+900% to -80%. Surprisingly, the number of firms which have grown in employment terms 
is quite substantial at 42.5%. In contrast, 51.6% of the sample have contracted in size. 
However, the magnitude of job losses in larger firms outweighs the growth of employment 
in smaller firms and the net change in employment is overwhelmingly negative. Figure 5.1 
cross-tabulates percentage employment change (1989-95) against firm size in 1989 and 
shows graphically that it is the larger defence firms (>120 employees) which have shed the 
most labour. However, even more striking is the fact that the majority of the new jobs 
created have been within medium sized enterprises typically employing between 50 and 120 
workers. 
In order to test the relationship between size and employment change firms were divided 
into four categories by size and classified according to whether they had expanded or 
contracted in employment terms. From this classification it was possible to produce a 
contingency table showing the cross-tabulated frequencies between the two types of 
information. The null hypothesis H j^Was that the frequency of firms in each category of size 
was not related to the overall change in employment recorded between 1989-95 in that 
firm. The alternative hypothesis (Hj) was that there was a significant relationship between 
firm size and employment change. A tabulation of the observed and expected frequencies 
was calculated and summed according to the Pearson Chi-Square formula in equation 5.1. 
equation 5. / 
where O is the frequencies actually observed and E is the frequencies expected. The 
chi-square distribution varies according to the number of degrees of freedom which can be 
determined by the expression ( r - l ) (c- l ) , where, r represents the number of rows and c 
represents the number of columns. Thus, in a four cell (two by two) contingency table the 
number of degrees of freedom would equal one. The requirements o f the chi-square test 
include the fact that data must be in the form of frequencies counted in a number of 
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categories (percentages cannot be used) Secondly, the total numbers observed must 
exceed 20 Thirdly, the expected frequency in any one fraction must not normally be less 
than 5 Finally, the observations must be independent and one observation must not 
influence another (Hammond & McCullagh, 1975) 
The value of chi-square can be compared against chi-square tables showing significance 
levels for various degrees of freedom .AJternatively, a statistical package such as SPSS 
produces a range of output associated with the above calculation Thus, figure 5 2 shows 
that H.^ can be rejected at the 5°o confidence level, because the significance is less than 0 05 
with 3 degrees of freedom for a Pearson chi-square value of 15 15 The other statistics 
produced by the SPSS output also confirm the significance of this relationship For 
example, the likelihood ratio test is a calculation of -2 times the log-likelihood Chi-square 
and the Mantel Haenszal is a test for linear association which assumes that both factors 
forming the table are quantitative (For further details of these tests see Bishop (1975)) 
Thus, the tests show that there is a significant relationship between firm size and 
employment change in the sample 
Figure 5.1 Employment change in defence firms by size (1989-95) 
40 
10 employment change 
• expansion 
contraction 
<15 15-49.9 50-120 >120 
size (no.employees) 
source: postal survey 
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Figure 5.2 Chi-square test of firm size (EiMPCO) against employment change (EiViPL02) 
EMPL02 by £MPCO empco 
EMPCO Page 1 of L 
Counc 
Exp Val <i5 15-4 9.9 50-120 e >120 emp 
employee mployees loyees Row 
1.00 2.00 3. 00 4 . 00 T o t a l EMPL02 
e.v.pansion 17 23 26 7 73 
15.6 20.7 19. 4 17.3 42. 2% 
contracCion 20 26 20 34 100 
21.4 28.3 26. 6 23.7 57.8% 
Column 37 49 46 41 17 3 
l o c a l 21.4% 28.3% 26. 6% 23.7% 100.0% 
Chi-Sq[\:are Value DF 
Pearson 15.14504 3 
Li k e l i h o o d Ratio 16.34141 3 
ManCel-Kaens^el esse for 4.35383 i 
l i n e a r a s s o c i a c i o n 
Minimum Expected Frecjuency 15.613 
Nuniber of Missing Observations: 2 
S i c n i f i c a n c e 
.00170 
.00097 
.02753 
source: postal survey 
A possible explanation for the apparent growth of medium sized enterprises in the sample is 
that many of the major defence contractors may have externalised some of their functions 
and are making increased use of suppliers and sub-contractors. Thus, new opportunities 
have been created for medium sized firms to win new business. In particular, existing 
companies with proven track records in the sector may have grown whilst still remaining 
small enough to have the flexibility to serve the requirements of big firms. Conceivably, the 
success of medium sized firms in the new environment may provide some validation of 
theories of flexible specialisation or accumulation as discussed in section 3 .4. 
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5.42 Age, ownership and history 
The age distribution of the firms in the sample reveals a number of interesting 
characteristics. No firm in the sample was older than 330 years, whilst half of the total 
sample was represented by establishments which were less than 25 years old. Thus, 
although there was a broad spread in the ages o f defence companies, clearly there were a 
large number of younger firms. Thus, it is incorrect to view the defence sector only in terms 
of well-established contractors and, therefore, proven track records may not be a 
mandatory requirement for company growth. Nevertheless, just over 25% of the sample 
had existed since before the end of World War Two and it is appropriate to recognise the 
long term presence of a number of enterprises in the defence sector. Indeed, figure 5.3 
shows that a standard chi-square test implies that generally the oldest firms were the 
largest. 
Figure 5.3 Chi-square test of age ( A G E C 0 2 ) against size (EMPCO) 
ElMPCO erapco by AGEC02 
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Nurriier o f M i s s i n g O b s e r / a t i o n s : 3 
source: postal survey 
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There is some evidence of geographical inertia in the defence industry in the South West as 
53.8% of the sample had always traded from a single site. However, 46.2% of the sample 
had traded from more than one site and only 10% of firms established pre-war had 
remained at a single location. Furthermore, 45% of those firms who have re-located have 
done so in the last 10 years (36 firms). Indeed, 70% of those firms who have relocated have 
done so within the last 20 years, and 85% have done so within the last 30 years. This seems 
to imply that there has been an increasing rate of firm relocation in the South West. 
The picture presented by the data from the survey is plausible given the standard view that 
whilst in the past defence firms have faced little competitive pressure to relocate, recently 
changes in the defence industrial environment have spurred firms to seek more 
cost-effective locations. However, the acceleration in the trend of relocations appears to 
begin in the mid-1970s when there were fewer major changes in the defence industrial 
environment. This could suggest that, given the high level of civilian business conducted by 
"defence firms", it is changes in these markets which were providing pressures to relocate 
in the 1970s. However, without additional data revealing relocation rates of similar civilian 
firms it is difficult to assess whether the rapid rise in defence firm relocations in the 1980s is 
a continuation of a broad industrial trend, or the product of a new defence industrial 
regime. 
As far as ownership status is concerned, firms in the sample were categorised into three 
broad types. The majority of the firms were independent single plant enterprises, (46%), 
but this category was closely followed by branch plant firms (41%). The latter was split 
into equal proportions of branches being set up by parent firms, (20.9%), and branches 
being acquired by merger or take-over (19.8%). The importance o f branch plants may 
imply that there is only limited autonomy of decision making within many defence 
enterprises in the region, with major decisions perhaps being taken elsewhere. However, 
this does not necessarily imply that all decisions are taken outside the region. Indeed, the 
last major type of firm was the multi-plant headquarters which represented 10% of the 
sample. Finally, approximately 3% of the respondents could not be classified because of 
complex joint venture relationships between a number of firms. 
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Cross sectoral comparisons of ownership status in the South West are not readily available 
although there are surveys of sub-regions. For example. Potter (1992) and Dobson (1987), 
respectively, estimate that about 10% and 30% of manufacturing units in Devon and 
Cornwall are externally owned. However, it is highly likely that this sub-region has its own 
regional characteristics and, therefore, direct comparisons to the present survey are 
inappropriate. Indeed, traditional literature suggests that peripheral areas such as Devon 
and Cornwall are more branch-plant dependent than core regions (Lever, 1974; Marshall, 
1979; and Taylor & Wood 1973). Thus, it might be thought that there would be a lower 
proponion of externally owned firms in the current survey than in the surveys quoted 
above. However, this is clearly not the case and may imply that defence firms in the region 
are subject to a higher degree of external ownership than the general population of firms. 
One possible explanation for this may be that the high technical content o f defence products 
may require production to be carried out by larger enterprises. Large multiple-plant firms 
may be more capable of raising finance for R&D and may be more able to carry the risks 
associated with new product development. These larger firms may in turn be more likely to 
be group members than their smaller counterparts. 
5.43 Employment characteristics 
There is a diverse range in the size of firms in the sample. At the bottom of the scale there 
are one man operations, whilst at the top are major defence contractors employing several 
thousands of people. This information is broadly described in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Total employment 
Number of employees Number of firms 
1 to 9 23 
10 to 24 35 
25 to 99 61 
100 or more 55 
iTotal 174 
source: postal survey 
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The Annual Abstract of Statistics (1996), reveals that the typical distribution o f 
manufacturing establishment sizes in the UK includes many small firms and increasingly 
fewer larger ones. Thus, the present survey is slightly different because there are a few 
more medium sized firms than smaller ones. However, this may merely reflect the nature of 
the source directories which may omit smaller firms. Moreover, small firms suffer higher 
failure rates potentially reducing their participation in the sample. Nevertheless, previous 
sections of the chapter have argued that there may be logical reasons why there are fewer 
small firms in the defence sector. These include a higher level of risk associated with 
technical products. Finally, note that employment data is based on the number of workers 
in an individual plant and does not reflect the total number of people in an organisation. 
Therefore, ownership status is also a highly significant variable in this issue as it reveals that 
a plant may be supported by a wider organisation. 
One of the major characteristics of the work-force is that it includes a low proportion of 
female employees who only represent 14% of total employment compared to an average of 
43% for female employment in South West manufacturing industries as a whole (Regional 
Trends, 1995). Indeed, 79% of firms employ less than 40 % of their work-force as women, 
and in only 9% of the sample do women constitute over half the workforce. In addition, 
there is also a low proportion of part-time work in the sample. Only 3% of employees in 
the sample were part-time workers in contrast to a South West average of 24% (Regional 
Trends, 1995). Indeed, 44% of firms only employ fijll time workers, and 91% of firms have 
less than 20% of their employees on part-time hours. 
Explanations for the levels of female and part-time employment in the industry are 
suggested by Covering (1991 a). He argues that recruitment, promotion and rewards were 
traditionally determined by internal formalised and negotiated systems. These systems 
created a work force predominantly based on unionised white male labour which was 
locally bom. Nevertheless, the popular argument seems to be that defence industrial labour 
is being replaced with a labour force dictated increasingly by competitive markets. 
Conceivably, this should promote levels of female and part-time employment in the sector 
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in common with developments in other sectors. However, the present study illustrates that 
this development is a considerable way behind manufacturing in general. 
Most typically, the proportion of managers on the pay-roll of defence firms lies between 10 
and 30% of the work-force with 63 .5% of firms indicating that they had this percentage of 
managers in their firm. Regional data suggests that this is not atypical o f managerial levels 
in general. For example, 26% of all persons in employment in the South West were 
recorded as Managerial or Professional workers in 1994 (Labour Force Survey, 1995). 
Indeed, this is similar to the national average of 26.4%. However, levels of these categories 
for manufacturing may be slightly lower. For example, the General Household Survey 
(1993), records only 19% of national manufacturing employees as either professional 
employers or managers. 
Only 7% of the employees in the sample were R&D workers. There were a significant 
number of firms in the sample who employed no R&D staff, with 37% not registering this 
category of employee on their payroll. The typical defence supplier had 10% or less of their 
work-force engaged in research (29.7%) with 15% having between 10 and 20% of their 
employees involved in R&D. As might be expected, there were a few firms which had a 
very high percentage of this type of employee. For instance, 11 firms had more than 50% of 
their workers in new development. This data is consistent with Lovering's (1991a), 
Professional, Engineers, Scientists and Technologists survey, which estimated R&D 
employment for defence firms to lie between 10 and 17.5 % o f employees. Moreover, 
ACOST (1987), estimated that 7-9% of the national stock of Qualified Service Engineers 
(QSEs) were engaged on MoD fianded work. Thus, the survey tends to confirm the view 
that the defence industry continues to be characterised by significcmt levels of R&D 
employment. 
The picture of defence firms utilising higher quality labour is fijrther confirmed by data on 
unskilled employees. Indeed, 32% of firms claimed that they did not employ unskilled 
labour and 62% employed less than 20% of this type o f labour. Less than 10% of the 
sample had a work-force which was more than 50% unskilled. Such data suggests that the 
defence industry may be different fi^om other industrial sectors as over 35% of South 
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Western employees are recorded as partly skilled or unskilled (Labour Force Survey, 
1996). However, data relating specifically to manufacturing is not readily available. 
Furthermore, the survey suggests that defence firms contain greater proportions of skilled 
than unskilled labour. For example, 73% of the survey employ at least 20% skilled labour. 
Explanations for the levels of high quality labour within the sector include the need to 
produce sophisticated technical products where only the best specification standards are 
acceptable. Moreover, the insulation from competitive forces may have enabled labour 
within the sector to remain overskilled thus commanding higher wages. 
5.44 Product nature 
The survey attempted to examine the nature of the markets in which firms operated by 
asking firms to indicate whether they produced defence products which were made by 
many other UK firms, goods made by less than 5 other UK firms or were unique goods. 
Further divisions within these product types could be identified according to whether firms 
produced customised or standardised output. In theory, this classification should give an 
indication as to the level of competition within product markets. For example, firms 
producing unique goods are domestic monopoly suppliers, whilst those producing more 
general products are more likely to sell in more competitive markets. 
Table 5.4 reveals that many defence suppliers do enjoy monopoly positions for some of 
their products. Even more firms operate in markets where there are less than five other UK 
competitors, although there may be additional international competition. Very few defence 
industrial products can be bought in highly competitive markets where there are many 
sellers. 
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Table 5.4 Defence industry competition by product type 
Type of good % of sample implication 
unique 57 monopoly 
with less than 5 competitors 67 oligopoly 
custom goods 71 niche supplier 
off the shelf goods 26 competitive market 
made by many other firms 16 competitive market 
source: postal survey 
Thus, the overall picture of competition is of a series of defence product market niches 
which are dominated by monopolists or oligopohsts. However, this is an oversimplification 
because individual firms may produce a range of goods which span different ends of the 
competition spectrum. Indeed, the data shows that it is relatively rare for monopolists also 
to sell output in highly competitive markets, but often firms who are oligopolists will sell in 
monopolistic or competitive markets too. Some firms do produce a number of different 
defence goods at different ends of this competition scale and table 5.5 depicts the number 
of firms in the sample producing statistically significant combinations of product types. One 
limitation of this analysis is that it relies on the perceptions of managers who may have 
differing views on the nature of their products or markets. In fact, it is possible that 
managers may actually be unaware of their competitors and so there is an informational gap 
associated with their responses. 
Table 5.5 Firms in sample producing significant combinations of product types 
unique less 5 many custom shelf 
unique X positive positive 
less 5 
1 X negative positive 
many X negative positive 
custom X 
shelf X 
note: significance based on Chi' at 5% level showing correlations bet^^een production of product types 
source: postal survey 
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Tailoring output to an individual customers needs could obviously be undertaken by any 
firm operating at any level of competition. However, whilst this is the case in the sample 
firms, firms with more specialist output were more likely to tailor their products to serve 
individual customers needs. This is logical because firms producing highly specialised 
output might envisage their product as either customised or unique. The division would 
most likely depend on the basic form of the product and the degree to which additional 
resources are required to transform it into a final good. At the other end of the competition 
spectrum, it might be suggested that customising a standardised product is a way of 
maintaining market share, perhaps as a form of product differentiation. With the changing 
conditions in the defence sector, it might be expected that firms producing off the shelf 
products would be seeking aggressive market stances by pursuing such strategies. This may 
enable defence firms in competitive markets to transform the demand for their products to a 
more inelastic form, thus making customers less sensitive to price. 
5.45 Defence industrial nature of the sample 
The firms in the sample had varying degrees of defence dependence as can be seen from 
table 5.6. Many firms only engaged in small quantities of defence work, with just under 
25% of the sample generating less than 10% of their turnover through defence goods. 
However, 55% of the sample had at least 25% of turnover generated through defence 
goods. 8.7% of the sample were pure military suppliers. Interestingly, the sample 
distribution differs from that found in other studies. For example. Bishop (1992), found that 
70% of respondents in a Devon based survey had less than 25% defence sales. Similarly, 
Finch (1994), concludes that 77% of Lancashire based firms had less than 10% of their 
sales in defence markets. Of course, these differences may be anributed to different samples 
as more locally based surveys may have traced a larger number of small firms. 
Nevertheless, Braddon et al (1992), in an analysis of the defence supplier chain of 
Rolls-Royce find a similar pattern to the present survey. However, the Braddon suidy does 
not find as many firms with very high and very low defence sales. This may be related to 
the sub-contractor status of the firms in the Braddon sample which may have contained a 
bias because the authors were deliberately looking for sub-contractors, thereby excluding 
firms which didn't fit their preconceptions. Finally, the Wiltshire County Council Survey 
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(1992), identifies that 46% of their sample had less than 20% defence related turnover, 
whilst 16% had more than 80% of their sales accounted for by defence markets. 
As far as exports are concerned 57.6% of the sample did not export any of their defence 
output. This may reflect the highly domestic role that the DIB performs and also the 
restrictions which exist on selling arms abroad. Moreover, of the 42.2% of firms who 
exported, 67% eamt less than 10% of their turnover overseas. Few firms were significantly 
geared to serve foreign markets and less than 5% of the sample sold more than half of their 
sales abroad. Regionally, the level of defence exports may be under-represented when 
compared to UK defence exports. Section 2.11 illustrated that national defence exports 
made up 40% of defence demand by expenditure in 1993-94, whereas 40% of turnover is 
clearly not sold abroad by South West defence companies. However, it is possible that very 
expensive military products are sold by some firms in the region and these may increase the 
v2Llue of regional defence exports although they may represent a small percentage of 
company turnover. Furthermore, it is not easy to compare the level of defence exports 
against general manufacturing exports for the region. For instance, there appear to be no 
official regional data detailing manufacturing exports. Thus, it is not possible to assess 
whether defence industrial production generates a relatively larger stream of foreign 
earnings than civilian manufacturing. 
Table 5.6 Defence dependence (% sales) 
% firms 
% of sales MoD Defence 
Contractors 
Exports Defence sales 
as % of total 
0 22.7 22.7 57.6 1.2 
> 0 but <5 21.2 13.4 11 12.8 
5 to 9.9 13.4 15.2 11.1 10.4 
10 to 24.9 19.3 27.4 9.8 20.4 
25 or > 23.8 21.5 10.5 55.2 
source: postal survey 
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Defence suppliers sold approximately equal proportions of their output to the MoD and to 
other defence suppliers as can be seen firom table 5.6. Indeed, this is consistent with the 
Wiltshire County Council Study (1992) which also identified a degree o f symmetry between 
turnover levels associated with MoD and other Defence work. This may be explained by 
favoured contractor status which may enable a firm to win MoD work and thus also make 
that firm eligible to be a supplier of other defence work. 
Figure 5.4 Chi-square test of whether firms set up to supply defence 
products (DEFSUP) against level of defence sales (DEFSALC2) 
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Within the sample, 38% of firms replied that they had set up specifically to supply defence 
markets. However, this does not imply that all these firms originally intended to be purely 
defence suppliers. Rather, some aimed to produce a product which could be sold in part to 
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military customers. Figure 5.4 shows that there is a very clear and strong relationship 
between the level of defence sales and whether firms set up specifically to supply the 
defence industry or not. Firms who have moved into defence from civilian markets are, in 
general, more likely to have lower levels of defence related turnover than firms who did 
not. This tends to suggest that specialists need to be highly committed i f they wish to 
concentrate on defence markets. 
The age of a firm did not significantly affect whether firms established themselves as 
defence suppliers or not. In every decade since World War Two there were always more 
firms established to supply civilian markets which later converted to become defence 
suppliers, than there were firms established specifically to supply defence markets. This 
may be consistent with the fact that to become a defence supplier firms must often have a 
proven track record and must win quality assurance certificates. Thus, many firms may only 
be able to cross into defence fi-om civilian markets when they have achieved some degree of 
commercial success. 
Despite the evidence above which suggests that some defence firms have enjoyed 
employment growth (1989-95), significantly more firms stated that cuts in defence 
expenditure since 1990 have had a deleterious effect on their profits. More than twice as 
many firms replied that this had been the case than firms who reported improved profits 
ft-om defence cuts. Only 2 1 % of firms said that there had been no effect on their profits 
over the period. This gloomy analysis is made more depressing by the predictions which 
firms have for future defence cuts. Over 54% of the sample anticipate that profits will be 
fiirther squeezed over the next two years from forthcoming reductions in defence 
expenditure. Only 19% of firms expect any future benefits from a smaller defence budget. 
More firms also expect any fijture defence cuts to have no effect on their business (26.8%). 
This may be caused by undue optimism, or because firms consider that most of the 
restructuring in the sector will have already taken place by 1997. 
The closure of military bases since 1990 does not seem to have had a strong effect on the 
sample population. This is not surprising as the firms who would suffer fi-om base closures 
are predominantly service type enterprises, which are not included in this survey. However, 
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defence industrial firms are not immune to this type of restructuring as 2 1 % report reduced 
profits fi-om such closures and a similar pattern anticipate being fijrther affected by 
additional base closures up to 1997. 
In general, firms indicated that competitive contracting procedures had had little effect on 
their profits in the first half of the 1990s. Indeed, 44.3% report this effect as being neutral, 
whilst slightly more firms report their effect as negative (31.7%) than positive (24%). The 
fact that only 55.3% of firms report that competitive contracting has had any effect on 
profits at all, may imply that large sections of defence markets have not seriously been 
subjected to market forces. This could be explained in two ways. Firstly, many firms which 
have suffered under new market conditions may have closed, and are not present in the 
sample. Secondly, some firms may have taken part in competitive tendering and won their 
traditional contracts relatively easily. Alternatively, it could be that the time scale of the 
question was inappropriate given that competitive contracting has been around for several 
years before 1990 and even more dramatic changes may have occurred in the 1980s. 
Future expectations are that more competitive contracting is going to have less of an 
impact in defence markets. An additional 10% of firms estimate that new contracting will 
have no effect over the next two years, and this is over and above the 44.3% of firms who 
estimate that competitive contracting has had no effect on their profits over the last five 
years. 
5.46 Spatial characteristics 
A number of spatial relationships are identifiable in the study. These are primarily of two 
types. Firstly, those that follow administrative spatial units, such as variations in variables 
between counties i.e. inter-county relationships. Secondly, there those that follow general 
spatial relationships, most likely involving shorter distances such as intra-county 
associations. However, this division is not likely to be pure because local spatial 
relationships or clusters of activity could transcend county boundaries and different 
combinations of county groupings reveal different relationships. Generally, caution should 
be exercised concerning county level relationships because of the variation in the quality of 
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source lists. However, broader spatial relationships are less affected by local samples and 
aggregate geographical trends can be considered. 
Figure 5,5 Chi square test of custom producers (CUSTOM) by location 
(COUNTYK4) 
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One of the most significant spatial relationships concerning defence industrial firms in the 
region is that the counties of Devon and Cornwall seem to be different to the rest of the 
region. Figures 5.5 & 5.6 show that together defence firms in these counties are much less 
likely to tailor their output to individual customers needs, and in general they produce stock 
products. Moreover, companies in the far South West generally operate in less specialised 
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markets competing with many other firms in the UK. In contrast, firms in the rest of the 
region are more likely to be producers of unique products or products made by less than 
five other UK firms. Hence, firms in the rest of the region are more likely to be monopolists 
or oligopolists. These difference could be explained by the branch plant nature of Devon 
and Cornwall (Dobson, 1987). For example, peripheral branches may be established to 
capitalise on lower cost and lower skilled labour, thus they are more likely to manufacture 
more general output. Alternatively, peripheral firms may find it more costly to obtain 
specialised inputs. Therefore, they may prefer to supply more general products which can 
be manufactured without having to rely on far-away input suppliers to provide essential 
components. Indeed, it is generally accepted that in the periphery transport costs are higher 
and would significantly affect the cost of importing high quality inputs. 
Figure 5.6 Chi square test of "off the shelf ( S H E L F ) producers 
by location (COUNTYC2) 
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The idea of a core-periphery relationship existing within a sector and within a region is 
plausible because it would mean that the more distant fringes of the region were surviving 
on a comparative advantage based on lower skilled labour. This comparative advantage 
permits the periphery to overcome its poor accessibility and trade within a sector in which 
the whole region has some degree of overall specialisation. 
To attempt to validate this theory it is useful to assess the perceptions o f managers of their 
location and its effect on their business. The data from the defence supplier survey reveal 
that it is the firms from the counties of Devon, Cornwall and Dorset which report 
significant access limitations from their geographical positions. Firms from these areas 
consistently reported that access to inputs, access to markets and the contribution of 
transport links were generally detrimental to the success of their business relative to other 
firms in the rest of the South West. For example, figure 5.7 shows the significance of the 
statistical association between transport links and location. Firms in the periphery were also 
more likely to report that material costs were a disadvantage than firms in other areas. Of 
course this regional disadvantage is well known and governments have attempted to 
alleviate some of the problems by providing the area with financial assistance. The firms in 
the counties in question acknowledge this and report that assisted area status provides their 
businesses with some help. Despite this aid, the predictions for the future of defence 
businesses in the three counties is more pessimistic than elsewhere. Most noticeable is the 
pessimism in the Dorset area which may be related to the relocation of many MoD 
institutions to other regions. 
The presence of local military institutions is arguably a potential source for encouraging 
local economic development based on defence expenditure. In fact, 61% firms in the survey 
recorded that there was at least one defence institution within 20 miles from their company 
which provided some benefit. Defence institutions included military bases, government 
research establishments, and major defence contractors. Furthermore, there was a 
significant correlation between firms recording good access to markets and also recording 
benefits from local defence institutions. Of course, this may be related to military 
institutions being located in urban or successfijl local economies. Nevertheless, there is no 
130 
reason to believe that this is necessarily the case and a significant number of military bases 
are located in rural areas. A more detailed breakdown reveals that only 32% of firms record 
that local military bases provide some advantage to their firm. Clccirly, this shows that 
although military institutions may provide some local economic advantages, major defence 
contractors are the most beneficial defence related institution for local firms. 
Figure 5.7 Chi-squarc test of transport links (TRANSCO) by location (COUNTYC2) 
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It is interesting to note that many Dorset firms recorded that the Defence Research 
Establishment provided considerable advantages. In fact, the research station was the only 
military institution which all local firms acknowledged as a creator o f local advantages. 
Thus, it might be suggested that a research station could form an important component of a 
localisation economy. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Despite the difficulties associated with tracing defence industrial firms it was possible to 
survey a large number of companies with defence business from the South West. The 
questionnaire technique proved to be an effective one and yielded a comprehensive data 
set. Basic analysis of the new information provided a number of revealing details about the 
DLB in the region. Indeed, the survey tends to support a number of studies which suggest 
that some defence companies have distinct characteristics when compared to other 
manufacturing organisations (Lovering, 1993). 
The survey confirms that a substantial number of defence companies in the sample appear 
to be either monopolies or oligopolies. Whilst this confirms R. Smith's (1989) assessment 
that a number of UK prime contractors are monopolies it suggests that many firms other 
than prime contractors may be monopolies. In addition, very few companies are pure 
defence suppliers and most companies trade in both defence and civilian markets. The study 
also tends to suggest that, in general, defence companies may be less independent than 
non-defence manufacturing firms. 
In terms of employment the survey tends to imply that defence industrial restructuring has 
been much more severe than restructuring in South West manufacturing as a whole. 
Indeed, the real falls in the defence budget and new competitive procurement systems may 
have resulted in over the loss of one third of defence industrial employment in the South 
West (more than 13,300 workers). However, these redundancies only represent a small 
proportion of the total 1.8 million regional employees in employment in 1995 (Regional 
Trends, 1995). Nevertheless, figure 5.8 shows that these redundancies are highly 
concentrated in a number of areas demonstrating that the impact of restructuring will have 
distinct regional effects. Most noticeable is that the highly defence dependent areas have 
suffered the worst falls in defence employment (such as in West Devon and Avon). 
Furthermore, the survey verifies that these job losses will predominantly affect full-time 
male employees given the low levels of female or part-time employment within the sector. 
Defence sector employment is also different because it involves large quantities of R&D 
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employees and tends to depend on skilled rather than un-skilled labour However, the 
majority of recent redundancies have arisen in larger enterprises and it is interesting to note 
that the majority of medium sized companies are actually employing more workers than 
they were 5 years ago In theory, this may provide substance for ideas such as flexible 
specialisation (Piore & Sabel, 1984) or flexible accumulation (Scott, 1988), which it is 
argued, may increasingly characterise production in the DIB (Markusen, 1991) 
Figure 5.8 Defence industrial employment 1989-95 
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The recent restructuring may also be affecting the spatial location of the industry with the 
data suggesting that defence companies are more likely to relocate nowadays than they 
were twenty years ago I f increasing rates of relocation are evidence of companies seeking 
to lower their costs then it may be that competitive conditions have been increasingly 
pervading the defence sector Thus, the introduction of new competitive procurement 
systems may not represent a radical new environment for many defence companies Indeed, 
the levels of non-defence business in the sample may indicate that a primary factor 
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determining the location of defence companies may be dictated by the demands of their 
civilian activities. 
Of course, any geographical conclusions inferred at the county level must be treated with 
caution because of the variation in the quality of source lists. However, it would appear 
that there are defence industrial relationships which follow core-periphery lines in the South 
West. For example, defence companies in Devon and Cornwall appear to be less specialised 
than other firms in the region. Indeed, many firms in western areas specifically note the 
limitations of their location with respect to access to markets and inputs. 
Thus, the cornerstone of the study is an illustration of the severity o f defence industrial 
restructuring. Moreover, the survey identifies a number of important conclusions about 
competition levels in the defence sector. Interesting evidence suggests that there may be 
higher levels of competition in the sector than may have been predicted in the past. 
However, recent redundancies suggest that changes are continuing and that there may be 
less competition in defence than in civilian manufacturing as a whole. 
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6 
Further analysis of the Defence Supplier Survey 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the sample of data derived fi-om the questionnaire survey in more 
detail by testing for the existence of a variety of relationships using the techniques of 
logistic regression and log-linear analysis. First, the essentials o f logistic regression are 
outlined and this approach is used to examine the nature of local linkages between defence 
industrial firms. Secondly, a hierachical log-linear model is used to analyse statistical 
associations amongst a number of spatial variables. Thirdly, a logistic regression model is 
used to analyse the characteristics of defence companies according to their customer types. 
Finally, a number of conclusions are drawn fi"om the statistical analysis. 
6.1 Logistic regression 
Logistic regression is a technique which allows a dependent variable to take only two 
values, thus lending itself to modelling issues which are represented by dichotomous 
responses. For example, questions which can only be answered either as "yes" or "no", and 
variables with only two possible outcomes such as gender, must be analysed as categorical 
ones since no intermediate responses can exist. 
The form of the logistic regression model is an estimate of the probability of an event 
occurring, where: 
Probability (event) = equation 6.1 
Where Z is a linear ftinction of the independent variables X „ Xp such that; 
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equation 6.2 
where P's represent parameter co-efficients. Regardless of the value o f Z, the probability 
estimates will always be between I and 0. However, there is no linear relationship between 
the independent variables and the probability estimates. Thus, i f the probability is less than 
0.5 the event is not likely to occur, greater than 0.5 the event is likely to occur, whilst 
values equal to 0.5 imply no outcome can be predicted. 
Whereas the estimation method in linear regression uses the least squares method, (where 
coefficients result in the smallest squared distances between observed and expected values), 
logistic regression employs a maximum likelihood method. This implies that the coefficients 
which make the observed results most likely are selected by the estimation procedure. 
Moreover, because logistic regression is non-linear, the procedure requires an iterative 
algorithm. 
When the dependent variable can lake only two values it is impossible for the distribution 
of errors to be normal, and thus multiple regression is inappropriate for analysis. Multiple 
regression assumes that the dependent variable is continuous and in principle can take any 
value. Moreover, multiple regression is also limited in that it cannot be used to interpret 
predicted values as probabilities. There is a danger that a model based on multiple 
regression could be used to predict the probability of an outcome, for example, estimating 
the likelihood of a yes response in a referendum, when there is no justification for such a 
prediction, 
It follows that logistic regression can also be applied to the analysis of continuous 
dependent variables which are characterised by data breaks. For example, respondents to a 
question which is not pre-grouped into class intervals may often voluntarily respond by 
rounding estimates to the nearest five or ten percent. Effectively this transforms continuous 
data into a discontinuous form. 
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Continuous data may not be normally distributed because of thresholds within data sets 
where a small change in the value of a variable results in a large rise in the number of cases 
which record that value. On a cumulative frequency plot this would be illustrated by sudden 
steep jumps in the curve. With information like this, multiple regression would be unlikely 
to make good predictions because the distribution of the errors is not normal. Logistic 
regression, on the other hand, would be suitable because values on either side of a 
significant threshold can be given categorical values. Thus, logistic regression is highly 
appropriate for the analysis of data containing data-breaks. 
Within the defence supplier survey there are a number of variables which are classified by 
dichotomous responses, and there are also a number of continuous variables which do not 
seem to be distributed normally. As an illustration, the cumulative frequency plot of 
percentage of inputs obtained from within twenty miles is shown in figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Cumulative frequency plot of % of inputs which respondents estimate 
were derived from within 20 miles 
N P U T 2 0 
source: postal survey 
Figure 6.1 shows that there is a distinct jump in the data between 3 and 10% of inputs, 
which indicates that this variable could be discontinuous and non-linear. The threshold 
within this variable shows that multiple regression may be inappropriate and that logistic 
regression may be a more suitable tool for analysis. 
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The use of the logistic regression model is relatively common in geographical analyses. For 
example, Hensher and McLeod (1977), use the technique for measuring the probability of 
choosing a car or train trip to work in suburban Sydney, Australia; and, VVrigley (1976), 
evaluates the existence of bronchitis in a sample population as a function of attributes of 
location using a logistic regression model. Thus, it is a method which is widely acceptable 
for modelling spatial effects. Moreover, logistic regression is also commonly used in 
economics and other social sciences. However, there appears to be little application of the 
technique in the area of defence economics, although a study by Finch (1994) has examined 
the strategic actions of defence firms in the Lancashire region. 
6.2 Model evaluation 
The validity of a logistic regression model can be assessed by a number of regression 
statistics. The Wald statistic, for example, is used to test whether the coefficient on a 
particular predictor variable is zero and is simply defined as the square of the ratio of the 
regression coefficient to its standard error. This has a chi-square distribution and for 
categorical dependent variables the degrees of fi-eedom are equal to one less than the 
number of categories in the current model. The acceptable significance level on the Wald 
statistic need not be as strict as the traditionzii 5%. Indeed, Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989), 
argue that even 15-20% levels may be appropriate in some situations. Thus, variables with 
significance levels of <0.1 are considered as appropriate predictors to include in the model 
to explain the dependent variable. However, the Wald statistic is unreliable for the analysis 
of large co-efficients, thus, it is often necessary to consider alternative statistics. 
To test the relationship between various variables within a model, it is necessary to 
consider a partial correlation R-statistic. This is particularly usefiji when independent 
variables are highly correlated as the R-statistic can be used to test the partial correlation 
between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables (Nomsis, 1992). The 
values of R, lie within | 1 | , such that R-values >0, imply that as a variable increases in value 
so does the likelihood of the event occurring; and R-values <0, imply that decreasing values 
of a variable reduce the likelihood of the event occurring. 
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The R-statistic may be calculated as follows: 
^ _ _i_ J { y < a i d - 2 K ) equatiott 6.3 
where, K, is the degrees of freedom for the variable. For a fiiller discussion see Norusis, 
(1992). 
When the co-efficients of a variable are estimated in multiple regression, they represent the 
partial derivatives relating a one unit change in the dependent variable to variation in the 
independent variable. In logistic regression, the co-efficients themselves are difficult to 
interpret directly as they are in log form. It is usual therefore to calculate the exponent of 
the co-efficients. This can be seen from the logistic model when described in terms of the 
log of the odds, (known as a logit). 
. ^ probjevent) \ _ {i^^^Xi+.-.^^pXp equotion 6.4 
° \prob{nort~everit)J 
Thus, the logistic co-efficient represents the change in the log odds associated with a 
one-unit change in the independent variable. Positive co-efficients increase the likelihood of 
an event occurring, whilst negative ones reduce the chance. 
The overall fit of the model can be measured by the likelihood ratio. Recall that the 
parameter estimates selected in logistic regression are the ones which make the observed 
results the most likely. The probability of these results is quantifiable and is commonly 
known as the likelihood. Since this likelihood is less than one, it is traditional to use -2 
times the log of the likelihood (-2LL), as a measure of goodness of fit. Therefore, good 
models will result in a high likelihood of the observed resuhs, and, -ILL will tend towards 
zero. 
More importantly, the model chi-square statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients except the constant are zero. This is calculated as the difference between 
the best model possible and one containing only a constant. However, when the -2LL ratio 
is used as a selection procedure for model estimation, the change or improvement in the 
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model chi-square represents the difference between successive stages of the procedure. 
Thus, it is a test that the coefficients added at the last step are not zero. When the 
likelihood ratio is used as a filter for backward elimination, the 10% significance level is 
used as a basis for the removal of variables. Note, that when selection is made in a 
backward direction the improvement in the chi-square is usually negative. Both these uses 
of model chi-square are comparable to an F-test in standard regression analysis. 
Alternative measures of the goodness of fit can be made using a classification table which 
compares predicted against observed cases. The table reveals the number of correctly 
classified cases on the leading-diagonal against the number of incorrect classifications on 
the off-diagonal. By reading the table across the cells the model can be assessed for its 
accuracy in classifying each of the dichotomous categories of the dependent variable. The 
overall accuracy of the whole model is also given. A model which is characterised by an 
overall classification of 50% implies that the estimated probability of the cell ft-equencies 
has a fifty-fifty chance of occurring. Thus, the closer to 100%, the more likely the model 
fits the sample. Note however, that the classification table does not reveal the distribution 
of the estimated probabilities for the co-variates. 
One limitation of the classification table is that when only a small portion of the sample is 
represented by one of the categories, then it may appear that the overall percentage of 
correct classification is very good. For example, this might happen when a structural break 
occurs in the data towards the upper or lower limit of the cumulative fi-equency graph. The 
problem occurs when most of the dominant category are correctly classified, but the minor 
category is mostly classified incorrectly. The overall percentage of the classification table 
would suggest that there is a good description of a relationship, when in fact, there is 
virtually no difference across the values of the variable. One way o f overcoming this 
limitation is to pay attention to the differences in the diagonals in the classification table. It 
is desirable that both the rows in the table are more than 50% correct in their predictions 
fi-om the data. 
The procedure for specifying a model is to select a dependent variable which can be 
explained by either one or more independent variables. These predictors must be selected 
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on theoretical grounds so that spurious correlations between left and right hand side are not 
reported. The theoretical basis on which variables are selected can either be fi"om past 
studies which identify causal relationships, or alternatively, it must be possible to make 
credible arguments to support the inclusion of an independent variable. The former method 
gives rise to hypothesis testing of existing literature, whilst the latter sets up new or 
untested hypotheses for examination. 
6.3 Dobson theory 
One model within the existing literature which examines the causes of local linkage patterns 
is provided by Dobson (1987). The model considers the major features of local linkages 
between manufacturing firms, their customers and their suppliers in a peripheral region and 
tests the theory with data firom Devon and Cornwall. The analysis does not consider 
muhivariate logit models but draws conclusions from bi-variate chi-square relationships. 
Whilst these provide basic descriptive conclusions, there is considerable scope for more 
sophisticated analysis of linkages. Moreover, as there has been virtually no attention 
devoted to linkages in the defence sector, further work may provide a valuable contribution 
to existing defence studies. 
Dobson's study is based on the premise that the individual characteristics of firms determine 
the nature of links between manufacturers, their suppliers and their markets. These 
characteristics include a number of factors; ownership status, firm size by employment, 
product type, the effect of local risk conditions, and the general trading environment. 
Firstly, ownership status is traditionally thought to play a significant role in determining 
inter-plant linkages, (Lever, 1974; Marshall, 1979, Taylor and Wood, 1973). Indeed, it is 
commonly thought that externally owned plants possess more dispersed linkages than 
independent firms. This occurs because many independent firms trade fi-om a single site 
and, therefore, have fewer contacts outside their local area, whilst firms with several 
dispersed plants trade across a number of economic areas. Moreover, these firms may trade 
with other branches of their own company. 
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Ownership status is also important for the formation of linkage patterns because the 
autonomy of managers is affected by a company's decision making structure. Clearly, there 
will be significant differences in organisational structure between finms who are single 
independent plants and firms which are composed of a hierarchy o f spatially separate 
functions. Moreover, there may be differences between the decision making structures of 
different multi-plant firms which may affect linkage patterns. Thus, autonomy within 
organisations is closely related to ownership status. 
A third characteristic of firms which will play a part in the nature of linkage patterns is the 
size of the firm (Pugh & Hickson, 1976). Once again firm size is often directly related to 
organisational structure, and traditionally it is considered that small firms will purchase or 
sell proportionally more in their local environment than larger firms. 
Fourthly, there are notable differences in the linkage patterns of different sectors of the 
economy because different products are produced by specific factor endowments (Britton, 
1976). For example, the production of highly specialised products may require technical 
labour skills and service backup, thus requiring highly accessible links between buyers and 
sellers. By contrast, mass produced homogenous products can be transported in bulk and 
require few considerations of access to the market place. Thus, product nature may be a 
prime determinant of linkage pattern type. 
All entrepreneurs face environmental uncertainty, however, the degree o f uncertainty may 
vary across regions and sectors. Milleti and Gillespie (1976), propose that uncertain 
environments engender more customer and supplier contacts because firms seek to avoid 
risk. For example, with more linkages the firm can switch to alternative contacts i f an 
individual link fails. Thus, i f regions are characterised by certain features such as 
peripherality, then this may create a unique set of trading conditions and firms will adopt 
local responses to deal with local risk factors. Therefore, the creation of local linkages may 
represent a response to risk, suggesting that specific local conditions are a fifth determinant 
of linkage patterns. Thus, for example, i f a firm records that it has many local competitors, 
then this illustrates that the firm's customer may have a wide choice of input suppliers. 
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Finally, the Dobson model is constructed within a regional firamework which is specifically 
peripheral. I f peripherality per se has particular geographical effects such as poor access or 
a detrimental physical environment, then an objective test would have to consider 
peripheral eflfects on linkages relative to other areas. Regional data indicates that the 
conditions in the economies of Devon and Cornwall are the least favourable in the South 
West (Gripaios, 1995). Thus, these counties were considered to represent the periphery 
whilst the remainder of the region represented the core. 
It is possible to test a Dobson type linkage pattern using logistic regression on the data 
provided by the Defence Supplier Survey. For example, one proxy for the dependent 
variable of local linkages is the proportion of inputs which firms purchase from within a 
twenty mile radius. The right hand side variables which Dobson identifies as determinants 
of linkage patterns can be either be directly measured such as ownership status, 
employment size, and county locations (within or outside Devon and Cornwall), or they 
can be created using alternative measures. A proxy for the perception of the local risk 
conditions might be the perceived location of the firm's main competitors. For example, 
Dobson argues that firms in more uncertain environments possess more customer and 
supplier contacts. Thus, i f a firm has more competitors it suggests that that firm's customer 
can choose amongst more suppliers. Effectively, the customer faces less risk because i f one 
supplier should fail he can obtain inputs fi^om alternative sources. However, a limitation of 
this measure is that it efifectively brands highly competitive environments as more risky, 
which may not actually be the case. Finally, a proxy for product type could be the defence 
dependency of the firm, thus recognising a distinction between military and civilian 
producers. 
Taking into account the above considerations the following regression equation was 
estimated. 
!NP20L - a + ^iFIRMLO + P2EMPLO + ^zNNDEFSA9 
^^.COUNTYLO + p^COMPSLOO - K e 
equation 6.6 
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where: INP20L is local inputs (categorised as 0, i f a firm purchases less than 10% of inputs 
locally, and 1, i f firms buy 10% or more). FIRMLO, is firm ownership (categorised as 0, i f 
a firm is an independent single plant, and I i f the firm is part of a group). EMPLO, is 
employment size (which has a tri-variate categorical form where, 0 represents 10 
employees or less, 1 represents employment of 11 to 100 workers, and 2 represents 
employment of greater than 100 workers). NNDEFSA9, is defence sales (categorised as 0, 
if defence turnover is less than 10%, and 1 i f 10% or greater. COUNTYLO, is county 
location (categorised as 0 i f within Devon and Cornwall, and 1 i f within the rest of the 
south west). COMPSLOO, is competitor location (categorised as 0 i f principal competitors 
are located within 20 miles, and 1 i f main competitors are found in the rest of the UK). 
Note that there were 44 cases missing fi-om the analysis because of incomplete data, thus, 
the sample total was only 131. 
6.4 Results of the model 
Figure 6.2 shows that the model produces a correct classification score of 69.34%. 
Moreover, the model is robust in that the model chi-square statistic is 18.79 with a 
significance of 0.0004, and seven degrees of freedom. Despite the overall success of the 
model in its predictive capabilities, an examination of the classification table reveals that it 
is substantially better at predicting cases in which firms do not purchase a high proportion 
of inputs locally than the alternative case. However, even in the latter case, the 
classification score is over 50% which is a significant improvement over a random model 
The significance of the independent variables is also presented in figure 6.2. Three of these 
(NNDEFSA9, COUNTYLO, and COxMPSLOO), were acceptable at the 5% limit but no 
other variables were found to be significant even at the 10% level. The ovmership status 
variable was, however, almost significant at the 10% level. As has already been noted, 
Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989), argue that weak confidence limits are not inappropriate in 
logistic regression analysis. However, even i f these limits are considered as unacceptable, 
this does not imply that it is necessarily correct to reject these variables as significant 
determinants of local linkage patterns. It could be that either they are not statistically 
significant for defence firms, or they are not significant within the sample. Another 
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interpretation could be that the proxies used to estimate the Dobson variables were poor 
measures of the actual predictors. However, two of the insignificant independents were 
direct measures as Dobson had intended. Nevertheless, it could be that the rejection of 
these variables was partially caused by weak proxies for other variables within the model. 
Figure 6.2 Dobson Model 
Oopondont Variable. . IlfPOT20L 
Bediming Block Kxmbor 0. I n i t i a l Log Likelihood Function 
-2 Log Likolxhood 187.27878 
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Variable (a) Entered on Stop Nuzobor 
1. . NNDEFSAS 
FIKMLO 
EKPLO 
COONTYLO 
COMPSLOO 
Batimation terminated, at i t e r a t i o n number 3 bocauao 
Log Likelihood docroaaod by leaa than .01 porcont. 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Goodnoas of F i t 
Model Chi-Squaro 
Improvement 
168.486 
137.401 
Chi-Square d£ Significance 
18.793 
18.793 
.0045 
.0045 
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50.85% 
83.33% 
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Variable B S.B. Wald 
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2057 .0000 2 3882 
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8813 
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The magnitudes of the parameter estimates demonstrate the quantitative effects of the 
independent variables in the model. However, these are expressed as odds ratios, which are 
defined as the ratio of the probability that an event will occur to the probability that the 
event will not occur. These can only be interpreted by using the exponent of the 
co-efficients (Exp(B)). For example, the log of the co-efficient on the COUNTYLO 
variable shows the effect of a firm being located within Devon and Cornwall (0), compared 
to the rest of the south west ( I ) . A change in the co-variates from 0 to 1 affects the odds of 
purchasing more local inputs by a factor of 3.24. Therefore, this confirms the a priori 
assumption that local linkages are less common within peripheral areas. For instance, 
putting the statistical limitations of the model aside, this implies that firms in peripheral 
areas may have a higher propensity to import firom outside the region because they are 
unable to find the inputs they need in the surrounding area. 
Increasing defence sales from below to above 10% of turnover increases the odds of 
purchasing more local inputs by 2.9 times. This tends to confirm the view that the defence 
industry is, in fact, dififerent from other forms of manufacturing (Markusen, 1991). Local 
inputs may be important for defence companies for a number of reasons. For instance, close 
proximity may facilitate contact between enterprises and this may be particularly desirable 
when developing new products of a highly technical nature or when the compatibility of 
components need to be ensured. Alternatively, defence sub-contractors may have 
developed locally as a result of the conditions in the DIB such as the relatively stable levels 
of demand and the chosen club of prime contractors (Smith, 1990). As Lovering (1993) 
suggests, these factors may have generated a degree of geographical inertia in the sector 
and this may have actively encouraged local spin-off industries. Indeed, i f the prime 
contractors had been subject to more competitive pressures and had been forced to adopt 
contingent strategies such as relocation, then the resultant pattern of sub-contractors may 
have been more dispersed. 
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Figure 6.3 Backwards elimination of Dobson model 
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A change in the location of a finn's competitors from within, to beyond 20 miles, changes 
the odds of a firm purchasing more locaJ inputs by 0.1768. Another way of putting this is to 
say that firms with predominantly local competitors are 5.66 times more likely to purchase 
locally than firms with competitors located over 20 miles away. This may be strong support 
for a localisation argument within the defence sector because it implies that whole supply 
chains fed by multiple sources of defence demand may be contained within local areas. 
Another interpretation could be that there are simply certain products or markets which 
typically rely on local trading patterns. 
The next stage of the procedure was to re-specify the model on statistical grounds such that 
insignificant variables were removed from the regression. Figure 6.3 shows that the deletion 
of right hand side variables by backwards elimination using the likelihood ratio made no 
improvement to the model in overzdl terms. Of course, the efifects of this were to reduce the 
chi-square statistic, the percentage of correct classification and change the significance of 
the independent variables. Moreover, the exponents of the variable co-efficients fell, thus 
reducing the effects on the odds ratios. The same three independent variables remained in 
the best model, although one of these was marginally excluded at the 5% significance level. 
The exponent on the NNDEFSA9 variable shows that firms with more than 10% of 
turnover in defence are 2.7 times more likely to purchase a higher proportion of their inputs 
from local suppliers. The revised COUNTYLO exponent shows that firms from outside 
Devon and Cornwall are 2.8 times more likely to purchase a higher percentage of inputs 
locally, than firms from the far South West. Finally, the COMPSLOO variable suggests that 
firms with local competitors are 5.5 times more likely to purchase more than 10% of their 
inputs locally than firms with more distant competitors. 
Thus, a summary of the Dobson model is that there are three particularly good explanatory 
variables for local linkages which apply to firms with defence business. These are, the 
defence dependence of the firm (a crude measure for different product types), the particular 
location of the company (whether in a peripheral region or not), and the local trading 
environment as measured by the number of local competitors (which is a proxy for the 
perceived level of risk within a region). It is more difficult to draw conclusions on the 
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remainder of the right hand side variables although ownership status did generate weak 
significance in the model. 
Thus, the defence sector appears to have different linkage patterns to those proposed by 
Dobson. However, the measure for peripherality appears to suggest that local linkages may 
be more common in core areas than in the periphery. This may occur because peripheral 
areas have a smaller economic base and, therefore, it is necessary to import more goods 
into the region. Contrast this to the alternative hypothesis where an isolated region may 
have more local linkages because accessibility into and out of the area is so limited that 
traders have to rely on local suppliers. This second argument may be inappropriate for 
defence because the sector is so high-tech that many highly specialised inputs have to be 
traded from a number of specialist manufacturers at a number of locations. Alternatively, 
the most significant growth poles based on defence expenditure may simply be more 
common in the core areas than in the peripheral ones. 
The link between local competitors and local suppliers shows that some defence firms may 
be located within agglomeration economies. This observation suggests that there are 
benefits from trading locally which are present in a number of the links in the supply chain. 
These benefits may also be present in non-defence related supply chains, however, the 
defence sales variable in the model confirms that it is the more defence dependent 
companies who are the most likely to trade and compete locally. 
6.5 Extensions of hypothesis testing 
Many commentators have noted the possible existence of concentrations of defence activity 
in space. However, many existing studies rely on anecdotal observations of industrial 
activity and there is little empirical evidence to support this theory. The strongest evidence 
for agglomerations come from studies which report a high degree of defence dependence 
within regions. It has already been noted that the European Union's study of the 
Community records a number of highly dependent areas in the UK at the county level or 
within groups of counties, although no explanations for these patterns are put forward. 
Other studies include qualitative analysis of supplier linkages within local areas which are 
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non-spatial (Braddon et a/, 1989; Wiltshire County Council, 1992). Thus, a logical 
extension of the statistical analysis of the Defence Supplier Survey is to examine firstly, the 
hypothesis that there are such concentrations of activity in the defence sector, and 
secondly, the causes of these agglomerations should they exist. However, an examination 
of these issues requires the use of the technique of log-linear analysis and this is now 
discussed in some detail. 
6.6 Log-linear analysis 
Often, within a large data set such as that produced by the Defence Supplier Survey, there 
may be many relationships which can be analysed by contingency tables. However, when 
there are many variables in a cross-classification table, the number o f cells in the table 
rapidly increases and it becomes very difficult to interpret a relationship fi-om the 
fi-equencies. This can be fiustrating when a statistical analysis of a contingency table reveals 
that there is a significant relationship within the data, but it is difficult to decipher. 
There are two options available to overcome this problem. Firstly, cross-tabulated data can 
be broken down into a number of sub-tables and chi-square tests can be applied to each 
one. This tests for independence between the separate interactions. However, this 
procedure does not test for the effects of variables on each other. Thus, a second strategy 
which tests for interaction efiFects may be more appropriate. One such technique is 
log-linear analysis which attempts to fit a model to the log of the cell frequencies of a 
contingency table. This type of modelling satisfies the condition o f handling categorical 
data, but also has the advantage that there is no causation implied in an association. This is 
useful because, as in the later analysis in this chapter, it may be difficult to stipulate a 
dependent variable in a model, rendering regression models inappropriate. Thus, the 
benefits of this technique makes it similar to logistic regression analysis in that continuous 
data containing breaks can be modelled. 
When using a log-linear model the number of cases in each cell of a cross-tabulation can be 
expressed as a fijnction of the remaining variables. Linear models can be obtained fi-om the 
natural logs of the cell fi-equencies. For example, in a contingency table containing a 
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variable for the proportion of inputs purchased locally with two categories (local and 
distant) and a variable for defence turnover proponion (high and low), the log-linear model 
for the cell representing both these variables may be expressed as: 
l o g ( f ) = H + X'^^c + + -X'toc'ww equation 6.7 
Where F is the cell frequency; \i is the of the logs of the frequencies in all the cells of the 
table (the grand mean). The X parameters represents the change from the value of | i for 
each row or column association. Each row and column category has its own A. value. Thus, 
the term ?I^^^LOW shows the effect of being in the low defence turnover category, and the 
term A.*^ \oc »s the effect of being in the local input purchasing category. The X '^ ^"^^ '^^ Lociow 
represents the interaction between purchasing local inputs and having a high proportion of 
defence turnover. 
The X parameters therefore, represent the average log of the frequencies in a particular 
category minus the grand mean. The main effect of an i*^ category of a variable is calculated 
as 
X = \ii — \x equation 6.8 
where Hj is the mean of the logs in the i"*" category and | i is the grand mean. I f A,>0, then the 
average number of cases in a row or a column is larger than the overall average. Thus, it 
follows that the X interaction parameters indicate how much difference there is between the 
effects of the variables taken individually and collectively. They represent the boost or 
interference associated with particular combinations of the values (Norusis, 1992). 
For example, i f firms with low defence sales have a high level of inputs from local suppliers, 
then the number of firms in the low and local cell would be larger than the number 
expected based only on the frequency of low defence sales {X and on the frequency 
of firms with local suppliers (A.^^^LO») positive differential would be represented by a 
value for X ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ L O C X O W ^ ^ However, i f low defence sales typically result in firms who 
purchase a lower proportion of their inputs locally then the X value for the interaction term 
151 
would be negative. In other words, i f ^ " ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ O C L O W ^ ^ ^hen firms with high defence sales 
purchase more inputs from distant suppliers. Of course, i f this A,=0, then defence sales have 
no implication for the location o f a firm's suppliers. Note that this last statement is only 
robust with respect to the particular categorical breaks chosen for the variables in question. 
A second important point is that the lambdas must sum to zero across the categories of a 
variable, and this is also true for the lambdas associated with the interaction terms which 
must sum to zero over all the categories of a variable. This implies that i f it is found that 
firms with low defence sales purchase inputs from distant suppliers, then the inverse 
statement is also true that firms with high defence sales purchase a high proportion of 
inputs from local suppliers. 
After specifying the saturated model, terms are successively deleted in a manner analogous 
to stepwise procedures in multiple regression analysis. At each stage o f analysis the term 
with the smallest and non-significant impact upon the likelihood ratio chi-square is 
eliminated from the model. The procedure ends when the removal of any additional terms 
would have a significant effect upon the chi-square statistic and hence no further terms can 
be eliminated. 
Log-linear models may be specified using the same procedure as regression analysis. 
Models must fit the data, be substantively interpretable and they must be as simple as 
possible, (Norusis, 1992). Thus, the main implication for log-linear models is that complex 
higher order interactions should be avoided because of the difficulty in interpreting them. 
Therefore, variables must be selected on theoretical grounds and deleted i f not significant. 
The most parsimonious model is derived from a saturated model which fits the data 
perfectly as it includes all variables independently and in all possible two way, three way 
and four way interactions amongst the variables. Insignificant variables can be assessed and 
rejected by a statistical process such as backwards stepwise elimination. Principally, 
specification is constrained by limits on the number of variables which can be contained at 
one time without making the model unmanageable. Once again this is facilitated greatly by 
an algorithm which removes highest order interactions from the model in a stepwise 
manner. This results in the creation of a model which is the most parsimonious possible. 
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The advantage of this is that the complex higher orders which are difficult to interpret are 
de-selected, leaving a robust model based on simpler interpretable interactions. 
6.7 Agglomeration model 
One aim of the present study was to examine whether a concentration o f defence industrial 
activity was likely to be centred on a major defence institution. For instance, defence 
demand-led activity could be induced by local research agencies, military bases, or major 
defence contractors. In the present survey, respondents indicated the degree to which they 
recognised that such establishments located within twenty miles contributed to the success 
of their business. The advantages of local defence institutions may have included both 
direct customer-supplier relationships and indirect relationships such as the free provision 
of military service personnel or airstrips for R&D purposes (Markusen and Yudken, 1993). 
Alternatively, firms may have simply assumed that local institutions created opportunities to 
trade with other defence companies. The data is encoded as the AGGLOM variable which 
is categorical in nature and thus the contribution of a local defence institution is categorised 
as I i f that institution is seen to provide benefits to the firm, and 0 i f it provides no 
advantage. 
The other three variables in this model were present and significant in the Dobson model. 
The COMPSLOO and NDEFSAL9 variables being acceptable at the 1% level, whilst the 
INP20 variable formed the dependent variable in the logistic regression. Note that the 
inclusion of additional variables would have limited the use of the model because each term 
adds many additional cells to the cross-tabulation creating interpretation problems such as 
described above. Thus, although other variables may play a role in the development of 
localisation economies, data limitations preclude their incorporation. One way in which this 
might be solved is to produce a number of separate log-linear models, where new variables 
replace some of the original four. Although this may add relevant variables to a model 
specified to incorporate effects contributing to localisation econonues, this methodology is 
of limited use as it may exclude significant interaction effects. Thus, the strategy adopted 
here was to select empirically proven variables from the logistic regression model whilst the 
insignificant ones were omitted. 
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Thus, the second variable in the equation (NDEFSAL9) included a measure of a firm's 
defence sales as a proportion of its turnover. This was a categorical variable defined as a 0 
i f defence sales were less than 10%, and 1, i f 10% or greater. The variable gave an 
indication of the defence dependence of a firm, and, it can be broadly interpreted as 
distinguishing between civilian and defence firms. However, this is subject to the proviso 
that all firms have some defence interests. 
Thirdly, the percentage of local input supplies purchased by companies was a variable used 
to measure the importance of local linkages. This provided a comparison between firms 
who purchased significant local inputs against those firms who primarily sourced from more 
distant locations. The variable INP20, was a measure of the proportion of inputs which 
firms recorded that they obtained from within a radius of 20 miles. I f firms were assigned a 
0, it implied that they purchased less than 10% of their supplies from the local area, whilst 
firms classed with a 1, recorded that more than 10% of inputs came fi-om the local area. 
Finally, the proximity of local competition was a variable which could be included to show 
that other firms recognised that there may be advantages from trading locally. The variable 
COMPSLOO was a measure of the location of a firm's principal competitors; i f a firm's 
main competition was represented by firms closer than 20 miles then that firm was assigned 
a 0; and it was assigned a I , i f principal competitors were located fijrther away than this. 
Note that the categories within this variable were mutually exclusive despite the option that 
firms had in the questionnaire to record that important competitors could be located on 
either side of a 20 mile radius. 
The above four variables were examined using hierachical log-linear analysis, thereby 
eliminating insignificant interaction efiFects. Note that the analysis was based on 132 cases 
due to missing data. 
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6.71 Results of the model 
The best model had a generating class defined by six, two way interactions. Thus, every 
possible two-way interaction was present in the best model, as was each individual main 
effect. One way to test the robustness of this model is to use the likelihood ratio chi-square 
statistic. The chi-square decreases when more terms are added to a model, since small 
values of chi-square are associated with good models. This occurs because in a saturated 
model containing all interactions the chi-square is zero, and as you remove interactions the 
chi-statistic and degrees of freedom both rise. Figure 6.4 shows that in the final model the 
likelihood ratio chi-square was 4.53, and thus, acceptable for all two-way interactions with 
5 degrees of freedom. Figure 6.4 also shows the observed and expected frequencies, the 
latter being identical to those that would be obtained from a two way cross-tabulation 
between any two of the variables. The residuals associated with each interaction are also 
provided in the output, and another way to assess the goodness of fit is to consider the 
variation in the standardised residuals. I f the ratio of the difference in the observed and 
expected frequencies to the standard error lies outside the range |1.96|, then it suggests that 
the model is inadequate. The standardised residuals of the current model all remained 
within these limits suggesting a satisfactory model. 
It is also possible to test that the coefficients on the parameters are not zero by using a 
partial chi-square. This compares the fit of two models which are almost identical except 
for a single variable which is omitted. The difference in the likelihood ratio chi-square of. 
the two models confirms or rejects the hypothesis that the coefficient on the parameter is 
not zero. The output for the current model reveals that the model is adequately explained 
by the second order and main effects. This can ascertained by large significance levels for 
the exclusion of the third and fourth order interactions. Thus, the conclusion here is that 
each of the second order interactions and main effects are important. 
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Figure 6.4 Hierarchical log linear agglomeration model 
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With the confirmation of the significance of each interaction, the logical step is to quantify 
and interpret these effects using odds ratios. This is a superior strategy to the traditional 
one of considering the parameter estimates, because these can vary between different 
statistical packages (Page, 1977; Holt, 1979). When calculating odds ratios, for any two 
variables A and B, the odds ratio represents the ratio of the frequencies of the two 
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categories of variable A evaluated at one category of B divided by the ratio of the 
frequencies of A evaluated at the other category of B. The odds ratios for the six 
significant relationships can be calculated fi-om the expected fi-equencies predicted by the 
current model. 
Looking firstly at the interaction between competitor location (COMPSLOO), and the 
proportion of supplies purchased locally (rNP20), the odds ratio estimates the odds of a 
company with a high proportion of local inputs having local competitors, against a firm 
with a low proportion of local inputs having local competitors. The odds of a firm with 
local competitors having a low proportion of local inputs can be calculated fi-om table 6.1 
as (15.5/0.3)=51.6. The odds of a firm with local competitors having a high proportion of 
local inputs was (4.8/0.5)=9.6. The final odds ratio is, therefore, (51.6/9.6)=5.38, indicating 
that firms with local competitors were more than five times more likely to purchase a high 
proportion of local inputs than firms with distant competitors. This suggests that there may 
be distinct agglomerations of industrial activity within the sample o f companies with 
defence business. Conceivably, there may be individual product markets where firms 
purchase locally and also serve local customers or this may reflect the general nature of the 
defence sector. 
Table 6.1 Expected frequency table for odds ratio calculation 
rNP20 (low) INP20 (high) 
NDEF (0-10) NDEF (10+) NDEF (0-10) NDEF (10+) 
COMP (local 0) AGG (0) 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 
A G G ( l ) 1 0.7 4.3 7.1 
COMP (distant 1) AGG (0) 15.5 15.2 4.8 11.5 
A G G ( l ) 5.3 20 4.5 41.2 
source: postal survey 
The other five significant interactions can be quantified in a similar manner. The interaction 
effect between AGGLOM and COMPSLOO was 9.65. This shows that firms who recorded 
local advantages fi-om a military institution were almost ten times more likely to have local 
competitors than distant ones as compared to firms who recorded no advantages from a 
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local institution. This does not imply, however, that all defence firms trade in an 
environment where there are agglomerations with institutions and local competitors as the 
number of firms who recorded that they have local competitors only constituted a small 
percentage of the sample (11.5%). What this odds ratio does suggest is that there is strong 
evidence of some local concentrations of activity based on these two variables. Moreover, 
because all the pair-wise interactions were significant we can conclude that this was but one 
contributing factor to a localisation economy. 
The relationship between the level of defence sales and the origins of input supplies 
produced an odds ratio of 1.2, which shows that heavily defence dependent firms were 1.2 
times more likely to have a high proportion of local inputs than firms with a low defence 
sales turnover. Strictly speaking, firms with 10% or more of their turnover accounted for 
by defence sales were 20% more likely to purchase more than 10% of their inputs from 
within 20 miles than firms with less than 10% defence turnover. Thus, this suggests that 
defence firms may be different from civilian manufacturing firms as defence firms are 
slightly more likely to purchase more local inputs. 
The odds ratios also revealed that highly defence dependent firms were only 0.34 times as 
likely to have local competitors as distant ones as compared to less defence dependent 
firms. In other words, firms with high defence sales were three times more likely to have 
more distant competitors than firms with low defence sales. This appears to contradict the 
localisation economy argument as it appears that firms with high defence sales have their 
principal competitors usually located fijrther than 20 miles away. A possible interpretation 
of this is that firms operate with a degree of competition that is consistent with a Central 
Place model of location where the threshold of a good prevents significant overlappmg 
sales market areas (Christaller, 1966). Another interpretation is that there are so few 
defence industrial producers that although there may be agglomeration economies in the 
sector, many firms find that their competitors trade in a different growth pole from 
themselves. Alternatively, there could be many defence firms in a locality each specialising 
in particular products. Finally, it may be that the definition for local trading used in the 
Defence Supplier Survey, 20 miles, is insignificant for these variables. Re-defining the 
categorical nature of the variables may be one solution, however, the 20 mile threshold is 
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inflexible because it wass encoded in the questionnaire. This defined limit was considered to 
be the optimal method of assessing local factors in the survey. For example, it was 
necessary to be specific about the word "local" which, for example, could be interpreted by 
multinational firms as situated within a particular continent. 20 miles was considered to be 
the average distance between medium sized towns in the UK. Moreover, it is highly 
doubtftil that any respondents would have measured the distances involved to their 
suppliers. Thus, a general impression of local was all that was required in the analysis. 
The interaction between the AGGLOM and INP20 variables showed that firms who 
perceived that local institutions were advantageous were more than two and a half times as 
likely to purchase inputs locally as firms who did not perceive any such advantages. This 
suggests that growth poles may be a feature of the defence supply chain as firms recognise 
both demand-led and supply-driven local advantages. This is potentially one of the most 
significant findings of the model, because it may be an empirical validation that a degree of 
localisation exists within the sector. 
Highly defence dependent firms were twice as likely to record advantages from local 
military institutions compared to firms with few defence sales. This is logical because an 
institution may simply represent a firm's customer. Thus, this provides fiarther evidence 
which suggests that the defence industry is different from civilian industry and possible 
explanations for the localisation of the sector have been discussed above. 
The general conclusion from this section is that the main effects of the four variables are 
not independent of each other and all pair-wise interactions are significant. The results seem 
to confirm the view that it is very likely that highly defence orientated companies are 
engaged in geographical trading patterns which are different from those which occur 
amongst civilian orientated defence firms. These trading patterns are characterised by local 
linkages between different military institutions and firms, between firms and their suppliers, 
and, there may be a high level of local competition between defence firms and their 
competitors. Thus, the model suggests that agglomeration may be an important spatial form 
within the DIB. Hence it provides some empirical validation for the qualitative studies 
which suggest that the defence sector may be spatially concentrated. Previous studies have 
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suggested that this inertia may be related to the lack of competition, the stable demand, and 
the highly technical nature of the defence sector (Smith, 1990; Lovering, 1993; Lovering, 
1991a). 
6.8 Customer driven models 
The analysis is now extended ftjrther by considering dependent variables which recorded 
whether firms sell to particular defence customers (DEIVIAND variables). This enabled the 
development of a profile of defence firms by customer types. The DEM variables were all 
categorical and were coded 0, i f a firm did not supply a particular institution and I , i f they 
did. Table 6.2 shows the frequencies of the four DEM variables considered in this section. 
As the DEM variables were categorical, muhiple regression was inappropriate and logistic 
regression was a more suitable tool for analysis. Backwards step-wise elimination using the 
likelihood ratio was used to select the model with the best independent variables. The 
independent variables themselves were all categorical and they are outlined in table 6.2 for 
clarity. 
The previous two models demonstrated that the proportion of inputs purchased locally by 
firms (INPUT20) played a significant role in the defence industrial environment. Thus, this 
was included as a predictor variable and was classified as in previous models. Local 
competition was also shown in previous models to play an important role in the local 
defence environment. Thus, the COMPSLOO variable was also included in the model and 
was classified as before. Another characteristic which may be important is the type of 
product which a firm produces. In previous models the defence sales proportion of 
turnover was used to distinguish between the producers of military and civilian products. 
The NDEFSA9 sales variable was also included here in its originid form. However, fiirther 
analysis of product types using alternative measures was also included as shown in table 
6.3. For example, firms were asked in the questionnaire whether they supplied a range of 
goods. Two of the extreme product types are included here: firstly, unique products which 
imply that companies are monopolists in that market; secondly, of f the shelf products which 
implies that output is highly standardised. 
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Table 6.2 Frequencies of D E M variables 
Variable Customer frequeocv 
(0) % 
frequency (1) 
% 
DEMMOD MoD procurement executive 37.3 62.1 
D E M L O C MoD local contact points 70.8 29.2 
D E M D E F defence contractors 37.9 62.1 
DEMSUB defence sub-contractors 57.1 49.2 
note % may not sum to 100. due to missing cases which vary for each DEAf variable 
source: postal survey 
It is possible that finns which supply different types of defence customers may trade in 
geographically distinct supply chains. Thus, it was appropriate to include a variable which 
measured the cost competitiveness of local input suppliers. Such a variable would 
demonstrate the grounds on which firms may select their input suppliers. Thus, the 
LOCOST variable was categorised as a 0 i f firms regarded cost competitiveness as 
important, and a 1 i f no cost advantages were perceived fi^om local suppliers. 
Defence customers may be supplied by firms who have always been defence dependent, or 
they may be served by firms who have transferred resources into the industry fi^om civilian 
manufacturing. It is possible that some defence customers are more likely to be supplied by 
one of these groups than the other as firms with a proven competance may be favoured for 
technological projects. Thus, the DEFSUP variable recorded whether suppliers originally 
established themselves to serve the defence industry (categorised by a 1), or converted to 
the sector later in their history (categorised by a 0). 
Finally, an additional variable which recorded the age of establishments was included since 
it is often suggested that MoD contractors are those with a proven track record who have 
enjoyed a long-standing institutional relationship with the military (Lovering, 1993). A 
cumulative fi"equency plot of the age range of firms in the defence supplier survey revealed 
that there is a structural break in the data at 30 years. Firms of less than 30 years were 
thereby classified as a 0, and firms which were 30 years or older were classified as a 1. 
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Table 6.3 Frequency table of RHS variables in D E M logistic regression models 
Variable frequency 
(0) % 
frequeocv 
(1)% 
specificatioD 
NDEF 21.1 78.9 siructural break at 10% sales 
INPUT20 44.7 55.3 structural break at 10% inputs derived locally 
COMP 7.3 92.7 0 denotes local competitors 
UNIQUE 40.7 59.3 1 denotes manufacture of unique products 
SHELF 74.8 25.2 1 denotes manufacture of non-customised goods 
LOCCOST 60.2 39.8 0 denotes that cost competitiveness is highly important for input 
DEFSUP 58.5 41.5 1 denotes that firms set up to serve militar>' customers 
A G E 53.7 46.3 structural break at 30 years 
note % frequencies are calculated for 52 missing case 
source: postal survey 
6.81 DEMMOD model 
Figure 6.5 shows that the best DEMMoD model which explained the characteiislics of 
firms which sold to the MoD procurement executive, had a model chi square of 32.57 with 
a significance level greater than 99.99%. The correct classification score was 76.42. The 
model only contained four of the selected independents as the INP, DEFSUP, LOCCOST 
and COMP variables were not significant at the 10% level. 
The exponent on the parameter estimate of the UNIQUE variable showed that finns which 
produced these goods were 4.6 times more likely to sell to the M o D than firms which 
manufactured other types of good. The significance o f this variable was very strong at 
0.0006. This implies that defence contractors which sell directly to the MoD are of\en 
monopolists as suggested by a number of studies (Smith, 1989; Smith, 1990; Smith & 
Smith, 1992) 
Heavily defence dependent firms were 4.16 times more likely to sell to the MoD as firms 
with a low defence dependence. This can be seen by the NDEF variable which was 
significant at the 1% level. This confirms the image that defence contractors are specialists 
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who directly concentrate their expertise on serving military customers. Indeed, it implies 
that a level of commitment to defence contracts is important i f firms wish to act as 
contractors to the MoD. An alternative explanation for this situation may be that MoD 
approved certification restricts access to defence markets, thus, concentrating production in 
the hands of limited number of contractors. 
Defence suppliers who were more than 30 years old were 2.54 times as likely to supply the 
procurement executive as firms who were less than 30 years. This provides empirical 
evidence that primary defence contractors may be well-established firms as suggested by 
historical accounts (Lovering, 1993). 
Surprisingly, firms who produced non-customised output were also 3.84 times more likely 
to sell to the MoD than firms which produced other types of output. This phenomena might 
perhaps be explained by the fact that the defence sector is characterised by a monopolist 
selling to a monopsomist (excluding export sales). Thus, with the MoD as a single nominal 
end user there is limited scope for suggesting that the product is tailored to the needs of 
individual customers. Note that both these final variables are significant at the 5% level. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that the MoD purchases such a wide range of output that 
this may include large volumes of non-technical or non-destructive output which could be 
classified as off the shelf products. 
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Figure 6.5 Logistic regression model of DEMMOD variable 
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6.82 D E M L O C model 
Figure 6.6 shows that the second DEM variable considered the attributes of firms which 
sold to MoD local contact points. The best model had a model chi square of 21.32 with a 
0.0007 significance level. There was a classification score of 76.42%. Five independent 
variables were acceptable at the 10% level, one of which would have been accepted at 5%. 
These included the variable for the age of the firm which showed that firms older than 30 
years were 2.34 times more likely to supply local contact points than firms which were less 
than 30 years. This suggests that established firms with proven track records may be more 
likely to supply local contact points. However, it is only possible to conclude whether such 
firms are new to defence markets or have always supplied the military by considering the 
DEFSUP variable. The negative co-efficient on this parameter suggested that firms 
originally established as civilian suppliers were 2.28 times more likely to sell to local 
contact points as firms originally established as defence manufacturers. Potentially, this may 
reflect the nature of the products generally sold to local contact points which may have 
fewer military applications. 
The COMP variable had a negative co-efficient and the exponent on this parameter showed 
that firms with local competitors were 4.9 times more likely to sell to local contact points 
than firms which had distant competitors. The LOCOST variable also had a negative 
co-efiRcient, and the exponent on this parameter showed that firms which recorded cost 
advantages from local suppliers were 3.05 times more likely to sell to local contact points 
than firms who did not recognise such benefits. Both these parameters suggest that such 
firms may operate in locally concentrated supply chains. Indeed, this is consistent with the 
official role of local contact points which actively encourages nearby companies to act as 
MoD suppliers (Defence Supplier Service, 1995). Moreover, the model suggests that this 
area of defence activity may be more competitive when compared to sales destined for 
other types of defence customers. 
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Figure 6.6 Logistic regression model o f D E M L O C variable 
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Finally, firms who produced non-customised output were 2.44 times more likely to sell to 
local contact points than firms which did not produce such goods. This may confirm an a 
priori assumption that local contact suppliers are firms who generally manufacture less 
military orientated products, and instead make goods which are sold in civilian marktes byt 
which are also purchased by the MoD. This conclusion rests on the assumption that 
non-customised output may be classed as less specialised and is, therefore, less military in 
its applications. 
6.83 DEMSUB model 
The next model considered the characteristics o f the third tier of the defence supply chain 
and was based on companies who sold output to defence sub-contractors The DEMSUB 
dependent variable was tested against the same set of independent variables as in the 
previous models. Figure 6.7 shows the results of the model which produced a model chi 
square of 15.64 with a significance level o f 0.0013 and 3 degrees of fi-eedom. The rate of 
correct classification was 67.48%. This model contained three significant independent 
variables (UNIQUE, AGELO, INPUT20L), two of which were acceptable at the 5% and 
one at the 1% levels. 
The model implies that firms which are less than 30 years old are 2.23 times more likely to 
sell to sub-contractors than firms which are older than 30 years. It is possible that, in 
general, sub-contractor suppliers are typically younger firms because they are fiirther 
up-stream in the supply chain and, therefore, more exposed to competitive forces. The 
additional element of competition might create more risk and thus higher rates of firm 
failure. An alternative explanation could be that competitive pressures force 
sub-contractors to continually search for cheaper inputs thus continually selecting new 
firms with modem practises and new capital machinery. This is an appropriate explanation 
if the rates of capital replacement in defence sub-contractor suppliers are low. 
Firms which made unique products were 2.34 times more likely to sell to sub-contractors 
than firms which did not produce unique products. This may contradict earlier findings 
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which suggested that final goods in the defence supply chain are unique and composed of 
many intermediate inputs. This model implies that final defence output may be composed of 
highly specialised components. Thus, products may become more specialised as they 
receive value added at each stage of the supply chain. 
Figure 6.7 Logistic regression model of DEMSUB variable 
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Firms which purchased a larger proportion of their inputs from local suppliers were 3.16 
times as likely to sell to sub-contractors than firms which purchased a lower proportion of 
their inputs locally. This suggests that at the beginning of the supply chain local purchases 
are more common. Indeed, this may be consistent with the fact that many primary suppliers 
may be smaller independent firms with greater levels of autonomy (Dobson, 1987). Thus, a 
possible implication of this is that the supply chain becomes more geographically 
concentrated in an up-stream direction. 
6.84 D E M D E F model 
The final model, which considered the attributes o f those firms which sold to defence 
contractors (DEMDEF) is different from the other DEM models because no specification 
produced a statistically significant output. The model chi square was not acceptable even at 
10% but a single predictor (the defence sales variable), was acceptable at 10%. This was 
surprising because all the other DEM variables produced plausible models and there is no 
obvious reason to explain the lack of significance of this particular model (i.e. generally the 
second tier in the defence supply chain). One possible interpretation is that the 
sub-contractors in the supply chain are diverse and thus no outstanding profile for these 
firms can be identified by statistical analysis. This is particularly strange because the tiers in 
the chain above and below this one possess a profile o f characteristics which can be 
identified by statistical means. 
6.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be seen that in three of the four models firms who sell to different 
types of defence customers have distinctly different profiles. The results are summarised in 
table 6.4. It is interesting to note that the COMPSLOO, LOCCOST and INP20 variables, 
which measure geographical relationships are statistically significant only within the 
DEMLOC and DEMSUB models, whilst the DEMMoD model contains no statistically 
significant relationships which record spatial patterns at all. This suggests that local 
linkages are more prominent within the supply chain for suppliers of defence 
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sub-contractors than contractors, and so it is possible that local linkages are a more 
common feature of the early part of the supply chain. This may be consistent with the fact 
that sales to the MoD procurement executive are determined centrally, whilst sales to 
sub-contractors or local contact points are, in general, decided at the local level. Tt is not 
entirely surprising that the DEMLOC model records that local geographical relationships 
are highly significant. Indeed, the Defence Supplier Service (1995), emphasises the 
importance of local market purchases by local contact points. For example, the Supplier 
Service states that firms should not implement mail shots to all addresses provided on the 
local contact list, but should only contact their local office. Moreover, the limited size of 
many contracts means that they are perhaps more likely to be awarded to small firms which 
are likely to trade locally. 
Table 6.4 Significance of D E M variables against RHS variables 
D E M L O C D E M M O D DEIVISUB D E M D E F 
N D E F insignificant DEP. DEPENDENT insignificant insignificant 
INP20 insignificant insignificant L O C A L insignificant 
COMPS L O C A L insignificant insignificant insignificant 
S H E L F Y E S Y E S insignificant insigniijcant 
A G E >30 Y E A R S >30 Y E A R S <30 Y E A R S insignificant 
DEFSUP CONVERT insignificant insignificant insignificant 
L O C C O S T L O C A L insignificant insignificant insignificant 
UNIQUE insignificant Y E S Y E S insignificant 
note: significance at 5% 
source: postal survey 
In previous models firms were distinguished as either defence or civilian dependent. In the 
log linear models a high defence dependence appeared to be correlated with a number of 
variables which implied that local trading conditions were important for such firms. The 
latest model seems to contradict this conclusion somewhat because the most significantly 
defence dependent companies are those who sell to the procurement executive and these 
contractors do not appear to have any locally determined characteristics. This anomaly may 
occur because the sample is divided into a greater number of classes by customer type. 
Thus, relationships which apply to the sample in general may not be applicable to 
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sub-divisions of the sample. Moreover, it is also true that many defence companies sell to a 
number of different types of defence customers. This might explain the lack of a clear 
profile of defence contractor suppliers because such firms may also sell goods to other 
purchasers of defence output. 
Thus, this section demonstrates that there are spatial relationships within the defence 
industrial base which may not be as prominent as those within civilian manufacturing 
industry. Local linkages are seen to exist between defence suppliers, their customers and 
their competitors. A number of statistical analyses suggest that local links are probably 
dependent upon individual characteristics o f the firm, the proximity of local defence 
institutions and the nature of defence customers. 
I f elements of the defence supply chain are geographically concentrated then some 
communities may be disproportionately badly affected by defence cuts. Problems may be 
fijrther compounded i f such areas also suffer fi-om the closures of military establishments, 
which, as it has been demonstrated may provide important advantages to local defence 
manufacturers. Most badly hit may be the local contact suppliers who appear to trade 
within especially localised patterns of activity. Not only are inputs purchased locally but 
major competitors are also recorded as being local firms. Moreover, the low value of the 
contracts which typify trade with local contact points suggest that in the main any closures 
could predominantly disadvantage smaller firms. This would be potentially disastrous for 
those areas because small firms are often perceived to be the engines of growth in many 
regional economic models (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). Fortunately, many local contact 
suppliers are not highly defence dependent and a significant proportion originally 
established themselves as civilian manufacturers. Their civilian operations may ensure their 
survival because they can rely on other purchasers and they are used to trading under 
competitive conditions. 
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7 
Explanations for the geography of the defence 
industrial supply chain 
7.0 Introduction 
To complement the questionnaire survey discussed in previous chapters a series of 
interviews were conducted with a selected group of firms. This chapter discusses this 
second stage of research which is essentially qualitative and intensive in its approach. It 
begins with a description of the overall objectives of the interview technique and then 
analyses the responses which were obtained. These responses are often presented as direct 
quotes fi-om respondents and are used to draw a number of important conclusions. 
7.1 Methodology 
The second phase of the research took the form of in-depth telephone interviews with 26 
defence industrial companies who had participated "m the questionnaire stage of the 
research. This next phase was concerned with establishing explanations for the relationships 
identified in the earlier sections of the thesis. Sayer (1992), details how intensive research 
can complement extensive surveys by providing explanation for processes amongst causal 
groups. However, he cautions that such explanatory relationships are not necessarily 
representative of a population. 
The interviews were semi-structured to allow ft-eedom to discuss ideas and for inductive, 
qualitative research techniques to be used. However, the loose questioning technique was 
sufiBciently structured to constrain the interviewee to a narrow area of discussion. 
Moreover, it was fi-equently necessary to probe individual managers on unique topics to 
fijlly comprehend their experiences. The companies were selected randomly fi^om the 
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sample response to give a balanced picture. However, the sample was stratified so that the 
selection included large prime defence contractors as well as smaller industrial firms. All 
seven South West counties were included in the sample coverage but no attempt was made 
to provide equal representation from each one. Tables 7.1 & 7.2 below illustrate the 
composition of the sample response by size, product nature and County. 
Table 7.1 Size and product nature of defence firms in stage 2 sample 
firm employees product 
1 17 founders and pattern makers 
2 3 insirumentaiion and control 
3 25 aircraft de-icing 
4 5 technical control 
5 76 communication equipment and s>'stems 
6 15 wound components and electronic sub-contractor 
7 6 microwave components 
8 100 high pressure water jets 
9 1,335 aerospace and defence equipment 
10 23 electrical manufacture/ distribution 
U 10 electronics components, materials and production 
equip. 
12 550 ship repair/ conversion 
13 150 engineering services 
14 12 motor boats 
15 13 electrical manufacturer 
16 5 defence materials supplier 
17 20 electrical manufacture 
18 170 aerospace/ defence 
19 24 heat treatments 
20 260 airborne and ground support software 
21 200 electro-optical engineers 
22 26 mechanical engineers 
23 60 naval electronics 
24 170 filler and filter s>'stem manufacturer 
25 738 landing gear 
26 4 specialist ammunition manufacture 
The 26 telephone interviews were obtained as a consequence of contacting 41 firms. 
Ultimately, it was the availability of managers which was the determining factor in the 
173 
selection of firms which were actually interviewed. No firm refused outright to participate. 
However, in most cases it was rare that contact was secured with the managing director on 
the first call. Usually, the first call was merely an opportunity to arrange an appropriate 
time when the interviewee would be available. Nevertheless, on many occasions one or two 
additional calls were necessary before contact was eventually made. In some cases these 
initial contacts made it clear that further effort was unlikely to secure an interview. Thus, 
15 firms which were contacted on more than one occasion proved unable to find sufficient 
time to contribute to the project. Effectively therefore, this represents a second stage 
response rate of 63%. 
Table 7.2 County composition of stage 2 sample 
County no. firms 
Avon 2 
Cornwall 1 
Devon 5 
Dorset 0 
Gloucestershire 5 
Somerset 9 
Wiltshire 4 
total 26 
As detailed above, the complementary nature of intensive and extensive research provided 
the basis for the two stage research process. Thus, research questions were formulated to 
attempt to explain the descriptive relationships identified from the quantitative data and the 
Dobson model which confirm the existence of localised concentrations o f defence industrial 
activity. Consequently, the questions were established to seek explanation for the spatial 
organisation of the defence industry in the UK. Thus, it was necessary to answer four 
questions: firstly, to explain the density of defence firms in particular areas in order to 
understand the spatial relationships identified earlier. Secondly, to determine the 
geographical effect of institutional factors which may play a role in the spatial pattern of 
defence firms. Thirdly, to account for the historical development of particular firms to 
assess past trends in defence industrial evolution. Finally, to assess the influence of changes 
in contemporary environmental conditions to try to understand how the geographical 
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patterns identified earlier may have changed or may be changing. A check list of questions 
was used to guide the interviewer and this is reproduced in appendix 2. 
Initially, managers were asked about their perceptions of the number o f defence firms in 
their local area. This was a question designed not only to prompt the respondent into 
discussing the geographical organisation of the supply chain, but it was also used to 
provide an insight into the extent of local defence industrial activity. The discussion also 
helped to illustrate the awareness of individual managers concerning their local defence 
environment. However, caution was needed in the interpretation of the responses because 
of underlying spatial variations in defence industrial activity. 
Many geographers have noted the importance of perception in the analysis of spatial 
phenomena. For example, Billinge (1989), notes that one branch of environmental 
perception studies in geography has concentrated particularly on the question of resource 
appraisal, demonstrating how the perception of different groups is culturally, socially and 
economically determined. For example, in the context of the present study it is clear that 
"local" is an arbitrary term often defined by the perceptions of individual managers. Hence, 
it was often necessary to elaborate on the term "local", and this was always restricted to the 
town or city area which respondents had documented in the postal questionnaire. I t was felt 
that this was an appropriate definition because it naturally implies proximity as a form of 
advantage. At least, this impression was certainly given on occasions when respondents 
supplied without hesitation, a list of companies fi-om their local area. In cases in which 
respondents seemed hesitant or needed prompting they were often unable to confirm the 
existence of many local defence companies. Secondly, in terms of environmental 
perception, there is also the question of what managers may actually perceive as 
constituting defence business. Given that there is no official definition of a defence 
industrial firm it seems likely that many managers may actually disagree on which firms are 
defence suppliers. 
In general, it was found that most managers did not know of the existence o f a large 
number of local defence firms. Most managers could name a few major contractors located 
close by which they thought might be significant in the local economy. Other managers 
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named a few firms which were smaller enterprises. Moreover, given a little more time they 
could often think of additional firms in their local areas which may have defence business. 
Some cases were able to describe considerable numbers of firms with defence business and 
could even venture historical explanations for high concentrations o f such firms. For 
example, one manager fi-om a small firm based in Somerset described his local area as 
follows: 
"Six miles away there's West land, whilst in the village there are two industrial estates and 
several compofiies are associated as sub-contractors to Westland. For example, small 
engineers who have two or three employees ofid a couple of machines, usually less than a 
lOOOff, nothing big. But as long as they make the quality I'm sure you could probably put 
together a whole helicopter if you went around all the little people in the area.". 
Similar views were expressed fi^om around the region. This fi^om a Bristol based firm: 
"There are a few companies in Bristol with defence work, but whether they're very 
committed to it, I don't know. They're already diversified. There's quite a high proportion 
of tool making in Bristol which is a hangover from British Aerospace and Bristol 
Aeroengines (now Rolls Royce), and a whole load of people became involved in work for 
people like Westland, BAe, and the MoD. But, even if we were working for (them) we 
wouldn't necessarily know what it's for: it coidd be for a customer or the MoD". 
The above example is interesting as it clearly shows that are gaps in the information 
available to respondents. This confirms the results of other studies (for example, Braddon 
et al, 1992), which have found that many contractors are not aware of the defence 
industrial nature of the supply chain in which they operate. Consequently, the knock-on 
effects of restructuring may be more widespread than many managers may have anticipated. 
Unsurprisingly, managers fi-om the Devon and Wiltshire firms generally perceived a high 
concentration of defence related firms in their local areas. Elsewhere, a manager fi'om a 
Gloucestershire firm specialising in aerospace suggested that any sort of industrial 
concentration in that county was particularly aerospace dependent rather than being simply 
defence orientated. However, he concluded that military aerospace was obviously a 
significant component of the business in that area. The only participant fi^om Cornwall did 
not consider that there was a significant number of defence enterprises in his local area. 
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Most managers denied that there was any sort of community or network of defence firms in 
their local area. However, there were a few firms which knew of local authority or joint 
venture attempts to create non-trading links between defence companies. For example, the 
Somerset County Council Defence Contractors Network was described by some firms in 
Somerset; one firm ft*om Avon mentioned the defence slant of the local Regional Supply 
Office; and, two firms fi-om Gloucester were pleased to espouse the value of their 
membership of a private initiative establishing a network of smaller defence and aerospace 
companies ft-om the Somerset, Avon and Gloucestershire Counties. Only one Somerset 
defence manager described a "family feel" to the defence businesses in his local area. 
However, even he added that this did not extend to actually meeting any other defence 
company managers. 
Thus, despite the informational gap discussed above, in general, managers did not seem to 
perceive that there were significant agglomerations of defence firms in their local area. 
Moreover, this introductory question often naturally identified whether respondents had 
any local defence orientated customers. Clearly, i f managers did not know of any important 
defence companies in their local area they were unlikely to be reliant on local defence 
demand. In many cases, local customer demand was clearly unimportant to defence 
companies because their main customers were the major national defence contractors who 
are not located locally. For example, a large contractor specialising in aerospace explained 
that local customers were non-existent: 
'We have 20 or so customers for our products. Our customers are the 20 airframe 
manufacturers from around the world, people who actually make machines who need 
our...gear. In addition, we supply in bulk to the military who stock-pile replacement 
military ...gear. The government has a number of stock-piles, for example, it has certain 
stores in certain areas, such as mechanical stores. So when they buy a batch of 20 
harriers, they buy a batch of initial product support from the various sub-contractor 
parties or direct from people like us. There are specific depots which hold the spares in 
several areas. So for instance our equipment will be sent to Cambridgeshire or wherever". 
Another company, a medium sized electrical transformer manufacturer from Somerset was 
quick to point out that their: 
"...dealings are with defence primes, which are the main ship-yards and the main 
companies like the Ferranti's and Mantra Marconi's. They're distributed all over the 
country". 
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Two other similar sized Somerset based contractors espoused similar views: 
"The only customer we have locally, is Westland at Yeovii Although I scfy they're a 
customer, they are really a atstomer of our customer, which is a US company, but we 
deliver our product to them. They are the only people who are local...local customers are 
certainly not the main reason we're located here". 
and, 
"We ...sell as far apart as Scotland, Lincolnshire and East Anglia. We actually do work 
for the major defence contractors in Britain. We supply them directly to their stores, so 
we've a got a reputation for high quality ofid knowledge in the product". 
It is tempting to consider such case studies in the context of company characteristics in an 
attempt to find explanations for their customer types. For example, it could be argued that 
the above three cases deal with primes because of their product nature or firm size. 
However, this is not the role of qualitative analysis. Moreover, the previous sections of the 
thesis based on quantitative studies did not reveal any such relationships. Thus, i f 
explanations were sought from the stratification of qualitative data, this would be akin to 
analysing contingency tables with tiny sample sizes. Conclusions fi'om such an approach 
would clearly be mere conjecture. 
Within the interview sample there were a number of firms which did have some customers 
who were specifically local. For example, in the conurbations of Bristol and Plymouth some 
contractors had business which was aimed at local defence primes rather than at major 
contractors located elsewhere. Two quotes illustrate typical responses: 
"We supplied a lot of equipment to DML, and DML also sub-contracted a lot of work to 
local contracting firms who we also supplied...Most of our customers ctre local, say within 
30 miles, but we're part of a national company". 
'We're casting tools for BAe and Rolls Royce. There's a lot of tool making companies 
because there's always been the demand, although I don't doubt that the major 
matmfacturers have a certain internal tool-making capacity". 
The above responses suggest that certain types of defence firms are perhaps more likely to 
be involved in local trading patterns than others. Certainly this is the view of some authors 
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who have noted extensive sendee orientated enterprise surrounding dockyards such as at 
Devonport (Bishop, 1994). The current data suggests that local manufacturing companies 
may also be involved in supplying prime defence contractors. 
The next related stage of the interview asked companies about the nature of defence inputs 
that they could purchase from their local areas. In general, all respondents repHed that there 
were some things which they could obtain from local suppliers, and these were consistently 
similar types of product, such as general components or small manufactured outputs. Often 
managers were unhappy with the term "defence inputs" because they did not draw a 
distinction between goods which were applicable for defence and those applicable for 
civilian markets. In fact, however, respondents may not have considered that their suppliers 
could be defence firms by virtue of the destination of their sales rather than by the nature of 
the products which they traded in. Furthermore, a number of individual cases discussed 
industrial production standards which distinguished their defence from their civilian work. 
For instance, a Somerset firm was happy to describe the benefits of his local area: 
"There's quite a number of things we can buy locally, mainly at the component level, 
which could be for defence or it could be for anything else. For example, we have a 
contract with a group of electronics firms who are a local group north of Bristol, there 
are one or two suppliers such as firm X and firm K*. But, although they're supplying us 
they're not really defence suppliers, they are suppliers of engineered components". 
•(Note that these two named suppliers were both contributors to the Defence Supplier 
Survey.) 
This local picture was also true for other managers: 
"// certainly does happen that we buy local inputs which are defence related. Providing 
you hiow who the people are. That's quite a job to fitid out, most of the people who I've 
discovered are sub-contractors, can almost be by accident. We've got one company who 
makes precision castings, and there's another company just up the road, and when I went 
to see them, I discovered they were making lots of parts for the current army rifle (which I 
had no idea that they were doing) ". 
This particular example once again demonstrates the informational gaps which may exist in 
the defence sector. Indeed, it appears that local defence related firms may be discovered 
sometimes only by chance by other participants in the supply chain. Of course, this may 
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actually encourage the development o f local supply chains because these chance 
interactions between managers may be more likely to occur locally. 
Although local supply was readily available for some products there were some cases in 
which products could only be obtained by imports. For example, an armaments 
manufacturer explained: 
"/ can source everything that I need to make cases locally, except the only thing which is 
missing, and I have to bring in from the States or Italy, is press-stud work. So, there's very 
little press-work locally, but there's a lot of production on the engineering side 
Even companies which purchased the majority of their inputs from the international market 
still relied on a degree of local supply. Again, this was considered to be "bog-standard 
stuff", generally available through catalogues, which then perhaps had to be modified by 
local manufacturers: 
"Printed circuit boards: I take to a mofi down the road who actually matmfactures the 
PCBs and delivers. He's around the corner so he's very convenient. Metal-work: there's 
another small company around the comer; very competitive: very good; excellent quality: 
Just around the comer; very convenient". 
Despite the standard nature of these products and their availability, the above example 
clearly shows the importance which the respondent placed on product quality. This 
confirms the preconceptions which many commentators have concerning the level of 
quality associated with defence goods. For example, it is often argued that the technical 
quality of military products has been responsible for inflation in UK defence expenditure 
(Lovering, 1993, Smith, 1990). 
One aerospace manager suggested that his sector was more internationally organised than 
the defence industry in general. He suggested that this made local trading less significant: 
"There is a constellation of aerospace companies in the South West, and there's another in 
Lancashire. Within the defence industry there's obviously the prime contractors.., and they 
tend to have their own group of suppliers but they tend to be for general products or 
commodities such as machining itnits, bolts, washers, or electrical components. So they 
would set those up, whereas the more specialised market which we're in is more futtionally 
or internationally orientated.". 
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However, in many instances managers remarked on a national production or distribution 
network for their inputs. They often cited the need to remain competitive, thus encouraging 
purchases from the cheapest supplier regardless of location. However, it wasn't always the 
case that local suppliers were un-competitive, and often respondents expressed a preference 
for local trading where possible because of the advantages that local contact could bring. 
An example of these types of issues are illustrated by two electrical manufacturers in 
Plymouth who noted the following: 
"The vast majority of our supplies come from outside the local area. A lot of people have 
moved outside the area too. Take the cable manufacturers: there's no cable distributor in 
Plymouth now. So now if we want to buy our cables we've got to buy it from up country, 
through AEI, from one of their distribution centres". 
"Supplies come from all over the country. We don't buy much locally because not much in 
the electrical line is made locally. The only things that we would buy locally are the sorts 
of things which are manttfactured in the local area. We're in a competitive environment, 
and at the end of the day we would really buy anywhere in the UK. Wherever we can get 
the right price for an equally acceptable product If they are manufactured in Plymouth it 
would obviously be a lot easier, then we would have a lot readier access to the product At 
the end of the day we've got to compete on price and tender the product to the MoD 
establishments, cmd if our price is right we would get the business". 
Other managers suggested that the market was highly competitive in a national context and 
thus local supply was totally unimportant: 
"Steel can be obtained from all round the country, so its not a special case to come and 
see us. They're running around the country everywhere. Things like fasteners and 
proprietary items, that's not a problem because there's so many people running around in 
little vans. If there's a shortage and we can't find something it's not a local problem, 
because then it's not available country-wide". 
Thus, from the defence company managers' perspective, the spatial pattern of trade 
between firms in the defence sector is varied. There are some managers who clearly believe 
that local firms are significant in the industry, either forward or backwards in the supply 
chain. However, the most widely held belief is that only one or two fims may be relevant in 
local trading patterns. Finally, there are a number of cases which believe that their firm 
operates in a national or international market within which geography plays little part. It is 
possible that all of these conditions are accurate reflections of the spatial nature of the 
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defence supply chain given the diversity of the sector. However, given the informational 
gaps identified it is likely that the defence supply chain is more important in the local 
economy than many managers realise. 
7.3 A military industrial complex? 
Some defence economists have suggested that military institutions such as control centres, 
bases and research agencies may play a role in the geography of the defence supply chain 
(Breheny 1988, Markusen & Yudken 1992). This was only partly supported by the 
interviews. Some managers in the survey also noted that military bases may be important 
not just for supplier-customer relationships but as the magnets for significant business to 
exist v^thin certain local areas. For example, several managers spoke o f the advantages of 
the relocation of the main MoD centres fi-om Bath and London to Foxhill at Bristol. They 
implied that this would create advantages for that area, but they weren't necessarily defence 
industrial ones. Instead, there were likely to be spin-offs from the injection of employment 
into the area and the consequent rise in spending. 
In the main, the majority of defence company managers were adamant that local bases were 
unimportant for their local business. It was stressed that the centralised purchasing system 
of the MoD made it impossible for local trading patterns to develop. A managing director 
of a company with 100% turnover in military markets explained: 
"There is no connection between the two (the industry afid the military), they're entirely 
separate. For instance, if we were dealing with the MoD, we woiddn't deal with afiy of 
those (local) bases, we would deal through London. We could have a military camp on top 
of us, and there would be no way we woidd be dealing with them. If they want anything 
they've got an established set ofprocedures. If they watU help with a technical matter, they 
may come to us, afid say can you help us ottt, but there's no official connection between us 
and them. We have to deal through London or the accounts office in Liverpool, well 
they're spread all over the place really. Everything is very tightly controlled and the whole 
network is set up that it does actually work quite well; and for it to work well you have to 
have clearly defined lines of communication, which is what they have". 
The effectiveness of this system was emphasised further: 
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"This couldn't be changed.... for example, if you decide that you want to change from a 
horse to a tank, somebody has got to make a decision to do that You can't have 50 
satellite units all deciding whether they shoidd change because some would choose to 
change from a horse to a camel instead. Someone along the line at the top will decide that 
the infantry will work in such a way or the army are going to work in such a way that that 
becomes the "law". So it actually starts at the satellite level because a soldier will say. 
"well, this is a terrible rifle, and I prefer something better". That goes all the way up afid 
when they're having a big meeting someone will say "there seems to be murmurings about 
this, perhaps we ought to do something about it". We then go into a complete exercise to 
find out what they're going to do; we then work out, say 20 years ahead what the effect 
would be from all that, and then we would actually go into the procedure of actually 
getting a contract to produce the gear, re-writing the manual, and then at the end of the 
exercise, the soldier who raised the issue in the first place ends up with the new goods. But 
that particidar MoD procedure takes 20years". 
However, this does not mean that there is no contact between the defence company and the 
military at the local level. The same manager continued: 
"We have been on a firing range to oversee some exercise, and they say "we're very keen 
on this, or we'd like to do this or that"; but unfortunately one had to take that with a pinch 
of salt because we know perfectly well that they've got to go through the entire spectrum 
before it will ever get back to us. So whatever they'd like to do, I'm afraid that it had no 
bearing on the general value. The contact we have is purely friendly; from a commercial 
viewpoint it really has no sigfiificance whatsoever". 
However, despite this particular manager's denial of any benefits, it is hard to imagine that 
such contact exists in an entirely altruistic sense. Other managers did consider that there 
were direct advantages form local nnlitary bases. For example, in Plymouth a number of 
companies reported that they dealt with the MoD indirectly through agents who acted as 
sub-contractors. In one particular case the advantages of bases were described in the 
follov/ing way: 
"Military institutions are usefid. We deal with the old DSA, who has been superseded by 
the private companies and although they are supposed to be a lot easier to deal with... 
they have the same old DSA mentality. The reason is that a lot of them are ex-DSA 
employees". 
It is easy to imagine that a naval dockyard could create benefits for the local economy 
because there are so many items that need to be obtained in maintaining and re-fitting ships. 
These economic opportunities arise because the ship is a mobile vessel on which sailors not 
only have to fiilfil the actions of warfare, but also eat and sleep. Similar advantages are 
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unlikely to accrue in any other military force because their civilian operations are more 
conventional. Thus, it is unsurprising that local base advantages exist for dockyards but are 
not otherwise apparent in the region. 
Although bases were rarely relevant, other MoD institutions did seem to play an important 
role for some defence firms. For example, this was explicitly detailed by a marketing 
manager fi-om a defence prime in Gloucestershire: 
"There is a direct link, not so much with military bases, but with government 
establishments in Gloucester, for example, GCHQ, which we deal with quite a lot There is 
the DRA at Malvern, and the DRA sat-com station at Difford. That's not so much direct 
contact from sales but we do fitnded development for them all. Bases provide no 
advantage because it's the MoD procurement which provides the equipment for them... 
Information about on-going development and improvements comes out of the Operational 
Requirements Branch of the MoD. These are serving officers who work for the Army, 
RAF, RN etc, and serve them on the ground. They recommend to the MoD procurement 
what the MoD ought to buy, and what the service wants on a large scale ". 
Other managers reported that they did have connections with military institutions which 
were reasonably distant firom their premises. A firm specialising in microwave technology 
explained: 
'We make for the MoD directly in as much as we make research equipment, we make 
antennae and things which they use on the test range. We're doing a lot of research work 
through the establishment at Malvern. We use their facilities and have a considtancy to 
the MoD, but there's nothing local". 
Thus, the local advantages of military bases for defence industrial companies in the sample 
seem to be largely confined to the naval dockyards at Devonport. It is important to note 
that that this may be in part related to the agency management of the dockyards, which has 
replaced the centralised purchasing system with one which is partly decentralised. Such 
advantages do not always extend to other types of military base. However, control centres 
and research establishments are often reported as providing advantages to local firms. 
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7.4 The evolution of the defence supply chain and its geography 
The next section of the interviews involved asking managers about the historical 
development of their business including the reasons behind the original location decision. A 
few managers were unable to assist with this question including those who were not 
employed fi^om the outset of a business, but even they were often keen to venture possible 
explanations. In a number of cases this question was answered by a natural progression 
from the discussion of the role of local linkages. For example, a satellite communications 
specialist was clear on his company's reasons to locate where they did,: 
"77?^  firm established in this area because of GCHO, and we wanted to be central to these 
organisations". 
In other cases, military institutions may have played a role in the siting o f a number of other 
companies, not through proximity to an individual institution, but through a desire to have 
reasonable access to a number of institutions. For example, in one case location was said to 
be related to: 
"...aspects such as the ship-yards at Portsmouth and Southampton and all their activities 
around there and the Naval activities around the MbD at Bath. I suppose that the Bath 
axis was origimlly more important: mid-way between those points, but of course not 
mid-way with respect to Glasgow or Barrow-in-Furness". 
This particular example demonstrates the impossibility of having a perfect location. Thus, 
the site chosen was clearly advantageous for its proximity to some contact points but not 
others. 
Devonport Dockyard may also have been responsible for the development of a number of 
firms. For example, one contractor suggested that his company... 
"...has always had a presence in Plymouth for over 50 years, in one shape or another. 
They would have been for defence and general electrical work in the area. They've always 
had a presence in Plymouth because it's sttch a major town. I should expect that the 
business early on was dependent on the Ministry". 
In all the above cases location was dependent, at least in part, on a propinquity to military 
institutions or defence industrial companies, therefore, implying that local concentrations of 
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defence activity may stimulate the growth of new firms. A related theme was that a number 
of firms had set up as a result of spin-offs from local defence firms. For example, some 
owner-managers had established their company on the basis of a knowledge or skills gap 
which they had identified with a previous employer. Some had even set up companies 
especially to supply their previous employer; such as this manager from Gloucester: 
'We're a family firm, I started up in 1972, but I've been in aircraft since 1956. I went to 
Gloucester Aircraft when I left the R.A.F. and I went to Smith's where I did my first 
apprenticeship. So I had the background. My eldest son worked at Vickers and my second 
son is in the business too / was working for this firm ....making gyros and other stuff 
for a customer, but we found that we couldn't get the work done because the firm was 
American controlled and quite honestly they didn't want our work. They were bringing 
stuff over from the States, finishing it off and then selling it in Europe. So I was in 
Marconi's, and I cozddn't get the parts I needed. So I went to the boss and said that I was 
setting up on my own, and I came out with an order for 800 units. So that's how we got 
started". 
By co-incidence, the sample contained another example of an ex-Marconi employee who 
had established his own firm in Somerset. 
"Basically, the founder lived around the comer. This office is convenient Actually he used 
to work for Marconi, which is Just down the road, and of course he didn't want to move 
house, so that's what it really boils down to: its around the comer from where he lives". 
The above example clearly shows that firms may be established wherever is the whim o f the 
founder. Indeed, a common view was that location was a product o f co-incidence or 
chance with very little deliberate geographical planning. However, the above example 
shows that whilst such a decision may be viewed as resulting from chance, it is clearly 
related to the fact that an individual has developed his skills in a particular location. Thus, 
location patterns could be considered as being based on a form of agglomeration involving 
the transference of skills from one firm to another. Thus, new defence industrial firms may 
spring up in close proximity to existing defence companies as employees leave and establish 
their own businesses. With the down-turn in the defence sector and the significant 
reduction in employment in the last decade, this may have accelerated the rate of grovrth of 
new defence companies in locations close to existing contractors. This may account for 
some of the considerable number of relatively young firms identified in the earlier 
quantitative work of the thesis. Indeed, for a time the Plymouth area had an extremely high 
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rate of new firm formation and this has been attributed to the setting up of businesses by 
ex-dockyard workers (Gripaios P. and Gripaios R., 1992) 
The above considerations are based on a concept of inertia where location is determined 
either by prohibitive costs associated with relocation or a lack of pressure to search for an 
alternative site away from the founder's home. It could be argued that similar inertia exists 
for firms who become defence firms by conversion from other sectors. In many instances 
interviewees reported that their commercial business was set up by their founder at a 
convenient location close to his home. Later, the company may have switched some of their 
resources into the production of goods for the military market. However, presumably the 
point of such a conversion would be to allow the business to continue in a similar form to 
the present and not to have to re-locate. 
A number of cases reported that they were civilian converts. Interestingly, all these 
companies were all established near to their founder's location. For instance: 
"Well the designer of our original pump, those people came from here, and there's no real 
reason for being here. This is a rural area, we're a ma»mfacturing company with an 
engineering workshop and we struggle to get the people we need, so there's certainly a 
travel disadvantage ". 
It was not possible to find out why the innovators of this particular pump were in the local 
area in the first place. However, other manufacturers were more specific in the details of 
their conversion strategies: 
"There aren't mofiy defence companies here. We're out on a limb really: it's an accident of 
history. My Father started the business (because its where he lived), to serve the local 
farming community and others He developed a portable milking machine, so that it was 
possible to go out on to the moors to do the milking instead of bringing the cows in 
everyday they took that out with them. That was up to the early 1970s until the price of 
steel went up, it then became a very expensive item and farming was changing so that 
cows no longer went out on the moor; they were kept in yards; there were reductions in the 
size of herds, so it was cheaper to put up block buildings. That knocked that one on the 
head, so we moved into sub-contract fabrication and machining; and as one part of the 
business died down the other took over the business. Obviously, with people like Westland 
in the area we were able to pick up work, and from then on it developed. ... 
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Other companies also described a natural evolution of the growth of their defence business 
as their traditional markets waned: 
"Up to about 12 years ago we used to produce shotguns and sporting rifles in Bridgwater. 
We had 180 employees, but that was not military. We decided not to continue that 
production because of cheaper competition from overseas, and we didn't want to 
compromise on quality. But we were already here (at Highbridge), and we ran a parallel 
business which was military procurement So the civilian side ceased, but the military side 
continued and because we already had offices and warehousing here, we continued here". 
A number of firms had estabhshed premises at particular sites by the use of at least some 
location planning. However, this first example shows that this process may not be 
perceived in the highest scientific regard: 
"In the War, the gentleman who set up the company started up in London where they used 
to make transformers; but in the War/late 1930s he started to make coils for the radios to 
go into Spitfires, being entrepreneurial as he was. There was a lot of research being done 
in Box (a hole in the ground), which was where all the co-ordination for the Battle of 
Britain took place, and there were local houses, big houses, where the local intelligence 
services used to assimilate information from aerial photographs. One of the reasons for 
moving to Malmesbury was that there was a large premises available close to Box, which 
(the founder) thought was a usefid place out in the country. There's also a test range 
nearby. Of course he could have gone anywhere but he chose there". 
This is an example of a firm relocating during a period in which industry was encouraged to 
move west to reduce its vulnerability to air attack from Germany. However, there does 
appear to be some more sohd examples of commercial planning within the sample. For 
example, a midlands based multi-plant firm had set up a plant in Somerset in the last year 
especially to serve south western demand: 
"There's a large sub-contractor in Exeter, and we moved to supply that customer because 
they threatened to set up their own in-house facilities because they were fed up with 
transporting their custom up north to the other plants. We do castings for defence and 
civilian business... and so we had also certainly planned to obtain spin-off business from 
Westland/GKN" 
There are also other examples of a considerable investment in searching for a viable 
location: 
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'7 went to Bristol with my wife and we tried to find industrial units we could afford, but we 
couldn't find any space which we could afford in the Bristol area, and even as far out as 
JO miles it was so expensive; and, at the time, the nearest place with reasonably 
in-expensive industrial land was Martock, and so we moved down here. It was purely 
because of the availability of inexpensive land and it fitted in with South Somerset District 
Council's plan of the area. They wanted to put a new industrial estate back into Martock". 
Thus, there are a diverse range of reasons for the geography of the defence industrial base. 
First a number of firms clearly became established through labour skills which were 
developed in local industry. This perhaps confirms Lovering's (1990), view that labour 
skills have contributed to inertia in the spatial organisation of the sector. However, a 
number of firms have also developed in the South West by conversion fi^om civilian into 
defence business. This may, perhaps, be explained by the existence of a number of 
prominent prime contractors who are visible targets for potential business. Finally, a 
number of firms have developed as a consequence of planned location decisions. Rent costs 
and military institutions have both played roles in some of these particular cases which are 
often complicated by other factors such as military strategy. Thus, it is clear that there is 
no simple conclusion that can be reached because the location decision is a highly complex 
one. 
7.5 Regional attributes of the south west region: pressures for reJocation? 
One interesting issue to emerge fi-om the interviews concerned the number of companies 
which complained of rurality and its effects on their enterprise. Even some firms situated in 
well integrated areas of central or eastern counties of the region complained of their 
isolation fi-om markets. For example, one manager from Taunton suggested that the 
disadvantages from location merely extended to: 
"... a pain in the neck travelling to London all the time". 
However, he added that: 
"...the major problem that we've had is that it is kind of the back and beyond. If we 
wanted to expand in engineering terms by recruiting engineers it is difficult to persuade 
them to come here. I came here from Glasgow last year and since I've been here we've 
persuaded 5 people to come here from outside; which is about all we watUed to recruit 
But, when people come here they make a commitment to this company with the sole 
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realisation that if things don't work out they may have to find another job in the area 
which they may not find very readily. So there's that problem". 
Whilst this may be a particularly extreme example, it is possible that such issues arise 
throughout many rural areas of the South West. Indeed, the example suggests that whilst 
engineers may be mobile before they enter an area they may be less inclined to engage in 
subsequent moves. This may restrict the growth of the defence sector in some locations i f 
workers perceive particular areas as risky because of their limited employment potential. 
Other managers spoke of limitations of their particular area especially within the South 
West: 
"Tlie problem with Plymouth is it is fairly isolated. On the one side you've got the sea and 
obviously on the other you've got the hills. Whereas, if you're up in the conurbations like 
Birmingham or London, everywhere is built up with factories and development. It's not 
like that in Plymouth, its just part of being in this part of the world. But even if you 
compare it to South Wales, the Welsh development people get millions of pounds poured 
in. What we seem to get is peanuts In the last 10 years I've been here it's certainly not 
good and it doesn't leave a lot of room for optimism". 
However, even successfiil firms in "core regions" of the South West complained of political 
constraints on their location. For example, a Wihshire based manager expressed his desire 
to re-locate: 
"We'd love to move from the area, but the local authority is totally hostile to the idea. 
Most of our employees are in their 60s and were based in Malmesbury; but we're hoping 
to relocate and move somewhere else and that wotdd be a new avenue for the business. 
We'd like to move to a more politically sensitive area, and probably it would be Wales to 
exploit the university contacts, the Welsh Office, and the community which is "nichey" in 
Wales as opposed to the problems here. There are many things such as ifiward investment 
is welcomed; for example, if we wanted to merge with a large company, say from Canada 
(which we're considering at the moment), we would like to locate in Wales because it's 
nichey and premises are a lot cheaper and the schools are down there". 
Thus, there is evidence that a number of firms were discontent with the attributes of their 
location. This had prompted some interviewees to express a preference for alternative 
locations from which to trade. All firms were asked i f they would expect any great benefits 
from relocating to other places, and this invoked a range of responses. Indeed, some firms 
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had already re-located. However, the majority of these involved responses to increased 
demand which they could not meet with their existing plant. For example, a number of 
managers explained that their old warehousing facilities or premises were simply inadequate 
to serve their local markets and they had had to move around the comer or a short distance 
away. This gave them a new base to work from and most managers were keen to espouse 
the benefits of their new facilities. However, this did not generally include geographical 
benefits because the advantages were mainly those of additional space and operating from 
modem buildings. For instance: 
"The firm was under different ownership but its been here since the War. We've been at 
this site for six years before that it was on the Hoe, which was an old building which we 
had to move out of because the branch was doing extremely well. We needed bigger and 
more modem premises and now we've got this one it's got its pluses and minuses. Ideally, 
we'd have one premises at one end and another at the other (end of town), but that's a 
different matter". 
This mirrors the experience of the following firm: 
"Actually, we're around the comer from where we used to be, in 1988 we relocated from 
premises around the comer. The expansion was at the time when business was on the 
increase. They used to be a small company and on our own, but the compatiy has 
expanded so much since they've lost their independence now and its ftist snowballed from 
there". 
As the case above suggests, relocation may be associated with take-over or merger activity. 
Moreover, other examples exist where merger and relocation run hand in hand. The 
following example shows that longer distances may be involved in such strategies, 
however, these may not always be beneficial to the plant: 
'We worked for a highly financial outlet which only thought of those type of things and 
weren't at all interested in investment, encouraging new products, and they were just 
milking it Of course, ultimately the turnover didji't justify the yield of the large premises 
which we had. Eventually, it was decided that we would have to close the factory in 
Buckinghamshire atid move to Devon because we were associated (with this particular 
company), which is where we are now because we are now a combined company...So as a 
restdt there were very few people transferred with the work which was a distinct 
disadvantage, a?id it's getting worse because of the lack of skills, and other things such as 
facilities: we didn't even have our own lab situated in-house, it was located with a sister 
company". 
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One case within the sample had moved from London to Somerset, partly as a result of an 
association with Westland, but also it was explicitly noted that the cost of operations in 
London were restrictive. This is consistent with the view that the high costs of the capital 
have encouraged firms to migrate away from London (Lovering, 1993). However, this 
particular case demonstrates that firms may move further afield than the ROSEland 
catchment area when they are pulled by linkages with prime contractors. 
One particular company situated in an urban centre identified a specific problem of 
re-location which they had experienced. The firm's premises had been subject to a 
compulsory purchase order for a development area scheme. This had placed enormous 
pressure on the firm because they were offered minimal compensation and replacement 
buildings which were an unsuitable alternative. The situation eventually deteriorated into a 
legal battle, the result of which was ultimately favourable for the company: 
"We're in a better location, we've got better premises, its a better set up altogether". 
However, the managing director of the company was bitter towards the development 
company because of their "bureaucracy and un-professional management". Moreover, the 
whole debacle was compounded by the recession which had reportedly hit the company 
very hard. 
Some firms could not consider moving because of their investment in fixed plant. 
Moreover, they often criticised their location for its rurality but did not express a 
preference for any other particular region or county: 
"It's impossible to relocate from a financial point of view bearing in mind the equipment 
we use which is very unusual and very big. We do large machining, grituling and drilling 
from a 12 metre bed. This is a very big capacity for sub-contracting and we can attract a 
lot of work from far away because there's not very many firms with that capacity.... These 
machines are on an exceptionally extensive and deep foundation, not fiist laid on the floor. 
(We could move) only...if the market were good enough to do that, but we're still in this 
recession and it wouldti't really be possible. We don't find a problem getting work so 
there's no need to move". 
In conclusion, most firms in the sample were quick to dismiss any benefits of relocation. 
They could see no additional benefits of alternative sites to their present establishment. 
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7,6 The economic realities of the contemporary defence industrial environment 
The question which produced the most interesting responses in the interviews concerned 
the contemporary conditions in which defence industrial firms operated. This research issue 
was divided into two parts. Firstly, managers were asked about their experiences of the 
past few years and how they had coped with cuts in defence spending and an international 
recession. Secondly, this led respondents on to discuss how they viewed the future of the 
defence related markets in which they operated. 
Most managers described the defence market as un-predictabie and more risky to be in than 
civilian markets. For example, this risk was attributed to the highly technical nature of 
products in the sector; 
'We're not doing a lot of work for (Westland) at the moment because they come and go 
because the nature of the business is up and down. We're not involved in flying 
components but involved in their test facilities and things like that. It is because it is 
research based thai makes it more vulnerable because budgets like that come and go, as 
and when. 18 months ago we were really in with them but now its dried up. Not that we've 
fallen out, it's just that we're not doing anything with them. They're not flushed enough for 
us to get anything out of them at the moment because it's more in-hoitse at the moment". 
However, the existence of risk was countered by many firms who had evaluated clear 
strategies to deal with the problem. In many cases, small size was cited as an important 
quality for a firm to maximise its flexibility: 
'We're a very small company and so we're not like the major primes. It has happened 
fairly recently where contracts are Just cancelled, which must be mind-boggling if you're 
trying to nm a company. In overall terms, it depends on the company, ofid the product, 
and the niche in market... We can avoid that roller-coaster ride because we're small. 
We're capable of much greater flexibility,„A smaller company is always far more flexible. 
The defence industrial environment is really based on a remarkable number of small 
companies. Those companies will act as sub-contractors. For example, if you look into it a 
rifle is made from bits and pieces of probably 50 different companies. To produce a rifle, 
and all the engineering that goes into it you need quite a substantial plant to deal with it, 
RSdD funding etc. The majority of people haven't got that. So there's a lot of 
sub-contracting... the competition is always there, but it's quite pleasant". 
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The previous example suggests that the UK defence industry includes enterprises which 
operate according to principles of flexible specialisation as outlined by Piore & Sabel 
(1984). For example, this strategy includes accommodating ceaseless change and is based 
on factors such flexible multi-use equipment and skilled workers. Together businesses 
operate in an environment of craft-form production. Indeed, the idea that many small and 
medium sized defence firms operate side by side in the South West is supported by other 
respondents too. For example, one manager suggested that a symbiotic relationship existed 
between the defence industry and its component supphers: 
"The defence industry does actually help these little specialist firms come into their own; 
they're extremely expensive and they coiddn't really afford to spend any money on this sort 
of equipment. Because the defence industry pumps a lot of money into gyros the price had 
come down substantially, and so a lot of smaller companies can now afford to spend 
£30,000 on a small measurement unit, which before would have been ten times thai 
amount if defence hadn't actually spent so much in the industry. The man on the street 
couldn't of dreamt of spending that sort of money on this type of equipment". 
Other managers were also proponents that "small is beautiful". However, this did not just 
apply to productive flexibility as might be espoused by Piore & Sabel (1984), but also to 
organisational responsiveness: 
"We're a small firm, we can be very prompt in decision making between the four of us and 
in a big firm it would take up to a week to agree on new decisiofis". 
Other firms dealt with risk by supplying a particular market segment for which they had a 
specific competence. This ensures that the firm faces a more inelastic demand curve and 
can resist competition more effectively. This strategy may also be coupled with product 
differentiation based on quality. For example, the case described earlier with the deep 
cast-bed for sub-contracting was adamant that their equipment maintained their niche: 
"We've been very fortunate looking back over the last 3 years and its because of the 
specialised equipment. Not that there wasn't the competition there. The work was 
available, atid we like to say that we're very competitive and do a top quality job. So we 
don't want to be the cheapest, but somewhere in the middle. This strategy seems to have 
worked: we don't do any advertising, it all tefids to be on word of mouth artd 
recommendation; so our customers tend to be very long term ". 
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Other firms suggested that the rationalisation in the market place coupled with specific 
competencies or niches were responsible for their continuing success: 
"(Business) is starting to increase slowly., J don't think that it's because there's more work 
coming out of (prime contractors), but rather that there are fewer foundries who can fulfil 
the need. There are fewer and fewer foundries around and it would appear that there are 
fewer jobbing foundries who can respond to a one-off. We have a skills-based 
organisation here so we can manufacture things for a one-off without things getting too 
complicated using simple pattern making equipment, as opposed to somebody who has a 
foundry which is very production orientated using semi-skilled labour which requires 
expensive pattern making equipment, which ca?j only be Justified if you've got long 
production runs, I thought a few year ago that there was a niche for a foundry with our 
moulding skills and our ability to respond to the requirements for one-offs, and 
proto-types, and pre-production work, and in the last 15 months I've become more 
convinced that that's the case. We have something of a niche market but it doesn't mean 
that we're not under considerable pressure to be competitive". 
Some firms clearly had a mixed strategy in that they wished to retain flexibility by not 
growing too large, but at the same time they were diversifying into several new market 
areas: 
'We can't cope, I've stopped marketing operations because we're so successful there's no 
point in doing it. We just can't cope with the work,...I've diversified into the atomic 
industry, the medical industry, and also into communications. We've diversified too by 
looking at plasma (applications), and new microwave technology". 
The volatility of defence business was explained by one manager as making his operations 
difficult to plan for the future. Moreover, he implied that they tied up resources in the short 
term in the hope that future work would become available. This places a cost on the 
business and implies that the DIB is strategically vulnerable because o f short production 
runs which undermine domestic capabilities. The manager explains: 
"We are fortunate to be alive in certain programmes which means that its not so bad for 
us as it is for others. However, there is still a big problem with defence programmes in 
that you constantly get floated out to the right, as we say, in terms of time But keeping 
that facility ready for that programme for when it comes back in its second phase of 
production or whatever, is extremely difficult ofid that's still a big problem. I think that 
we've managed to position ourselves fairly well in the last year in that there's still enough 
defence business of the type we do that we can see ourselves continuing for many years. 
But its still quite difficult". 
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In response to this volatility, this particular firm had sought to mininiise risk by moving into 
other markets: 
"Civilian business has the same sorts of problems. We tend not to supply full pieces of 
equipment or full-solutions, but we tend to supply components. We found our customers' 
business is floated out to the right in certain respects but it's less peaky than defence. It's 
more stable and that's an area of our business which we're actively seeking to increase for 
that very reason. We do about 18% commercial non-military business and we'd hke to see 
that double, primarily, because we can; and so it also gives us a more stable base to work 
from. Defence is still our core, and we don't see ourselves as becoming a commercial 
company, but there's a balance between the vagaries of defence and the more uniform 
civil or aerospace business". 
The idea of deserting the defence business was unappealing to a number of other managers 
too. The enthusiasm for remaining in defence markets was explained by one particular 
manager specialising in metalwork; 
"Defence and aerospace represent at least 6-7% of turnover. This 6-7% is usefid because 
by the nature of it its got good value added because they are large castings So the large 
metal content has a large value added content and from our point of view that type of 
work does pay quite well" 
The respondent was then pressed whether this implied that there may be a greater return in 
defence business than in civilian work. He replied: 
'Yes, slightly, but it's high risk work because if you've got a contract to make a WOO 
castings you can probably afford to scrap one or two; but if you've got to make one which 
is worth £800 in value, if you scrap the first one, there's no way you are going to recover 
that situation... The profit margin comes from allowing for that risk atid actually keeping 
the scrap as low as possible ". 
Thus, many of the interviewees appear to have successfully survived the recent changes in 
the sector. In part, these survivors have remained in the defence business by having clear 
strategies to deal with risk. These include remaining productively and organisationally 
flexible or maintaining a certain quality or competence niche. However, many firms have 
found it necessary to seek alternative markets to avoid the increasing risk associated with 
milhary demand despite the higher returns available in defence. 
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Many of the interviewees revealed a picture in which the defence firms cu^ e willingly leaving 
traditional markets. However, this is only a partial response and there seems to be a desire 
to retain some defence turnover. Moreover, many interviewees clearly believed that the 
market for defence related products is becoming increasingly healthy. This confirms the 
idea that the contributors to the survey were survivors who had weathered the worst of the 
storm which has affected the sector. Many cases were convinced that this survival was 
related to their product area: 
'We're continuing to be very optimistic and very positive. If I was building hulls I wouldn't 
be very positive, but there are hulls being built both here ajid overseas. There are quite a 
number of international projects going on and where hulls are existing we have midnight 
extensions and quite extensive refits. So there's a great deal to do and its all to play for". 
This is consistent with the views of other respondents: 
"We're finding things are picking up because we're in the right area. Sat-coms and 
telecommunications surveillance area: these are the areas which are still growing 
especially sat-coms for the services. Right market at the right time, as opposed to weapons 
or platforms which are declining" 
'We're getting business from all over caid it's causing the business to expand in terms of 
profit and we might have to take on more labour". 
"Aerospace is booming: civil or defence but mainly civil. As far as aerospace is concerned 
ajid anyone connected with it, I think they're doing quite well". 
'We don't have a sufficiently large part of our business in defence to be gloomy about it; 
it has picked up. It may still be increasing slightly from previous lows, but the majority of 
our work is for BAe or Rolls Royce, but a small proportion is fighting vehicles. Although it 
took a dive a few years ago, its started to increase in the last 18 months and I'd guess its 
still slowed down but starting to increase slowly". 
Others continued to emphasise the volatility of the future even i f it was financially 
rewarding: 
"There's a slight increase in work from the restructuring of the defence market from 
people like Westland. They need expertise from an outside specialist for a project they're 
going along with. It's more a blitz of work than a long-run thing aiid they're on our 
doorstep which makes it easy because they're two minutes down the road. We've also done 
a bit of on-site work which is unusual for us but lucrative". 
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It is possible that the overall impression presented in these cases is a genuine reflection of 
conditions in the defence industrial base. However, the optimism recorded in these cases is 
a form of bias because not only has the general business climate improved but all these 
respondents are survivors of the changes in the sector. This may account for the lack of 
negative responses given by managers. Moreover, managers are of^en uncompromising in 
their ability to put a positive gloss on a situation reflecting their own performance. 
7,7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the qualitative data provide answers to the research questions identified at 
the beginning of the chapter and also offer interesting opinion on a wide range of issues. 
The case studies yield valuable information which is difiScult to collate because of the 
diversity of managers' perceptions and experience. Nevertheless, such experiences are 
successfully presented here to illustrate the important elements of location and restructuring 
in the defence sector. Personal opinion guided by semi-structured questioning provided an 
opportunity to consider explanations for descriptive relationships identified in both the 
existing literature and from the questionnaire survey. These opinions may or may not be 
representative of the industry as a whole and so must be treated with caution. However, the 
results of the survey suggest a number of important findings. 
With respect to the test for the density o f defence firms, no respondent was aware o f a 
large number of defence companies in their local area although some managers could name 
a few local defence firms. Moreover, the density of defence firms in each county cannot be 
assessed accurately by analysing the survey response because the sample is not a complete 
one. However, given the informational gaps which exist it is unlikely that mangers would 
be aware of all local defence companies. Thus, managers may understate the importance of 
the defence supply chain in the local economy. Consequently, the qualitative evidence does 
not appear to provide strong support for the idea of a spatial military-industrial-complex as 
identified in earlier empirical work in this thesis. However, the presence o f even a few local 
defence companies may be sufficient to distinguish the sector fi-om civilian manufacturing. 
Moreover, given the limitations o f qualitative data and the informational gaps identified 
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above it is reasonable to continue to believe the supporting empirical evidence for a defence 
industrial growth pole. 
Secondly, the role of institutional factors was clarified by the research which showed that a 
number of institutions may be responsible for promoting local defence-led economic 
development. The privatised D M L dockyard appears to be the most significant economic 
engine perhaps because of its agency status. However, other institutions may also be 
significant in developing military related grov^h poles, most notably defence contractors. 
Thus, the exact nature of a local military-institutional-relationship remains unclear. 
Moreover, the centralised nature of the MoD procurement executive confounds the 
concept of local linkages between the state and military suppHers. 
Thirdly, the evidence fi-om the case studies provided historical explanations for the question 
concerning how defence firms had evolved. They demonstrated that the location decision is 
an extremely varied but complex one. There is evidence of labour-led spin ofiFs and thus 
spatial inertia which has produced a geographical concentration of defence companies. 
However, in contrast, there are also cases o f highly planned spatial restructuring decisions 
which appear to represent examples of optimising behaviour. These include cost-minimising 
tendencies and do not necessarily accord with arguments that agglomeration is important. 
Finally, the research was concerned with the question of how contemporary environmental 
conditions were affecting respondents. They were able to give details concerning the 
difficulties associated with the sector and these were best illustrated by the contrast 
between their civilian and defence related business. For example, it would seem that 
although defence business may be seen as more risky the returns are more lucrative than 
civilian business. Thus, defence companies were keen to retain their defence related 
business where they could. Most significantly, the success of many firms appears to be 
based either on plant flexibility or specialisation which companies have evolved to provide. 
However, some defence market sectors were more healthy than others and product nature 
was responsible for the success of many companies. 
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Although the evidence is mixed and the information demonstrates the diversity of 
conditions which pervade the defence sector, the data provide a valuable insight into many 
location and restructuring issues. Indeed, the new information challenges many typical 
views that the defence sector is identifiable by certain relationships, practices, and 
corporate culture. Broadly, the blurring of the defence industrial divide arises as a 
consequence of the levels of civilian business undertaken by defence companies. 
Nevertheless, it is wholly apparent that this may be an issue of perception by company 
managers and also due to the non-representative nature of case studies. Indeed, the idea 
that defence is not special not only contradicts the conclusions of earlier sections of this 
thesis but also many notable commentators. 
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8 
Conclusion 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary and overview of the research project together with an 
assessment of its potential limitations. Initially, the context and motivation for the thesis are 
discussed, thus establishing the background for the thesis. Secondly, the limitations of 
contemporary information which describe the DIB are summarised. These limitations 
generate a discussion about the possible spatial development of the DEB and act as the basis 
for defining the survey population and establishing the methodology for the investigation. 
These are the subject of the third section of the chapter. The basic characteristics of the 
sample are discussed in the fourth section and more sophisticated statistical analysis is 
developed in the fifth section. Section six describes the results of the in-depth case studies 
which were used to obtain fijrther qualitative explanations for the relationships identified in 
earlier sections. Finally, the main conclusions are reported in the last part of the chapter 
8.1 Context and motivation for the thesis 
Regional defence economics is a relatively under-researched area which is currently 
receiving increased attention from academics. This heightened interest has arisen for two 
major reasons. Firstly, since the mid-1980s, there have been widespread redundancies, 
closures and cutbacks in both private and public defence establishments (Dunne & Smith, 
1992). In panicular, the move to a more competitive procurement system since the 
mid-1980s and cuts in defence spending arising firom the end of the Cold War have 
introduced substantial industrial restructuring (UK Defence Statistics, 1995). Consequently, 
there has been a spate of academic interest analysing the reactions of the defence industry. 
This has been complemented by a desire to gather information by local authorities in 
defence dependent regions. 
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Secondly, the growing interest in defence firms has been hampered by the availability of 
limited official data which disaggregates defence industrial employment into geographical 
regions or counties. This lack of data is somewhat surprising given the large amounts of 
public ftinds which are spent annually on defence across the UK (UK Defence Statistics, 
1995), but is no doubt associated with the traditional secrecy surrounding military 
operations. As a consequence many studies have been commissioned to plug the 
informational gap concerning defence. 
Thus, the present study has been motivated by the current importance o f the defence sector 
and the need to gather more primary data. In particular, it was regarded as essential that 
new data should detail the spatial organisation of the DEB and illustrate the nature of 
linkages and degree of dispersion which characterise elements of the supply chain. 
8.2 The UK defence industrial base 
The historical development of the defence sector and the traditional role of the state have 
nurtured an industry in which demand and supply conditions are far removed fi-om textbook 
descriptions of typical markets. Demand is primarily determined by the state and there is a 
chosen "club" of major systems suppliers (R. Smith, 1989). In the past, price determination 
methods have not encouraged cost-effective production but have encouraged the pursuit of 
high quality products whatever the cost to the taxpayer (Smith, 1985; Breheny, 1988; 
Lovering, 1991a). Even with recent change, there is mixed evidence to suggest that the 
state is securing better value for money (Schofield, 1995; Sandler & Hartley, 1995). 
However, although there are certainly imperfections in UK defence markets, a number of 
commentators describe high opportunity costs fi-om the demise of the DEB (Chalmers, 
1985; Hartley etal, 1986; Smith, 1990; Barker et al, 1991; Sandler & Hartley, 1995). As a 
consequence, there is considerable debate as to how policy makers should steer the future 
direction of the defence industrial sector. 
Despite a limited supply of defence studies at a regional level and the Umitations of many of 
these studies, a general picture has emerged which suggests that there is a high level of 
defence related employment in the South East and South West of the UK (UK Defence 
202 
Statistics, 1995; Nawaz, 1994, CEC, 1992; Lovering, 1991b). Moreover, relative measures 
of defence dependence emphasise the importance of the South West region. Whilst the 
North and North West regions also have significant levels of defence related employment, 
the rest of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales only have relatively small 
military and defence industrial roles. However, there is some evidence that the dominance 
of the South has been somewhat eroded in recent years as a consequence of cutbacks in 
defence spending (UK Defence Statistics, 1993, 1995; Bishop & Gripaios, 1995). There is 
also some concern that there is a degree of bias towards the South East in the regional 
data. Many proxies used in estimating regional defence related employment over-weigh the 
importance of the South East, and it is possible that the considerable falls recorded in the 
South East in recent years may be overstated (Nawaz, 1994; Lovering, 1993). Clearly, the 
special characteristics and uneven distribution of defence employment ensures that 
restructuring is likely to have important spatial effects. 
8.3 Explanations for the location of the defence industry 
Theoretical models of regional economic growth often predict that there are forces which 
encourage clustering of economic activities (Perroux, 1950, Myrdal, 1957, Hirschman, 
1958). In addition, some models suggest that long-run forces o f convergence may 
counteract polarisation tendencies (Williamson, 1965; Richardson, 1978). Conceivably, 
such models could be applied to provide explanations for the spatial evolution of the DIB in 
the UK. However, the complex economic, political and strategic relationships which have 
determined the distribution of the defence industry preclude the existence of a single 
explanatory theory. Often elements from individual theories appear to provide explanations 
for the development of the sector but such post-hoc rationalisations inevitably tend to "fit" 
the data by the nature of backward reasoning. Traditionally, this appears to have been a 
common error in a large number o f empirical studies o f agglomeration (Appold, 1995). 
Many studies of the defence industry in the UK and abroad, identify localised 
concentrations of defence industrial production (Markusen & Yudken, 1993, Lovering, 
1988; Breheny, 1988; Finch, 1994; Bishop, 1996). Thus, potentially, the MIC represents 
not only a special relationship in the production process of defence goods, but it may also 
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constitute a spatial phenomenon. Thus, growth poles generated by this complex could be an 
important form of production created by a traditionally stable level of state demand. 
However, without an empirical assessment of linkages in spatially agglomerated and 
non-agglomerated defence companies it is difficult to analyse the validity of this argument. 
The history of the defence industry reveals a number of time periods in which large scale 
changes have taken place in whole sections of the DIB (Law, 1981, Todd, 1987; Lovering, 
1993). Many of these changes were the result of strategic policy decisions designed to 
re-organise the industrial capacity of the state and its ability to wage war. Such decisions 
were the result of changes in threats, which in turn, were related to technological advances 
which reduced the strength gradient associated with military geography (Boulding, 1963). 
Thus, the role of history clearly complicates the simple economic explanations for the 
geographical appearance of the DIB. 
Today, there may be new influences in the geography of the defence mdustrial sector. For 
example, the new phase of rationalisation and retrenchment may produce new spatial forms 
of production which are consistent with the flexible specialisation and accumulation theses. 
Indeed, it is certainly possible that new production modes vsill evolve. However, so little 
evidence exists from the traditional nature of operations in the DIB that it may be difficuh 
to assess how such changes are truly affecting organisational patterns. Thus, new 
explanations for the spatial restructuring of the defence sector must be accompanied by 
evidence which relates linkages to specific geographical factors. 
Three project hypotheses were formulated fi^om the defence industrial literature to attempt 
to answer outstanding questions: 
Hypothesis 1: There are localised concentrations of defence industrial activity in the 
UK, 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional factors have contributed to the spatial organisation of the 
defence industrial base. 
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Hypothesis 3: Changes in the defence environment are causing changes in the spatial 
organisation of the defence industry. 
8.4 The South West defence sector 
To assess the true spatial nature of the defence industrial supply chain, a large enough 
geographical area needs to be studied so as to incorporate potential agglomerations and 
dispersed defence industrial firms of varying characteristics. The South West region was 
chosen for this purpose because of its highly defence dependent nature. Indeed, it is widely 
recognised that the South West is the most defence dependent region in the UK (Lovering 
1991a; Braddon et al, 1991). The region contains a number of prime defence contractors 
and a wide range of sub-contractors and defence suppliers (Bishop & Gripaios, 1995). It 
also contains a key aerospace centre (Avon), and the UK's major naval dockyard 
(Devonport). There are many important military bases in the region and also over 30 
contact points for local defence purchase orders (Defence Suppliers Service, 1995). 
Conceivably, the defence industrial importance of the South West may have evolved for a 
number of strategic reasons, such as the length of the region's coastline and its location 
relative to maritime trade and war with the rest of the world. 
Although a number of local government and academic studies have described the level of 
defence dependence in the South West, few have analysed the nature o f the supply chain in 
any detail. Braddon et al (1991), for example, failed to undertake any significant spatial 
analysis in their linkage study of Rolls-Royce's suppliers. Thus, with no other 
comprehensive regional study exploring the nature of local linkages in the South West there 
is clearly an opportunity for further investigation of these issues. 
8.5 Research methodology and basic sample characteristics 
The research methodology included complementary intensive and extensive strands (Sayer, 
1992). Thus, a questionnaire stage provided information about taxonomic groups within 
the sample and explanations for the relationships within the sample were provided by 
in-depth case studies. An initial list of defence industrial firms in the South West was 
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derived from Jane's International Defence Directory and was supplemented by asking local 
authorities to provide additional names of defence companies to try to combat omissions 
fi-om the directory. Clearly, there is no official definition of a defence industrial firm and the 
term could include an enterprise which sells military or non-military goods to a number of 
types of military customers. Thus, the sample firame was inevitably imperfect and some 
defence firms may have been omitted because of new business stan-ups and the limitations 
of the original sources. Generally, the composition of the original supplier lists was 
reasonable although it relied on the discretion of the original compiler of the list. The 
survey was confined to include only defence industrial firms and it excluded firms which 
provided goods such as food, clothing, fijel, transport and construction to the mihtary. In 
essence, defence service firms were excluded to narrow the focus of the research. 
A final population of defence manufacturers was identified comprising 558 defence 
manufacturing firms from the South West. All the major well-knowm contractors were 
present in the population which was significantly larger than the number of South West 
defence companies identified by JIDD. These firms were sent a questionnaire in the 
Summer of 1995 and an effective useable response rate of 35% was achieved after follow 
up telephone calls and mail shots. 
8.51 Survey results 
Despite the limitations of the survey, clear characteristics of the sample emerged. Firstly, 
the survey confirmed a substantial decline in regional defence related employment in recent 
years. Between 1989-95 over 32% (13,200) workers were made redundant in the 
companies in the survey. This compares to a fall in South West manufacturing employment 
of only around 13% between 1985-95 (Cambridge Econometrics, 1996). Thus, this 
demonstrates that recent defence industrial restructuring has been more severe than in 
contemporary manufacturing in general. 
Secondly, it is clear that defence industrial restructuring has involved more complex issues 
than simply down-stzing of workforces. Indeed, only half of the firms in the sample had 
reduced their employment over the period 1989-95. Of course, the sample excluded 
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employment falls recorded in firms which were no longer trading, and thus, respondents 
may be seen a sample of the most successfiil companies. Nevertheless, given the headline 
conditions which characterise the defence sector it is important to note that so many firms 
had grown in size. Growth appeared to be most prominent within medium sized enterprises. 
It is possible that such firms have been able to expand partly because o f their size which has 
enabled them to be flexible enough to meet demands placed upon them whilst also being 
large enough to raise finance for new investment programmes. Conceivably, this may be a 
justification for the flexible accumulation and specialisation theses which suggest that 
business success often relies on the ability of firms to adjust to new markets and their abihty 
to survive on trade fi-om particular niches (Scott, 1988; Piore & Sabel, 1984). These issues 
were examined in more detail in the qualitative stages of the research process. 
Thirdly, the firms in the sample had varying degrees of defence dependence. For example, 
only 8.7% of the sample were pure military suppliers with no sales to non-defence markets 
and many firms engaged in only small quantities of defence work. This shows the strength 
of many so-called defence firms' civilian market operations and suggests that such 
companies may not trade wholly within protected or special market conditions. Indeed, this 
tends to undermine the notion that the defence and civilian market sectors are separate 
entities at all. However, the defence companies in the sample seem to differ fi-om other 
types of manufacturing firms in a number of ways. For example, there appear to be different 
labour requirements in the DIB and any move towards female and part-time employment 
appears to be minor compared to other industrial sectors. This may be attributable to the 
traditional lack of competitive pressure to reduce costs in the defence industry which has 
been partly able to resist the move towards more flexible employment patterns. 
Alternatively, the high level of scientists and engineers employed in the defence sector may 
partly explain the male dominance since the majority of graduates in these professions are 
men. 
The study also suggests that there is a higher degree of external ownership in the defence 
sector than previous studies of manufacturing in the South West have indicated. Potter 
(1992) and Dobson (1987), suggest that 10-30% of manufacturing enterprises are 
externally controlled in Devon and Cornwall. However, the present survey suggests that 
40% of defence companies in the South West are part of a group. Although the far South 
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West may have its own regional characteristics, one possible explanation for this may be 
that the high technical content of defence products often requires production to be carried 
out by larger enterprises. Large multiple-plant firms are more capable o f raising finance for 
R&D and are more able to carry the risks associated with new product development. 
The overall picture of competition in the defence market revealed by the survey indicates a 
series of niches which are dominated by monopolists or oligopolists. However, this is an 
oversimplification as individual firms may produce a range of goods which span different 
ends of the competitive spectrum. Moreover, managers may have differing views on the 
nature of their products or markets and may be unaware of the extent of competition. 
Indeed, there may be an informational gap associated with the responses given to the 
questionnaire and any analysis should be treated with a degree of caution. 
The survey revealed a number of differences between the defence sector in the far South 
West and the rest of the region. For example, defence firms in Devon and Cornwall were 
more likely operate in less specialised markets and were more likely to be in competition 
with many other firms than firms in the rest of the region. Conceivably, these difiFerences 
could be explained, in part, by the branch plant nature of the far South West (Dobson, 
1987). For example, peripheral branches may have been established to capitalise on lower 
cost and lower skilled labour, and are thus more likely to manufacture more general output 
without having to rely on more-distant input suppliers to provide essential components. In 
addition, firms from Devon, Cornwall and Dorset consistently reported that access to 
inputs, access to markets and poor transport links were detrimental to the success of their 
business relative to other firms in the rest of the South West. These firms were also more 
likely to report that material costs were more likely to be a disadvantage than firms in other 
areas. These regional disadvantages are well-known and governments have attempted to 
alleviate such problems by providing the area with financial assistance. The firms in the 
counties in question acknowledge this support and reported that assisted area status 
provided their businesses with some help. However, despite this aid, the predictions for the 
future of defence businesses in the three counties was more pessimistic than elsewhere. 
Most noticeable was the pessimism in the Dorset area which may be related to the 
relocation of many MoD institutions to other regions. 
208 
The presence of prime contractors or military institutions is arguably a potential source of 
local economic growth based on defence expenditure. In fact, 6 1 % firms in the survey 
recorded that there was at least one defence or military institution within 20 miles of their 
company which provided some benefit. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation 
between firms recording good access to markets ar\d also recording benefits firom local 
defence institutions. However, this may be related to military institutions being located in 
urban or successful local economies. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that this is 
necessarily the case and a significant number of military bases are located in mral areas. A 
more detailed breakdown reveals that 32% of firms record that local military bases provide 
some advantage to their firm. Clearly, this shows that although military institutions may 
provide some local economic advantages, major defence contractors are the most beneficial 
defence related institution for local firms. 
Thus, the survey shows that the defence industry is different from civilian manufacturing 
because of lower levels of competition and the recent dramatic effects of restructuring. 
Nevertheless, the sample demonstrates that the industry is a highly diverse one. The 
intra-regional variation in the sample shows that location may affect the type of activity 
undertaken in the industry. Most importantly, the successful companies to emerge fi-om 
defence industrial restructuring are typically medium sized enterprises. 
8.6 Spatial analysis 
After examining the characteristics of the sample, further analysis of linkage panems was 
undertaken using more sophisticated modelhng techniques. The research was bolstered by a 
qualitative analysis derived from interviews with a number of defence firms. 
8.61 Dobson (1987) local linkage model 
One model within the existing literature which examines the causes of local linkage patterns 
is provided by Dobson (1987). The model considers the major features of local linkages 
between manufacturing firms, their customers and their suppliers in a peripheral region and 
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tests the theory with data from Devon and Cornwall. Dobson's study is based on the 
premise that the individual characteristics of firms determine the nature of links between 
manufacturers, their suppliers and their markets. These characteristics included a number of 
factors: ownership status (Lever, 1974; Marshall, 1979; Taylor and Wood, 1973), firm size 
by employment (Pugh & Hickson, 1976), product type (Britton, 1976), the effect of local 
risk conditions (Milleti and Gillespie, 1976), and the general trading environment (Dobson, 
1987). 
A Dobson type model with a dependent variable measuring levels o f local linkages was 
applied to the data from the present survey using the technique of logistic regression. The 
best model was found to be one in which three of the predictors were acceptable: the level 
of defence sales (NDEFSA9); the location of competitors (COMPSLOO), and the location 
of a firm (COUNTYLO). Quantifying the parameter estimates on these predictor variables 
using odds ratios indicated a number of important features about the nature of local 
linkages in the South West defence sector. Firstly, firms in peripheral areas were likely to 
have a higher propensity to import from outside the region (perhaps because they are 
unable to find the inputs they need in the surrounding area). Secondly, in general terms, 
highly defence dependent firms were more likely to purchase local inputs than firms with 
larger civilian market interests. Thirdly, firms with predominantly local competitors were 
more likely to purchase locally than firms with competitors located over 20 miles away. 
These results provide some support for a localisation argument within the defence sector 
given the implication that whole supply chains fed by multiple sources of defence demand 
may be contained within local areas. Another interpretation could be that the companies 
have detailed knowledge of only local conditions and, thus, i f they exist to supply a local 
customer they may not look very far afield for their suppliers either. 
Thus, in summary there are three particularly good explanatory variables for local linkages 
which apply to firms with defence business. These are, the defence dependence of the firm 
(a crude measure for different product types), the particular location of the company 
(whether in a peripheral region or not), and the local trading environment as measured by 
the number of local competitors (which is a proxy for the perceived level of risk within a 
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region). It is more difficult to draw conclusions on the remainder o f the right hand side 
variables although ownership status did generate weak significance in the model. 
The defence industrial nature of the sample has a number of implications for local linkages. 
Particularly outstanding is the measure for peripheraiity, which demonstrates that local 
linkages may actually be more common in core areas than in the periphery. It is possible 
that this occurs because peripheral areas have a smaller economic base and, therefore, it is 
necessary to import more goods to the region. Contrast this to the alternative hypothesis 
where an isolated region may have more local linkages because accessibility into and out of 
the area is so limited that traders have to rely on local suppliers. This second argument may 
be inappropriate for defence because the sector is so high-tech that many highly specialised 
inputs have to be traded fi-om a number of specialist manufacturers at national and 
international locations. Alternatively, the most significant growth poles based on defence 
expenditure may simply be more common in the core areas than in the peripheral ones. 
The link between local competitors and local suppliers shows that some defence firms may 
be located in areas in which agglomeration economies exist. This observation suggests that 
there are benefits fi-om trading locally which are present in a number of the links in the 
supply chain. These benefits may also be present in non-defence related supply chains. 
However, the defence sales variable in the model confirms that it is the more defence 
dependent companies which are the most likely to trade and compete locally. Thus, there is 
strong evidence that defence supply chains are more locally concentrated than civilian 
manufacturing supply chains. Moreover, agglomeration economies in the South West of the 
UK appear to be more prominent in less peripheral areas. 
8.62 Agglomeration model 
Existing studies of industrial agglomeration in the defence sector largely rely on anecdotal 
observations of activity and there is little supporting empirical evidence. The European 
Union's (1992) study of the Community records a number of highly dependent areas in the 
UK at the county level or within groups o f counties, although no explanations for these 
patterns are put forward. Other studies include qualitative analysis o f aspatial supplier 
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linkages within local areas, (Braddon et al, 1989; Wiltshire County Council, 1992). Thus, a 
logical extension to the statistical analysis of the survey was to test the hypothesis that 
there were concentrations of activity in the defence sector and in addition, test for the 
causes of these agglomerations. 
The next part of the study hence examined whether a concentration of defence industrial 
activity was likely to be centred on a major defence institution. For instance, demand-led 
defence activity could be induced by local research agencies, militJiry bases, or major 
defence contractors. The data was encoded as a categorical variable, "AGGLOM", and a 
model was specified using log-linear analysis to investigate the link between this variable 
and three others. Firstly, the DEFSALS variable which was a measure of the importance of 
the level of defence sales to companies in the sample. Secondly, the INP20 variable which 
recorded the percentage of local input supplies purchased by companies and was used as a 
measure of the importance of local linkages. Finally, the proximity o f local competitors 
(COMPSLOO) was a variable included to show that many firms recognised that there 
could be advantages fi-om trading locally. 
The best statistical model had a generating class defined by six, two way interactions. Thus, 
every two-way interaction was present in the best model, as was each individual main 
effect. Each interaction could be quantified using odds ratios. Firstly, the resuhs indicated 
that firms with local competitors were more than five times more likely to purchase a high 
proportion of local inputs than firms with distant competitors. This suggests that there may 
be distinct agglomerations of activity within the sample of companies with defence 
business. Secondly, firms who recorded local institutional advantages were almost ten times 
more likely to have local competitors than distant ones. Thus, this may be strong evidence 
of some local concentrations of activity based on these two variables. Thirdly, defence 
dependent firms were slightly more likely to purchase a high proportion of local inputs than 
firms with a low defence sales turnover. Fourthly, firms with high defence sales were three 
times more likely to have more distant competitors than firms with low defence sales. This 
appears to contradict the localisation economy argument as it appears that firms with high 
defence sales have their principal competitors usually located further than 20 miles away. A 
possible interpretation of this is that firms operate with some degree o f competition where 
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the threshold of a good prevents significant overlapping sales market areas. Another 
interpretation could be that there are so few defence industrial producers that although 
there may be agglomeration economies in the sector, msmy firms find that their competitors 
trade in a different growth pole. Alternatively, there could be many defence firms in a 
locality each specialising in particular products. Finally, it may be that the definition for 
local trading used in the survey, 20 miles, is insignificant for these variables. 
The fifth odds ratio revealed that firms who perceived that local institutions were 
advantageous were more than two and a half times as likely to purchase inputs locally than 
firms who did not perceive any such advantages. This could suggest that growth poles 
foster local linkages throughout the whole of the defence supply chain. Thus, the sample 
may include firms who recognise both demand-led and supply-driven local advantages. This 
may be an empirical validation that a degree of localisation exists within the sector. 
Finally, defence dependent firms are twice as likely to record advantages from local military 
institutions as firms with few defence sales. This suggests that defence dependent firms are 
more likely to benefit from the advantages which a local military institution may offer, 
whether these advantages are direct or indirect. 
The general conclusion from the AGGLOM model is that the main effects of the four 
variables are not independent of each other. Moreover, all pair-wise interactions are 
significant. The results seem to confirm the view that it is very likely that defence orientated 
companies are engaged in geographical trading patterns which are different from those 
which occur amongst civilian orientated defence firms. Generally, these trading panems are 
characterised by local linkages between different military institutions and firms, between 
firms and their suppliers. Moreover, this is confirmed by the fact that local competition 
seems to be significant between some firms and their competitors. 
8.63 DEMAND models 
The analysis was extended by considering dependent variables which recorded whether 
firms sold to particular defence customers (DEMAND variables). This facilitated the 
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development of profiles of defence firms by customer types. Final customers included the 
MoD procurement executive, defence contractors, sub-contractors and MoD local contact 
points. As the DEM variables were categorical, multiple regression was inappropriate and 
logistic regression was a suitable tool for analysis. Backwards step-wise elimination using 
the likelihood ratio was used to select the model with the best independent variables. 
The results showed that firms who sold to different types o f defence customers had 
distinctly different profiles. Firstly, firms who had local competitors (COMPS) were 
statistically more likely to sell to local contact points than firms with more distant ones. 
Secondly, firms who considered the cost competitiveness of local inputs as highly important 
(LOCCOST) were also more likely to sell to local contact points than firms who did not 
rate this as a primary sourcing factor. Finally, Firms who did not originally establish 
themselves to supply defence markets were also more likely to supply local contact points 
than those firms who set up specifically to act as defence suppliers. 
It is not surprising that the DEMLOC model recorded that local geographical relationships 
were highly significant. Indeed, the Defence Supplier Service (1995), emphasises the local 
nature of market purchases by local contact points. For example, it is stated that firms 
should not implement mail shots to all addresses provided on the local contact list, but 
should only contact their local office. Moreover, the limited size of these contracts means 
that they are perhaps more likely to be small firms and, thus, are more likely to trade 
locally. 
Firms with more local inputs (INP20) were statistically more likely to sell to 
sub-contractors than those who purchased more output from non-local sources. Younger 
firms, less than 30 years, were also more likely to supply sub-contractors than older firms. 
In contrast, older firms established for over 30 years were more likely than younger firms to 
be suppliers of the MoD procurement executive and MoD local contact points. Thus, the 
demand variables demonstrate distinct profiles for firms by their customer type. 
In conclusion, the data provided by the postal questionnaire was used to model a number of 
interesting relationships within the DIB. The Dobson, Agglomeration and Demand models 
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suggest that the defence industry is characterised by distinctive spatial relationships. 
Significant local linkages exist between defence suppliers and their customers and their 
competitors may also be local. Statistical analysis suggests that local links are dependent 
upon the characteristics of the firm, the proximity of local defence institutions and the 
nature of defence customers. Collectively, the evidence supports the argument that the 
defence industry has its own characteristics which have produced distinct spatial outcomes. 
8.7 Qualitative analysis 
The second phase of data collection took the form of semi-structured in-depth telephone 
interviews wdth 26 defence industrial companies who had panicipated in the questionnaire 
stage of the research. The general objective of the interviews was to understand the factors 
affecting the location of defence firms. Thus, the main subject areas o f the questions were: 
the density of defence firms in each area; the geographical effect of institutional factors; the 
historical development of each case study; and the contemporary environmental conditions. 
From the defence company managers' perspective, the spatial pattern of trade between 
firms in the defence sector was varied. There were some managers who clearly believed 
that local firms were significant in the industry, either forward or backwards in the supply 
chain. However, the most widely held belief was that only one or two firms were relevant 
to local trading patterns. There were also a number of respondents who believed that their 
firm operated in a national or international market within which geography played little 
part. 
The most common local advantages of military bases for defence industrial companies 
seemed to be confined to Devonport Dockyard. In part, this may be related to the agency 
management of the dockyards, which has replaced a centralised purchasing system with one 
which is supposedly more competitive. Such advantages do not generally appear to extend 
to other types of military base. However, control centres and research establishments were 
often reported as providing advantages to local firms. This is complicated by the fact that 
all defence firms need to operate through some of these institutions and therefore it is 
somewhat unclear as to what the specific advantages are. 
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Respondents were able to provide detJiils concerning differences between civilian and 
defence related business. For example, defence business may be seen as more risky, but, in 
general, the returns are more lucrative than from civilian business. Within the defence 
sector, the success of many firms appears to be based on a flexibility in their plant or 
through a specialised niche which they have evolved to provide. Thus, it would appear that 
the defence industry may not be based on a Fordist production structure despite the 
existence of a number of large prime contractors with national monopoly status. Instead, 
flexible specialisation may be a common form of production where firms are smaller and 
more craft-based (Piore & Sabel, 1984). 
There are a diverse range of reasons for the spatial evolution of the defence industrial base. 
A number of firms clearly became established through labour skills which were developed 
in local industry. This confirms Lovering's (1990), view that labour skills have contributed 
to inertia in the spatial organisation of the sector. However, a number of firms have 
developed in the South West by conversion into defence business. This may perhaps be 
explained by the existence of a number of prominent prime contractors who are visible 
targets for potential business. Finally, a number of firms have developed as a consequence 
of planned location decisions. Rent costs and military institutions have both played roles in 
some of these cases which are often complicated by other factors such as military strategy. 
Thus, there is no clear explanation for the spatial development of the defence industrial 
base. Instead, the geography of the defence industry has been determined by a complex 
range of factors. 
8.8 Conclusions and recommendations for policy and further research 
This thesis provides an account of the development of the UK defence sector fi-om a 
regional economic perspective. The methodology used in the research is a commonly-used 
one which employs a two stage approach (Sayer, 1992; Healey, 1991). Literature was used 
to identify the extent and coverage of the knowledge which exists to describe the defence 
industrial base in the UK. This acted as the basis for stage one; an extensive questionnaire 
survey of defence industrial firms. Secondly, causal explanations were sought from in-depth 
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interviews with relevant experts from the stage one sample. This research design proved to 
be an effective one which yielded a number of key findings. 
Original data provided by this project support past commentaries which assert that the 
geographical organisation of the defence industry is special and may have resulted from its 
relatively protected market form. Funhermore, the central contribution of the thesis is a 
model indicating that firms with relatively higher levels of defence turnover are more likely 
to be located in an agglomeration of defence activity. A range of factors may be responsible 
for this outcome such as the complexity of product nature and historical influences which 
have shaped the defence supply chain. Although previous accounts have successfully 
identified some aspects of the industry's spatial development they have relied on qualitative 
evidence and have rarely been supported by empirical information. 
The defence industrial data collected and analysed in this project are unique. Indeed, they 
provide an insight into the effects of recent restructuring in the UK defence industry. For 
example, they demonstrate that even in the late 1990s there are relatively low levels of 
female and part-time employment in the DIB when compared to other sectors. This tends 
to suggest that the defence industry is still relatively less competitive than other industrial 
areas. Nevenheless, large defence firms have shed many jobs over the last 6 years and the 
environment is clearly changing. The new regime comprises companies who have expanded 
in size, many of which are medium sized and operate with a high degree of flexibility or a 
specialised plant. Skilled labour may also be important for such defence companies 
specialising in a particular niche. Thus, the new data may provide strong support for a 
developing post-Fordist environment in the defence sector. 
The project illustrates the complex structure of the UK DIB, the variation in defence 
turnover and the range of defence market conditions. The effects of restructuring are also 
varied but the diversity of the sector presents research limitations. Principally, the lack of a 
definition of a defence firm is a problem in identifying a original population of companies 
v^th defence business. Moreover, it is often difficult to identify general relationships 
concerning defence companies because they are such a varied collection of firms. This fact 
also contributes to the difficulties *m making comparisons between defence and civilian 
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companies. Thus, although the data describe relationships within a sample of defence firms 
and it is possible to draw conclusions about the defence industrial divide on the basis on 
defence turnover, there are no comparative data which are explicitly concerned with civilian 
companies. Consequently, some caution has been exercised in formulating conclusions 
between the defence sample and its non-defence component. 
The research has a number of implications for policy makers. The research indicates that 
the defence sector has a special geographical distibution which makes a number of areas 
vulnerable to defence industrial restructuring. I f support is available for restructuring 
defence dependent economies then it should be targened at a number of local areas. 
Indeed, with future cuts and flither restructuring regional economic support may become an 
important adjustment tool. One way in which support could be directed is to increase the 
information available about defence companies and their capabilities. This may be an 
advantage as the research has demonstrated that many defence managers are unaware of 
defence companies even in their local area. Thus, this may permit firms to trade over a 
wider supply chain. 
Future defence industrial restructuring will require new strategies and new data. New 
research could proceed in a number of interesting directions. Firstly, many defence 
companies have, arguably, been slow to adjust to new environmental conditions (Smith & 
Smith, 1992). Thus, restructuring will continue to impact on local economies. The very 
long run nature of changes to local economies from defence sector restructuring creates a 
demand for additional information to assist policy makers who promote economic 
regeneration strategies. Secondly, the macroeconomic effects of a peace dividend on UK 
GDP growth could be assessed using information from the regional level such as from this 
research. Finally, the restructuring of the defence sector has clear causes and effects. Thus, 
the corporate response of defence companies to the new sector environment provide a 
model for the way in which restructuring may occur in other sectors where cause and effect 
are not as clearly defined. 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
DEFENCE SUPPLIER QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Name of firm: 
2. Location of this establishment: Town; County: 
3. Approximate number of years at cuaenl location 
4. Approximate age of establishment (if different fi-om above) 
5. Nature of business 
6. Was your firm established to supply the defence industry? YES /NO (delete as applicable) 
7. I f "no" please state original nature of business:_ 
8. Appro?dmately what percentage of your current turnover,..{^/ear? estimate percentages) 
i) involves sales to the MoD? u) involves sales to U K defence manufacturers?^ 
iii) constitutes defence exports? iv) is not defence related? 
9. Is this establishment: (please tick) 
i) an independent single plant firm • 
") a headquarters of a multi-plant firm • 
iii) a branch /subsidiary set up directly by parent firm • 
iv) a branch /subsidiary acquired by merger or take-over • 
V ) other (please specify) 
10. Approximately how many people are employed at this site? 
11. How many are: Full time part time male female 
12. Approximately what percentage of your employees at this site are: 
i) "Management, sales, and clerical staff 
ii) Research and development staff 
iii) Skilled employees 
iv) Semi-skilled and unskilled employees 
v) Other (please specify)^ 
t—I 
I — I 
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13. Approximately how many people were employed at this site in the year of: 
1989? 1991? 1993 ? 
14. Approximately what proportion of your expenditure on defence related inputs do you 
consider is sourced from: 
i) within 20 miles ofyour establishment? 
ii) the rest of the UK? 
iii) the rest of the world? 
15. From which 3 UK counties do you source the largest expenditure on defence inputs? 
}fplease place in descending order) 
\^  2. 3 
16. How important are the following attributes of local suppliers in influencing you to 
purchase from them, (please tick one box for each attribute) 
very of little no 
important important importance importance 
cost competitiveness • • • • 
provision of specialist inputs • • • • 
close working relationships • • • • 
reli:4?ility • . - " • • . • • 
convenience • • • • 
skills of workforce • • n • 
17. Are the majority ofyour main defence industrial competitors situated; (please tick) 
i) within 20 niiles of your establishment? • 
iii) in the rest of the country? • 
iv) in the rest of the world? • 
V ) no competitors exist for your principal products • 
vi) don't know • 
18. I f any of the following military factors are present within 20 miles ofyour locality p! 
estimate their effect on your business, (please tick) ease 
major minor no factor not 
advantage advantage advantage present 
RAF bases/airfields • • • • 
RN/Marines bases • • • • 
AjTny bases • • • • 
Government research agencies • • • • 
Major defence contractors • • • • 
229 
19. 
Which of the following are your customers 
or are responsible for getting your defence 
related goods to market: (please tick) 
MoD procurement executive? 
MoD local contact points? 
Defence contractors? 
Defence sub-contractois? 
Overseas governments or firms? 
lEmbassies and Attaches? D 
Defence services and agencies? 
Others? (please spedfy) 
20. 
Please identify the main UK county(ies) 
where the group(s) is / are located. 
21. Below is a list of regional fectors which afifect location. Please consider how your location 
within the UK contributes to the success of your business: please tick one hex for each 
factor) 
oeithcrsD 
major minor advantage nor minor major 
advantage advantage a <1isadvantage disadvantage disadvantage 
accessibility to markets • • • • • 
accessibility to inputs • • - • • 
transport links • • • • • 
labour skills/ costs • • • • • 
labour relations • • • • • 
capital financing • • • • • 
assisted area status • • • • • 
cost of raw materials • • • n • 
22. Does your establishment sell ANY defence related goods in the UK which are: 
(please tick all which apply) 
i) unique products • 
ii) highly customised products • 
iii) general "off the sheir products • 
iv) produced by less than five other UK firms • 
V ) produced by many other UK firms • V-
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23. What sort of effect have the following factors had on your establishment's profits in the 
last 5 years? (please tick) 
very slightly very 
positive positive neutral negative negative 
Reduced national defence expenditure • • • • • 
Competitive contracting procedures • • • • • 
The closure o f local military bases • • • • n 
24.What sort o f effect do you expect the following to have on your establishment's profits in 
the next 2 years? (please tick) 
voy sfiffilly slightly veiy 
positive posilive neutral ncgftlive negative 
Reduced national defence expenditure • • • • • 
Competitive contracting procedures • • • • • 
The closure o f local military bases • • • • • 
25. Please indicate the level of importance of the following factors to your establishment's 
response to changes in the defence market in recent years, (please tick one box for each 
factor) 
cxlrauely wery 
important unportanl 
not 
nnpoftsnl 
Diversification into new civilian markets • • • • 
Diversification into new defence markets • • • • 
Increasing exports of defence products • • • • 
Eliminating some defence product lines • • • • 
Reducing workforce • • • • 
Management re-organisation • • • • 
Merger / Takeover • • • • 
26. Are there any other major local or national factors affecting your defence business whiclj 
have not been mentioned in this questionnaire? 
(please delete as applicable) YES / NO 
I f yes. please state: 
Please return the questionnaire in the envelope provided 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERA TION 
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APPENDIX A2 
QUESTION S C H E M E F O R I N T E R V I E W S 
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date sent summary 
Firm 
Tel 
date 
call back 
1 Do you feel that there are large numbers of defence companies in your local 
area? 
2 Do you feel that there is a community of defence companies in your local 
area? 
managere of defence rums meet 
local authority defence networks 
defence manufacturera or cxpoiteis chib 
3 Do your feel that there are a large number of military bases or MoD agencies 
in your local area? 
4 What advantages do these institutions create? 
Are military bases direct customer? 
Do they provide tmining grounds, pcisonnel, tesling facilities? 
Arc they a magnet for supplicre or customers which you bcncTit from? 
5 Do you have any important local customers? 
How do )-ou transport your goods to markd? 
6 Do you buy much of your supplies locally? 
Arc these high in technical quality? 
Aictbcsehighin\-iiIueoraretb^ofalow ^itde? 
Are these bulky (do you need a kt of themX perishable or delicate; 
thus requiring special trauspwt oonsideraiions? 
Whai sort of goixfa are your local inputs? 
Are there alleniali\*e suf l^iers <^ these goods locally, nationally or intemnlionally? 
How are your iitpms transported to your Crm? 
7 Are your main competitors local (say within 20 miles)? 
If local, do you think that they are there for the same reason as you? 
ITrjot local, does this mean thai you may haw a geographical ad\-anlage over thcm.7 
If yes, vibal is it? 
8 How has employment changed in your company in the last 5-6 years? 
Major cniplo)!!^!! changes in your finn: (1989-95) change was (+X-)" 
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9 What were the principal causes of these changes? 
CONTRACTION main causes 
toss of qiuntity demand 
Loss of product<s) denund 
Closure of cuslomcr she (which) 
Inability lo get inputs 
New contracting regime 
EXPANSION main causes 
Expansion of existing defence markets 
New defence markets (products, customers) 
Elimination of cOTTpetitois 
Cheaper inputs 
New civilian markets 
Strategic maiugement 
10 How long have you been based at your current address? 
11 Why did the firm set up there? 
founder's home 
good access to customers 
good access to suppliers 
communications 
land 
rent 
labour 
joint \-enture 
locaticm un-impoitaiH 
12 Have you always been based at that address? 
13 If you have relocated [the date was (19 )] was it a major relocation? 
>20 nrilcs 
new premises in the onginal area 
14 Why did you decide to move? 
Expansion of demand 
New process 
New products 
New cuslomoB 
Ejqnnsion of your existing market 
Details 
15 If you have not relocated, are you considering moving? 
Yes 
Why? 
No 
Why not? 
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